most brilliant chapters in the history of our country's part in the great war.

"So well recognized had the value of the Liberty engine become that the Allies had an order, at the time of signing the armistice, for 16,741 airplane engines, and were constantly endeavoring to increase their rate of monthly delivery. Airplanes were being designed around this engine in all allied countries, and it was fast becoming the predominating aeronautical engine of the allied cause. It is of interest in this connection to note that this standardized engine already has been tested in the twenty-four-cylinder model, and showed results which will prove that the original basic idea will provide for engines of size which would have been required for any probable increase in airplane size during years of continuation of the war. The sixteen-cylinder was also proved by the success of the larger engine."

any

In May, 1917, the equipment division of the Signal Corps, after a careful study of allied engines, found it highly advisable for the American Army to design and produce a standard engine of its own. The Allies in Europe were using so many different makes of engines, the French having developed forty-six, and the British using thirty-seven, that if the United States should have to study all these engines and decide which was best, procure suitable drawings and specifications and negotiate with foreign owners for rights to manufacture, the delay that would be necessary might have disastrous results.

Two expert engineers, Mr. J. G. Vincent, of the engineering staff of the Packard Motor Company, and Mr. E. J. Hall, of the Hall-Scott Motor Car Company, men qualified in talent and in experience for the work, were selected to design a new engine. Arrangements were made by which these men could draw freely upon the experience and achievement of all American inventors regardless of patent rights.

In association with Colonel E. A. Deeds, and Colonel S. D. Waldon, of the Signal Department, the Liberty engine was designed, and in spite of the enormous difficulties was soon being produced at extraordinary speed. Meanwhile, many other engines were also produced, chiefly for use in the

training service.

In the nineteen months of the war the United States turned out complete and ready for service 32,420 aeronautic engines. Of these 15,572 were Liberty engines. Meanwhile, a commission sent abroad for the purpose had selected types of foreign service planes suitable for this country. These models had to be redesigned for the Liberty motor. The first successful type of plane to come into quantity production was the British DeHaviland 4. Operations began February, 1918, and by October a monthly output of 1,200 had been reached. By the time of the armistice four other airplanes had been tested and adopted by the United States Government. They were the Lepere, the United States De Haviland 9A, the Martin Bomber, and the Loening two-seater fighter.

Many difficulties were encountered in obtaining the spruce and other lumber used in the manufacture of the airplanes. Labor difficulties arose in the northwest brought about by I. W. W. The Chief-of-Staff of the army formed a military organization to take care of the situation, known as the Spruce Production Division of the Signal Corps, under the command of Colonel Brice P. Disque, and a Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen was organized to offset the I. W. W. propaganda. Specifications for logs were standardized, financial assistance given, and a system of instruction instituted for the personnel.

Many striking inventions were developed by the Science and Research Division of the Signal Corps. Of these, a telescopic signaling device, which made possible signaling in daylight over a distance of eighteen miles, and with the aid of an ultra-violet light signaling by night for six miles was of great use. Other inventions were propaganda balloons with a range of more than one thousand miles, improvements in the means of navigating airplanes with the aid of a sextant and artificial horizon, bomb sight stabilizers, and most remarkable of all airplane telephone apparatus by which the voice can be used to communicate between airplanes in fight and from airplanes to the ground.

Brigadier-General Mitchell in referring to these inventions said: "America is a nation of initiative—it had many men

with inventive minds. This much is established from either an economic or military standpoint, that henceforth whoever holds the mastery and supremacy of the air will hold the supremacy and mastery of all the elements, the air, the land and the water. If we are to hold the mastery of land and sea, we must master the air as well. The United States must organize to lead in aerial development, so that the country that invented the airplane may also be a leader in its expansion and use."

The war built up in the United States a new industry in the manufacture of airplanes. It developed new inventions. The future will decide the result.

AIRPLANE ARMAMENT

The development of armament for the fighting in the air began with the use of Lewis machine guns, made for use in the trenches. These ground guns were taken into the planes and fired from observer's shoulders. On account of the great speed of the airplane it was only with rapid fire that one could hope to bring down a hostile plane. The ordinary machine gun, however, soon began to be adapted to airplane use. The pursuit airplanes which engaged in the spectacular air combats were single seaters, the pilot of such a machine could not drop his controls and fire a machine gun from his shoulder. This necessitated a fixed gun that could be operated while the pilot maintained complete control of the machine, and led to the invention of the synchronizing gear, where a fixed gun fires through the whirling propellor without hitting the propellor blades. This method of using the machine gun was a development after various other methods had been tried.

In three years of warfare the Allies developed only a single machine which could be synchronized to fire through a revolving airplane propeller. In twelve months of actual effort America produced two others as good, both susceptible of factory quantity production. The United States also built balloons at a rate sufficient to supply more than its own needs, and devised a commercial practical method of obtaining non-inflammable helium gas for balloons and air

ships, which because of its safety from fire opened up a new era for the dirigible balloon.

The war ended too soon for the full force of the American effort in the production of machines and in the training of aviators to be felt. But the moral effect was, no doubt, great. The Germans knew well what was going on. They had lost their early supremacy in the air, and they knew that in a short time they would be overwhelmed by the tremendous airplane fleets that were coming from the west. Indeed, already hundreds of raids were working havoc in the great industrial centers of the Rhine. Cologne, Stuttgart, Mannheim, Mainz and Coblenz had been bombarded. Between

June 6th and November 10th 550 tons of bombs had been dropped on enemy territory by the British squadrons alone. Plans had been made for bombing Berlin and other centers. In one more year the war might have been won in the air.

CHAPTER XXIX

AMERICAN BUSINESS MEN IN THE WAR

EFORE America entered into the war, it had been made

B plain by the course of events in Europe that if America

should be compelled to fight it would be just as necessary to organize our civilian and economic forces for victory as it would be to mobilize a great army. Agitation in favor of preparation had been going on from the beginning. Theodore Roosevelt and General Wood had been especially insistent, and the President of the United States had headed a preparedness parade on the streets of Washington. On August 29, 1916, a law creating a Council of National Defense was approved by the President.

According to the terms of this law the members of this council were the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor. It was provided by the terms of the law creating the Council of National Defense that it should nominate to the President, and the President should appoint an Advisory Commission, consisting of not more than seven persons "each of whom shall have special knowledge of some industry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource or be otherwise specially qualified in the opinion of the council for the performance of the duties hereinafter provided."

In accordance with this provision, the following men were appointed upon the Advisory Commission: Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, chairman; Howard E. Coffin, Vice-President, Hudson Motor Company; Julius Rosenwald, President, Sears, Roebuck & Company; Bernard M. Baruch, Banker; Dr. Hollis Godfrey, President, Drexel Institute; Samuel Gompers, President, American Federation of Labor; and Dr. Franklin Martin, Secretary, General American College of Surgeons, Chicago.