are only recoverable when circumstances justifying them are averred in the declaration.1 They are not recoverable in an action of contract.2

Vindictive damages, while generally approved by the authorities, have been at times disapproved as contrary to legal principle and public policy. 1. The allowance of such damages confounds two jurisdictions which ought to be distinct, -the civil, which, at the suit of the individual, restores to him his property or rights, or compensates him for their loss where it cannot restore; and the criminal, which, at the instance of society, punishes by fine and imprisonment with a view to deter and reform offenders. 2. It effects a double punishment whenever the act complained of is a criminal offence. 3. It gives to the injured party, who is presumed to have had full satisfaction under the general rule of compensatory damages, a further sum which, if to be exacted at all, should, like fines in criminal prosecutions, be paid into the public treasury. 4. It intrusts to the jury a discretion in fixing the amount of what is allowed as a punishment, a power which is found in criminal causes to be more wisely administered by the court. 5. It tends to disturb the judgments of juries who are unused to the duty of determining what is the measure of a social wrong. It thus encourages extravagant estimates of damages, and creates the necessity of a frequent interference by the court, in the revision of verdicts, with the peculiar functions of the jury.

Damages for wounded feelings are, as already stated, allowed under circumstances of aggravation, and many cases, it may be remarked, which approve the punitive principle, may be sustained as consistent with the rule of compensation, which is the foundation of the law of damages.

- The

Verdicts set aside for Excessive or Inadequate Damages. court will set aside a verdict for excessive damages. It will

Parker, 53 N. H. 342. Contra, Chiles v.
Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Roberts v.
Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277.

Freidenheit v. Edmundson, 36 Mo. 226;
McKeon v. Citizens' R. Co., 42 Mo. 79;
Macon & W. R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250,

1 Johnson v. Chicago, R. I., & P. R. 265; Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 250;

Co., 51 Iowa, 25.

2 Walsh v. Chicago, M., & St. P. R. Co., 42 Wis. 23.

3 Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342; Wardrobe v. California Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118;

Dougherty v. Shown, 1 Heisk. 302; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyoming, 27; 3 Am. Jur. 287, 292, article by T. Metcalf; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 253.

interfere in this way where the damages so far exceed reasonable compensation as to show that the jury acted under the influence of prejudice or passion, or where they appear "at first blush" to be excessive. While such phrases are used in revising verdicts, it will be found that the judicial power intervenes where the damages appear to largely exceed just compensation for the injury.1

Where the damages are excessive, the court, instead of setting the verdict aside, may fix a reasonable sum, allowing it to stand upon the plaintiff's remitting the excess.2

The tendency of juries to give excessive damages against corporations, particularly in actions for personal injuries, and the necessity of controlling their discretion, has been the subject of judicial comment.3

1 Verdicts were set aside as excessive in L. & N. R. Co. v. Fox, 11 Bush, 495; Belknap v. Boston & M. R., 49 N. H. 358; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; Peoria Bridge Assoc. v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 235; Terre Haute, A., & St. L. R. Co. v. Vanatta, 21 Ill. 188; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Hazzard, 26 Ill. 373; Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. McKean, 40 Ill. 218; Pierce v. Millay, 44 Ill. 189; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Peacock, 48 Ill. 253; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 451; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Fillmore, 57 Ill. 265; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wilson, 63 Ill. 167; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ebert, 74 Ill. 399; Penn. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372; New Orleans, J., & G. N. R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607; Pleasants v. North Beach & M. R. Co., 34 Cal. 586; Turner v. North Beach & M. R. Co., 34 Cal. 594; Clapp v. Hudson River R. Co., 19 Barb. 461; Murray v. Hudson River R. Co., 47 Barb. 196. The court refused to set the verdict aside in Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202; Hanson v. European & N. A. R. Co., 62 Me. 84; Shaw v. Boston & W. R. Co., 8 Gray, 45; Collins v. Albany & S. R. Co., 12 Barb. 492; Hegeman v. Western R. Co, 16 Barb. 353; Curtiss v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 20 Barb. 282; Maloy v. New York Cent. R. Co., 58 Barb. 182, Mentz v. Second Av. R. Co., 2 Rob. (N. Y.) 356; Mooney v. Hudson River R. Co., 1 Sweeny, 325; Cox v. New York Cent. & H. R. Co.,

4 Hun, 176; Peck v. New York Cent. & H. R. Co., 4 Hun, 236; O'Donnell v. New York & H. R. Co., 8 Daly, 409; Wheaton v. North Beach & M. R. Co., 36 Cal. 590; Robinson v. Western Pacific R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Schmidt v. Mil. & St. P. R. Co., 23 Wis. 186; Duffy v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 34 Wis. 188; Berg v. Chicago, M., & St. P. R. Co., 7 Northwest. Rep. 347; Kennedy v. North Mo. R. Co., 36 Mo. 351; Whalen v. St. Louis, K. C., & N. R. Co., 60 Mo. 323; Sherley v. Billings, 8 Bush, 147; Maysville & L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 13 Bush, 122; Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Randall, 50 Tex. 254; New Orleans, J., & G. N. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660; Russ v. Steamboat War Eagle, 14 Iowa, 363; Macon & W. R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250 ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Young, 19 Kan. 488; Lambkin v. South Eastern R. Co., L. R. 5 App. Cas. 352; Phillips v London & S. W. R. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. Div. 406, L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 78, L. R. 5 C. P. Div. 280.

