siderations in favor of human life which apply where persons are unlawfully on the track do not apply in favor of property.1 Other authorities, however, hold the company liable where its servants, with proper vigilance, might have seen at a sufficient distance the trespassing cattle, and with due regard to the safety of passengers have stopped the train before it struck them, but failed to do so. This rule is adopted by the authorities which impose the duty of ordinary care, even in favor of wrongdoers.2

The company is under a superior obligation for the safety of persons and property on its trains, and is not bound to imperil their safety by an effort to stop the train in order to avoid injury to cattle which, without its fault, have come upon the track.3

The company is not required to stop its train where an animal is only near the track, and apparently not likely to come upon it. It is not liable for an injury to them where they come suddenly upon the track, and there is not time to stop the train before it strikes them.5

The company has been held not liable, even when it has failed to fence, for injuries to cattle which come upon its location, and fall into an unenclosed well within it. It is not bound, in order

negligence. Edson v. Central R. Co., 40
Iowa, 47; McPheeters v. Hannibal & St.
J. R. Co., 45 Mo. 22; Pryor v. St. Louis,
K. C., & N. R. Co., 69 Mo. 215. See
Morse v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 49.

1 Bemis v. Conn. & P. R. R. Co., 42 Vt. 375, 382; ante, Chap. X. pp. 354, 355.

2 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wainscott, 3 Bush, 149; Cincinnati & Z. R. Co. v. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Chicago & N. W. R Co. v. Barrie, 55 Ill. 226; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Bray, 57 Ill. 514; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Ingraham, 58 Ill. 120; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kellam, 92 Ill. 245; Pryor v. St. Louis, K. C., & N. R. Co, 69 Mo. 215; Card r. New York & H. R. Co., 50 Barb. 39; ante, p. 403.

8 Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, C., & C. R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172, 199; Cleveland, C., & C. R. Co. v. Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474; Cranston v. Cincinnati, H., & D. R. Co., 1 Handy (Cincinnati), 193; Chicago & M. R. Co. v. Patchin, 16 Ill. 198; Louisville & F. R. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 177,

180, 181; Price v. New Jersey, R., & T. Co., 3 Vroom, 19; Witherell v. Mil. & St. P. R. Co., 21 Minn. 410 Parker v. Dubuque S. W. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 399; Sandham v. Chicago, R. I., & P. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 88; Bemis v. Conn. & P. R. R. Co., 42 Vt. 375, 380, 385; Parker v. Dubuque S. W. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 399; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Mulligan, 45 Md. 4×6, 493; Pryor v. St. Louis, K. C., & N. R. Co., 69 Mo. 215.

4 Peoria, P., & J. R. Co. v. Champ, 75 Ill. 577; Edson v. Central R. Co., 40 Iowa, 47. But see Aycock v. Wil. & W. R. Co., 6 Jones (N. C.), 231. Compare Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kellam, 92 Ill.

245.

5 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Bradfield, 63 Ill. 220; Louisville & N. R Co. v. Wainscott, 3 Bush, 149. But see South & N. A. R. Co. v. Jones, 50 Ala. 507.

Hughes v. Han. & St. J. R. Co., 66 Mo. 325; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Carraher, 47 Ill. 333; Aurora Branch R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585.

to prevent injuries to cattle straying upon the track, to keep the excavations along its sides free from water and ice, or to cover with plank or other material a culvert or drain crossed by the track.2

Signals. The omission to give signals of warning which will alarm cattle is not in itself negligence, when they are not required by statute. But when they are so required the company is liable for injuries to cattle resulting from the omission. The omission, however, even when the signals are required, is not material, if it did not contribute to the injury; and evidence is required to connect the injury with the omission.5 The plaintiff whose negligence has contributed to the injury, cannot recover, although the required signals were not given."

