of the fee.1 Foundations for piers on a public street for an elevated railroad are taxable as real estate.2

In New Jersey, by the act of 1873, a State tax of one half of one per centum is laid upon "the cost, equipment, and appendages" of the railroad, and a county and municipal tax of one per centum upon real property occupied, used, or owned for the purposes of the road, excepting the main stem or road-bed and track not exceeding one hundred feet in width, exempting, however, from such municipal taxation ten acres in one parcel with improvements at the termini.3

In Massachusetts, by the act of 1865, railroad and other corporations are taxed, at the average rate of municipal taxation in the State, on the franchise valued by a State tax commissioner, who is required to take the sum total of all the shares at the market rate, and to deduct therefrom the value of real estate and machinery subject to local taxation, and, where the road extends into other States, such portion of the whole valuation as is proportional to the length of the part of the road outside of the State. The track of five rods in width is, as will be seen elsewhere, constructively exempt from municipal taxation, but it is taxed in effect by the taxation of the franchise. The entire tax, when collected by the State, is distributed among or credited to the towns and cities of the State in the proportion of the tax represented by stockholders resident therein; and the State retains the balance, being the proportion represented by shares owned by non-residents. It will be seen that the municipalities in which the stockholders live, and not those in which the road lies, derive a revenue from the tax. This system of taxing the franchise has been sustained by the State and national tribunals.4 In Illinois, by the act of 1872, there are, as to railroads, three separate valuations, which in general are as follows: 1. The real estate, which is not a part of the right of way; and the personal property, which remains permanently at a place. 2. The right of way with superstructure and buildings upon it, and rolling-stock

1 People v. Beardsley, 52 Barb. 105; erill, 12 Vroom, 147. See later act of People v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 46. 1876, State v. Railroad Com'rs, 12 Vroom,

2 People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 80 N. Y. 235. 573, 19 Hun, 460.

3 State v. Com'r of Railroad Taxation, 8 Vroom, 228, 9 Vroom, 472; State v. Mutchler, 12 Vroom, 96; State v. Weth

4 Hamilton Man. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 12 Allen, 298; Dwight v. Boston, 12 Allen, 316; Attorney-General v. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148.

and personal property which is not local. 3. The excess of the capital stock, including the franchise, over the first two classes which are designated as tangible property. The first class is taxable locally like other property, while the other two are each valued by a State board as a whole, and each county, city, and town taxes the corporation on this valuation in proportion to the length of the road within its own limits. The State board, under its power to adopt rules and principles of valuation, determined the cash value of the capital stock, including franchise, by adding together the market value of all the shares and of the funded debt, and deducting from the aggregate result the market or cash value of the tangible property as required. The statute and the method pursued under it have been approved as just and conforming to the Constitution of the State as well as not in conflict with that of the United States.1

Exemptions from Taxation. The property of corporations, like that of persons, is subject to taxation, and exemptions cannot be established by doubtful implications.2

Construction of Statutes exempting from Taxation. Statutes, which for the time being exempt railroad corporations from taxation, or apply to them special rates to the exclusion of ordinary municipal taxation, are, when subject to repeal, to be construed according to the rules stated in a later connection, where the construction of grants or contracts of exemption, which, under the National Constitution, are irrevocable, are considered.3

Where the charter exempts the company's lands from taxation until sold and conveyed, a contract of sale without a conveyance,

1 Porter v. Rockford, R. I., & St. L. R. Co., 76 Ill. 561; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Paddock, 75 Ill. 616; Huck v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 86 Ill. 352; Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Siders, 88 Ill. 320; Danville L. & M. Co. v. Parks, 88 Ill. 463; Chicago, R. I., & P. R. Co. v. People, 4 Brad. (Ill.) 468; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450. For decisions in Georgia as to the taxation of railroad companies, see Macon & A. R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 62 Ga. 463; Goldsmith v. Augusta & S. R. Co., 62 Ga. 468; Gold

smith v. Rome R. Co., 62 Ga. 473; Goldsmith v. Georgia R. Co, 62 Ga. 485; Goldsmith v. Southwestern R. Co., 62 Ga. 495; Goldsmith v. Central R. Co., 62 Ga. 509. For decisions in Nebraska, see Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 7 Neb. 33; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. York County, 7 Neb. 487; and in Iowa, see Dubuque v. Chicago, D., & M. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 196.