2 Belknap v. Boston & M. R., 49 N. H. 358; Ackerson v. Erie R. Co., 3 Vroom, 254; Collins v. Albany & S. R. Co., 72 Barb. 492.

3 Williamson v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 171; Pittsburg, A., & M. Pass. R. Co. v. Donahue, 70 Pa. St. 119, 124; Penn. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372; Penn. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318, Penn. R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa St. 60; Penn. R. Co. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298; State v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 107; Bannon v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 24 Md.

The court will grant a new trial in an action for personal injuries on the ground of inadequacy of damages, where it appears upon the facts proved that the jury must have omitted to take into consideration some of the elements of damage which ought to have been taken into account.1

The damages for permarket value at the

Damages for Torts to Personal Property. sonal property taken or destroyed is its time, with interest.2 If only injured, the damages will be the diminution in market value, with reasonable expenses, the whole not to exceed the market value.3

108, 123; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 451; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 56 Ill. 344.

1 Phillips v. South Western R. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. Div. 406, L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 78, L R. 5 C. P. D. 280.

2 Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Smith, 25 Ind. 288; Jamison v. Moon, 43 Miss. 598.

3 Gillett v. Western R. Co., 8 Allen, 560; Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. Hudson, 62 Ga. 679.

CHAPTER XI.

NEGLIGENCE.

A CRITICAL treatment of the various formulas concerning negligence will not be attempted in this chapter, and treatises upon the special topic are referred to for a discussion of the subtleties with which it abounds. It will be sufficient in this connection to state the rules which have the support of the authorities, without attempting what is as yet impossible to reduce them to a consistent body of doctrine.

Negligence defined. -Actionable negligence involves the breach of a legal duty. It consists, in the case of persons who are not in a relation of privity, in the exercise of rights in a manner which is not according to the conduct of reasonable and prudent men in a like situation, and which results in injury to others.1 Negligence is actionable only when it causes injury.2

Liability for Negligence limited to the Natural and Probable Consequences of the Wrongful Act. Liability for negligence includes injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act or omission.3 It does not extend to consequences which no reasonable man would expect to occur. The act or omission, in order to be actionable, must be the efficient cause of the injury.5 The law, according to the familiar maxim,

1 Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439, 441. Swayne, J.: "Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done. The essence of the fault may lie in omission or commission. The duty is dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion."

2 Chicago W. D. R. Co. v. Rend, 6 Brad. (Ill.) 243; Cosgrove v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 13 Hun, 329; Barringer v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 18 Hun, 398.

3 Lane". Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, 107 Mass. 104; Ryan v. New York Cent. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210; Bellefontaine & I. R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399, 410; Penn. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; Oil Creek & A. R. R. Co. v. Keighron, 74 Pa. St. 316; Cuff v. Newark & N. Y. R. Co., 6 Vroom, 17, 30; Milwaukie & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 344.

248.

4 Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 243,

5 Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray, 395; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Becker, 76 Ill. 25, 30.

-in jure causa proxima, non remota, spectatur, - regards the proximate and not the remote cause; and the proximate cause has been defined to be "the cause which naturally led to, and which might have been expected to be directly instrumental in producing, the result." The injury will not be deemed too remote if, according to the common experience of mankind, it ought to have been apprehended as a consequence of the act.2

The wrongful act may be the cause of an injury, although many circumstances intervene between the act and the injury.3 It may be the efficient and responsible cause, notwithstanding the intervention of the negligence or act of a third person; or of the viciousness of an animal which was unknown to the person driving it; 5 or of natural causes. The question, what was the proximate cause of an injury, is ordinarily one for the jury.7

Relation of the Court and Jury to the Question of Negligence. The respective functions of the court and of the jury in determining questions of negligence cannot be defined by any one formula. The court declares the legal duty, and the jury finds the facts, both those out of which the duty arises and those which involve a breach or performance. The jury applies the law as declared by the court to the facts, and determines by its verdict, as a final conclusion, what the duty in question was, and whether or not it was performed. Its control over issues of fact and its application of the law to the facts are by no means final. The court, however, while not interfering with the right of the jury to pass on all questions of fact where the common judgments of men may reasonably differ as to the conclusion, will interfere by

1 State v. Manchester & L. R. Co., 52 N.. H. 528, 552. See criticisms of the maxim, as applied to this class of cases, in Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. St. 358, 366; Penn. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372, 377; Lewis v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 38 Md. 588, 599. See post, Chap. XVI. p. 441, for a further treatment of the question of the proximate and remote cause.

2 Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; Derry ». Flitner, 118 Mass. 131.

8 Norton v. Eastern R Co., 113 Mass. 366; Lee v. Union R. Co, 12 R I. 383; Milwaukie & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469.

136, 107 Mass. 104; Eaton v. Boston & L. R. Co., 11 Allen, 500; Simmons v. New Bedford, V., & N. S. Co., 97 Mass. 361, 368, 100 Mass. 34; Harvey v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 19 Hun, 556; Clark v. Chambers, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 327. See Brandon v. Gulf City Cotton Press & M. Co., 51 Tex. 121, 128.

5 Harris v. Mobbs, L. R. 3 Exch. Div. 268.

6 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339; Brehm v. Great Western R. Co., 34 Barb. 256.

7 Milwaukie & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg,

4 Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 94 U. S. 469.