Duty to maintain Fences imposed by Statute. -The duty to maintain a fence on each side of the track, except at places where the fence would result in public convenience, is now quite generally imposed on railroad companies; but, as already stated, it is a duty created only by statute. The power of the legislature to

1 Peoria & R. I. R. Co. v. McClenahan, Mo. 33; Owens v. Han. & St. J. R. Co., 58 74 Ill. 435. Mo. 386.

2 Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Lyon, 62 Ala. 71.

3 Flattes v. Chicago, R. I., & P. R. Co., 35 Iowa, 191; Plaster v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 35 Iowa, 449; Jackson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 451; Michigan S. & N. I. R. Co. v. Fisher, 27 Ind. 96.

4 Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Reid, 24 Ill. 144; Great Western R. Co. ". Geddis, 33 Ill. 304; Toledo, W., & W. R. Co. v. Furgusson, 42 Ill. 449; Springfield & I. S. R. Co. v. Andrews, 68 Ill. 56; Howenstein v. Pacific R. Co., 55 Mo. 33; Owens ». Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 58 Mo. 386; E. T. Va. & Ga. R. Co. v. Scales, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 688.

5 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Phelps, 29 Ill. 447; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Goodwin, 30 Ill. 117; Quincy, A., & St. L. R. Co. v. Wellhoener, 72 Ill. 60; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Bibb, 37 Ala. 699; Stoneman v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 58 Mo. 503; Holman r. Chicago, R. I., & P. R. Co., 62 Mo. 562; Hawker v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 628; ante, Chap. XII. p. 351.

6 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Eaves, 42 Ill. 288; Howenstein v. Pacific R. Co., 55

7 Some cases of an exceptional character have seemed to regard the duty as existing in the absence of a statute provision. It was held in Vermont to be implied from reason and justice. Quimby v. Vt. Cent. R. Co., 23 Vt. 387; Trow v. Vt. Cent. R. Co., 24 Vt. 487, 492. But see Hurd v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 25 Vt. 116, 123. In New York, the law in relation to partition fences was at one time applied to railroad companies. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., In re, 4 Paige, 553. But see Long Island R. Co., In re, 3 Edw. Ch. 487. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 2 Iowa, 288, 305. Under a statute, the company and the land-owner has each been required to maintain one-half of the fence. Sandusky & C. R. Co. v. Sloan, 27 Ohio St. 341; Dayton & M. R. Co. v. Miami County Infirmary, 32 Ohio St. 566. Some cases have treated the company as chargeable with remote negli gence in not fencing. Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, C., & C. R. Co, 3 Ohio St. 172; Cleveland, C., & C. R. Co. v. Elliott, 4 Ohio St. 474; Cincinnati, H., & D. R. Co. v. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 424; Gor

require existing corporations to maintain fences along its track, and the power to impose a liability for double damages in case of injuries to cattle resulting from its neglect of the duty, will be considered in a later chapter.1

A statute imposing the duty to fence is not presumed to be retrospective. It is sometimes by express terms applied only to roads thereafter to be constructed.3 The statute requiring a company to fence the track has been construed according to its terms to apply as soon as the company commences running its road,+ or as soon as it begins the construction.5

The primary purpose of the statutes requiring the company to maintain fences is for the exclusion of cattle. They have been held not to be for the protection of employees, or persons travelling on the highway; but they have been held to be for the protection of children.9

The duty to maintain fences when imposed by statute may be enforced by mandamus.10 The land-owner may maintain an action to compel the company to build them.11

Liability for Breach of the Statute Duty. The company, when required by statute to maintain fences along its track, is liable for injuries to cattle which, being lawfully on the adjoining land,

man v. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441. In New Hampshire the duty of the company to fence, although not imposed in direct terms, has been implied from a statute which imposed a penalty after notice for its neglect to fence. The injured owner was not, however, confined to the statute remedy. Dean v. Sullivan R. Co., 22 N. H. 316; Cornwall v. Sullivan R. Co., 28 N. H. 161; Horn v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 35 N. H. 169; Horne v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 36 N. H. 440; Chapin v. Sullivan R. Co., 39 N. H. 564. See as to right of action at common law, where a penalty is provided, Norris v. Androscoggin R. Co., 39 Me. 273; Iba v. Han. & St. J. R. Co., 45 Mo. 469.