2 People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 76 N. Y. 64; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 11 N. Y. W. D. 110, 19 Hun, 460. 8 Post, pp. 483-485.

which is forfeited according to its terms for non-payment of the purchase-money, does not subject them to taxation.1

An exemption from local

Exemptions implied or constructive. taxation may be implied where the company would otherwise be subject to double taxation, and such taxation appears to be contrary to the legislative intent. Thus, the imposition, by a special act, of a State tax on all the property of the company has been construed to exempt machine-shops, foundries, and station-houses from local taxation under general laws.2 The taxation of individual shareholders for their shares creates no presumption against the right of municipalities to tax real property, including the track, which is within their respective limits.3

The character of railroad companies as public works similar to public buildings, highways, and aqueducts has been held in some States to effect a constructive exemption of their property which is within the location and necessary for their purposes. Thus, in Massachusetts, where the corporation may lay out its road not exceeding five rods in width, and for certain purposes acquire land outside of such location, the company is not liable to be taxed for land within the five rods, or for buildings and structures thereon which are necessarily incident to its business; but if any part of the land within such limits is used for and appropriated to purposes not incident to the proper construction, maintenance, and management of the railroad, or if the company acquires by purchase or even grant from the State other land outside of those limits, such real estate, in either case, with the erections thereon, will be subject to taxation. A similar rule of constructive exemption with a like limitation is adopted in Pennsylvania, where the property of the corporation which is necessary for its purposes is exempt, while property which is merely convenient and useful for the increase of business and for making profits is taxable. In other jurisdictions the doctrine of a constructive ex

1 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Goodwin, 94 Ill. 262.

2 New York & E. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 Pa. St. 242; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo. 550; State v. Han. & St. J. R. Co., 37 Mo. 265. But contra, Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176; Dunlieth & D. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque, 82 Iowa, 427.

8 Providence & W. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I. 459.

4 Worcester v. Western R. Co., 4 Met. 564; Boston & M. R. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. 237; Wayland v. County Com'rs, 4 Gray, 500; Charlestown v. County Com'rs, 1 Allen, 199; Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen, 75.

5 Railroad Co. v. Berks County, 6 Pa.

emption is rejected, and property, including the track, has been held liable to municipal taxation, unless specially exempted.1

Local Assessments. The authorities are in conflict on the question whether a railroad company is liable to special assessments, on the ground of a supposed benefit to it, for local improvements, as the widening, paving, or laying out of streets.2 They have been held not to be within the prohibition of statutes which exempt the company from taxes.3

A street-railroad company has been held liable for such local assessments, unless excepted. It may be required to contribute to the expense of paving and widening the street. It has been held, where the stockholders are taxed, to be exempt from taxation on its personal property, the value of such property being held to be included in the valuation of the shares."

Grant or Contract of Exemption from Taxation. The power of the legislature of a State, when not prohibited by the Constitution, to bind the State by a grant of exemption from taxation has been at times contested or questioned as an unauthorized surren

St. 70; Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Berks County, 11 Pa. St. 202; Wayne County v. Del. & H. Canal Co., 15 Pa. St. 351; Shamokin Valley R. Co. v. Livermore, 47 Pa. St. 465, 469; Erie County v. Erie & W. Trans. Co., 87 Pa. St. 434.

1 Providence & W. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I. 459; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mc. Lean County, 17 Ill. 291, 296; Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Phil., W., & B. R. Co. v. Bayless, 2 Gill, 355; Louisville & P. C. Co. v. Commonwealth, 7 B. Monr. 160; Cumberland Marine R. Co. v. Portland, 37 Me. 444 (overruling Bangor & P. R. Co. v. Harris, 21 Me. 533).

2 They were held legal in Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Davenport v. Miss. & M. R. Co., 16 Iowa, 348; Peru & I. R. Co. v. Hanna, 68 Ind. 562; Troy & L. R. Co. v. Kane, 9 Hun, 506. They have been held illegal in Philadelphia v. Phil., W., & B. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 41; Junction R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 424; New York

& H. R. Co. v. Morrisania, 7 Hun, 652; Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255; New York & N. H. R. Co. v. New Haven, 42 Conn. 279. See London, B., & S. C. R. Co. v. St. Giles, Camberwell, L. R. 4 Exch. Div. 239.

3 Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 155; State v. Newark, 6 Vroom, 157; State v. Jersey City, 7 Vroom, 56; State v. Elizabeth, 8 Vroom, 330; State v. Newark, 3 Dutcher, 185. They have been held to be included in the term "assessments." St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. St. Paul, 21 Minn. 526; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54; Ohio Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia, 10 Rep. 183. Contra, State v. Newark, 6 Vroom, 157.

4 New Haven v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 38 Conn. 422. In Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50, it was held that the city had made a contract with the company not to make such assessments.

5 Chicago v. Baer, 41 Ill. 306; Parmelee v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 267; North Beach & M. R. Co.'s Appeal, 32 Cal. 499. 6 Middlesex R. Co. v. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 330.

der of an essential attribute of sovereignty. It has, however, been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a grant of exemption from taxation, or an agreement in the charter that no other than a certain tax shall be imposed, is within the provision of the National Constitution which forbids State laws impairing the obligation of a contract.2

Surrender of Taxing Power not presumed. Temporary Exemptions. -The surrender of the taxing power is not to be presumed, unless the purpose of the State to part with it clearly appears. The power is essential to the existence of government, and it is of vital