1 Chap. XVII. p. 463.

4 Clark v. Vt. & C. R. Co., 28 Vt. 103; Holden v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 30 Vt. 297; Comings v. Han. & C. M. R. Co., 48 Mo. 512; Baltimore, P., & C. R. Co. v. McClellan, 59 Ind. 440. See Cincinnati, W., & M. R. Co. v. Harris, 61 Ind. 290.

5 Gardner v. Smith, 7 Mich. 410. 6 Buxton v. North Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 549.

7 Langlois v. Buffalo & R. R. Co., 19 Barb. 364; Wabash R. Co. v. Brown, 5 Brad. (Ill.) 590, 2 Brad. (Ill.) 516.

8 Ditchett v. Spuyten Duyvil & P. M. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 425, 5 Hun, 165.

9 Schmidt v. Mil. & St. P. R. Co., 23 Wis. 186.

10 People v. Rochester & S. L. R. Co.,

2 Stearns v. Old Colony & F. R. R. Co., 14 Hun, 371. 1 Allen, 493.

3 Stearns v. Old Colony & F. R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 493; Baxter v. Boston & W. R. R. Co., 102 Mass. 383; Sawyer v. Vt. & M. R. Co., 105 Mass. 196; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175.

11 Wademan v. Albany & S. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 568; People v. Rochester & S. L. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 294, 14 Hun, 371; Jones v. Selignam, 16 Hun, 230, 10 N. Y. Week. Dig. 226.

pass thence on to the track through its failure to perform the duty so imposed, although it is not chargeable with any negligence in the management of its trains at the time of the injury.1 The failure to fence, as required by statute, does not, however, make the company liable where the failure did not contribute to the injury. But where the company, having performed its duty to maintain fences, or not being required to maintain them at certain places, has complied with the statute, it is not liable for injuries to cattle coming upon the track at places where it is not in default under the statute, unless it inflicts wilful injury upon them, or, according to some authorities, unless it might have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care in the management of its engines at the time.3

If the original escape of the cattle was due to the company's failure to maintain a fence as required by law, it is liable, although they passed afterwards on to the land of others, and thence on to the track at a place where the company was also bound to fence.*

1 Norris v. Androscoggin R. Co., 39 Me. 273; Rogers v. Newburyport R. Co., 1 Allen, 16; Smith v. Eastern R. Co., 35 N. H. 356, 362; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Fanning v. Long Island R. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. 585; Williams v. New Albany & S. R. Co., 5 Ind. 111; Thayer v. St. Louis, A., & T. H. R. Co., 22 Ind. 26; Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co. v. Ross, 37 Ind. 545; St. Louis, A., & T. H. R. Co. v. Linder, 39 Ill. 433; Rockford, R. I., & St. L. R. Co. v. Lynch, 67 Ill. 149; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Pence, 68 Ill. 524; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Logan, 71 Ill. 191; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Lavery, 71 Ill. 522; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Delehanty, 71 Ill. 615; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Clutter, 82 Ill. 123; Burton v. North Mo. R. Co., 30 Mo. 372; Miles v. Han. & St. J. R. Co., 31 Mo. 407; Powell v. St. Joseph, 31 Mo. 347; Clark r. Han. & St. J. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Nall v. St. Louis, K. C., & N. R. Co., 59 Mo. 112; Cary v. St. Louis, K. C., & N. R. Co, 60 Mo. 209; Small v. Chicago, R. I., & P. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 338, 341; McCall v. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637; Bennett v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 19 Wis. 145, 149; Blair v. Mil. & P. R. Co., 20 Wis. 254; Brown v. Mil. & P. R. Co., 21 Wis. 39; Sika v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 370; aliter, if the company is by agreement

only, and not by statute, bound to fence,
Drake v. Phil. & E. R. Co., 51 Pa. St.
240.

son,

2 Waldron v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., 8 Barb. 390, 394; Talmadge v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., 13 Barb. 493, 496; Joliet & N. I. R. Co. v. Jones, 20 Ill. 221; AtchiT., & S. F. R. Co. v. Yates, 21 Kan. 613. Where the company fails to fence, as required by statute, neither the company nor its tenant has a right of action against the adjoining owner whose cattle enter on its land through the defective fence. Wiseman v. Booker, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 184.

3 St. Louis, A., & T. H. R. Co. v. Linder, 39 Ill. 433; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Barrie, 55 Ill. 226; Toledo, W., & W. R. Co. v. Barlow, 71 Ill. 640; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bull, 72 Ill. 537; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Farrelly, 3 Brad. (Ill.) 60; Indianapolis & C. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 9 Ind. 397; Indiana Cent. R. Co. v. Gapen, 10 Ind. 292; Indianapolis & C. R. Co. v. McClure, 26 Ind. 370; Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co. v. Huber, 42 Ind. 173; Gill v. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co., 27 Ohio St. 240; Nashville & D. R. Co. v. Comans, 45 Ala. 437; Swearingen v. M. K. & T. R. Co., 64 Mo. 73.

4 Keliher v. Conn. River R. Co., 107

If the original escape is attributable to the company's fault, it is not relieved of liability by the subsequent wanderings of the animal, the maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur, not applying.1

The company is liable for damages to crops caused by cattle coming upon land through the want of proper fences, which it is bound to maintain.2

- The company

The Statute Duty to fence not to be transferred. does not discharge its duty to erect a proper fence by employing another, even the land-owner, to build one; and if the person so employed erects an insufficient one, it is liable for the injuries resulting from the insufficiency.3

4

The duty of the company owning the road to fence, as required by statute, and its liability for injuries caused by the want of fences, continues, although the trains are run by contractors engaged in its construction; or the road is worked by other companies or persons under an agreement with or license from the company owning the road; 5 or by lessees; but if the lease is authorized by law, and the lessor company does not retain any possession or control, its liability for the lessee's torts may well be doubted.' Some authorities make the lessor and lessee, where both are using the track, each liable only for its own injuries to cattle.8

6

Liability of Parties operating the Road, though not owning it, as Lessees and Mortgagees. The statutes are held generally to im

Mass. 411; McDonnell v. Pittsfield & N.
A. R. Co., 115 Mass. 564, 566.

lis & M. R. Co. v. Soloman, 23 Ind. 534; Fort Wayne, M., & C. R. Co. v. Hine

1 Gilman v. European & N. A. R. Co., baugh, 43 Ind. 354; Huey ». Indianapolis 60 Me. 235.

2 Donald v. St. Louis, K. C., & N. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 157.

3 Norris v. Androscoggin R. Co., 39 Me. 273; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Swearingen, 33 Ill. 289, 47 Ill. 206; Gill v. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co., 27 Ohio St. 240.

4 Chicago & St. P. & F. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 20 Ill. 385; Gardner v. Smith, 7 Mich. 410; Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Meador, 50 Tex. 77.

5 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Finnigan, 21 Ill. 646; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Kanouse, 39 Ill 272; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Rumbold, 40 Ill. 143; East St. Louis & C. R. Co. v. Gerber, 82 Ill. 632; Indianapo

& V. R. Co., 45 Ind. 320; Bay City & E. S. R. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich. 390; Wyman v. Penobscot & K. R. Co., 46 Me. 162.

6 Nelson v. Vt. & C. R. Co., 26 Vt. 717; Clement v. Canfield, 28 Vt. 302; Whitney v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 44 Me. 362; Toledo, P., & W. R. Co. v. Rumbold, 40 Ill. 143; Clary v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 37 Iowa, 344; Kansas City, Ft. S., & G. R. Co. v. Ewing, 23 Kan. 273. See ante, Chap. X. pp. 283-285.

Ditchett v. Spuyten Duyvil & P. M. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 425, 5 Hun, 165.

8 Stephens v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 327; Clary v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 37 Iowa, 344.