to abrogate the general rule with regard to the short-haul, the statute says it must have regard to several matters. The first of these is adequacy of transportation. The expression would seem to apply only to the interest of the shipping public. The second and third matters to be considered are efficient and economic transportation. These expressions may well embrace both shippers' and carriers' interests. What the Public Desires? Clearly the public does have a stake in transportation and is interested in receiving its due. Time does not permit me to do more than mention one or two areas where beneficial changes could improve the transportation future of the country and promote the public interest. Assuredly the public should be interested in continuing private ownership of the carriers subject to regulation in the public interest. Also in an era of intense competition, the public requires a better integrated transportation system, one which more completely coordinates the service. of the different modes of carriage. Of course, there are many topics of this sort which could be pursued, but I know of your surpassing interest in ethics, and in concluding, I would like to comment briefly on this aspect of the public interest. Ethics and Public Service Woodrow Wilson in commenting on public service said: "There is something better, if possible, that a man can give than his life. That is his living spirit to a service that is not easy, to resist counsels that are hard to resist, to stand against purposes that are hard to stand against. The public administrator of course has the duty of ascertaining to the best of his ability how the good of the country will best be served. There is in the regulatory scheme of things, however, certain contradictory forces at work seeking to foster the welfare of special interests in derogation of the public interest. Foremost among these are the special interests themselves. As Professor E. Pendleton Herring pointed out in his book, Public Administration and the Public Interest, they spare no effort to secure favorable decisions by exerting pressure on the regulatory agencies through propaganda channels such as newspapers, magazines, trade journals, circulars, luncheon speeches, movies, personal letters, and radio and television appeals. They hire lobbyists and contact men to press their views upon both members and staff of the Commission and Congressmen. Professor Herring went on to say that it is axiomatic that, as a concomitant to our democratic system, Congressmen must give weight to the representations of their constituents, and the special interests, whether they be shippers, carriers, labor unions, trade associations, boards of trade, chambers of commerce, or port commissions, by virtue of superior organization, better know-how, excellent legal talent, sounder finances, unified policies, and planned tactics, are able to apply pressure out of all proportion to their relative importance. The Commission, however, must be ever mindful of the collective interest of the John Does of the country as representing the true public interest. Incidents set forth in Professor Herring's book show that there have been occasions in the past when the Interstate Commerce Commission, the President, Members of the Cabinet, and Congress have been deluged with supposedly spontaneously inspired letters seeking to influence the Commission to render a prompt and favorable decision in behalf of one of the parties litigant. The impropriety of so doing is regrettable, for should the Commission ever succumb to political pressures, it would lose its objectivity and independence, and even the favored party would soon question its sincerity and integrity in other matters. Should this ever come to pass, Professor Herring concludes that the Commission would be looked upon as a representative rather than a regulatory body and matters within the competence of the Commission might just as well be determined on the floor of Congress in the first instance. Still another related point must be considered. Since the Commissioners are appointed from various sections of the country, there may be some tendency to look to them to represent the viewpoint of sectional and regional interests. Again it is of public concern that the function of the Commission remain regulatory rather than representative. It is also true that there is representation on the Commission of the two major political parties, but I can affirm from personal experience that party affiliation is of no value in helping predict how a member will vote. In truth, the Commissioners are only concerned with the problem of providing impartial regulation. Voting in conference, as a consequence, has never to my knowledge divided along party lines. Although the many examples cited by Professor Herring prove that extraneous forces of this character are omnipresent as part and parcel of our regulatory system, I am happy to aver that at no time during my term in office have I encountered or been subjected to such pressures. Cooperation As An End At the same time, a sympathetic understanding of the Commission's aims and purposes, and difficulties faced, needs to be brought home to the general public. Cordial public relations are an end much to be sought after. From my point of view, cooperation and assistance from shippers, carriers, and other special interests are a sine qua non to counteract or alleviate unwarranted pressures and permit the Commission to function effectively and impartially. A number of years ago this was recognized by Charles E. Cotterill, a general counsel for the Southern Traffic League, when he said: "I think that in reality it is upon the traffic men and the commerce lawyers that the responsibility and duty rest in aiding the Commission to correct the situation . . . We have encouraged the Commission to be too tolerant in its entertainment of attempted influence of sectionalism and partisan attitudes. We have been too lax in failing to support the Commission in its obvious wish that testimony, briefs, arguments, letters, telegrams, and other forms of appeal shall not be presented when they are remote from issues contemplated by law, and which can only be described as clamorous appeal for class or sectional recognition. We have by our own course of conduct accentuated the looseness of the Commission's system of pleading and practice with the tendency to convert what ought to be law suits into something like town hall meetings and, I regret to say, at times political gatherings. Code of Ethics Since the time of Mr. Cotterill, much improvement has been brought about. The Association of I. C. C. Practitioners is a private organization which has been extremely helpful, and whose efforts in helping to formulate our Rules of Practice, setting up a comprehensive code of ethics, policing its members, and placing itself on the side of orderly procedure and good administration are praiseworthy. In line with my subject I would like to mention the Code of Ethics for Practitioners Before the Interstate Commerce Commission which has been published as an appendix to our General Rules of Practice. Canon 8 having reference to "Private Communications with the Commission" reads: In the disposition of contested proceedings brought under the Interstate Commerce Act the Commission exercises quasi-legislative powers, but it is nevertheless acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. It is required to administer the Act and to consider at all times the public interest beyond the mere interest of the particular litigants before it. To the extent that it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, it is grossly improper for litigants, directly or through any counsel or representative, to communicate privately with a commissioner, examiner or other representative of the Commission about a pending cause, or to argue privately the merits thereof in the absence of their adversaries or without notice to them. Practitioners at all times should scrupulously refrain in their communications to and discussions with the Commission and its staff from going beyond ex parte representations that are clearly proper in view of the administrative work of the Commission. Conclusion This is certainly illustrative of the singleness of purpose, the harmony, and cordial relations which presently exist between the Commission and the special interests appearing before it. They have joined forces to teach that there is such a thing as enlightened self-interest which is totally different from the narrower selfishness that seeks extralegal personal advantage. Obviously enlightened self-interest will not in the long run diverge too greatly from the path of the public interest. Legislation 85th CONGRESS-FIRST SESSION 12,520 bills were introduced in the First Session of the 85th Congress, and 316 of the public bills were enacted into law. Nine of the twenty-six bills embodying the recommendations of the Interstate Commerce Commission were enacted into law. These new laws follow. One bill has been withdrawn, (H. R. 5662 and S. 1460), I. C. C. Recommendation No. 12, so sixteen of the original twenty-six still await action during the Second Session of Congress. A number of other major bills in the field of transportation were also introduced. Among them was the appropriations bill for Independent Agencies, (H. R. 6070), including the I. C. C., which was passed by Congress. (Public Law 85-69, printed elsewhere in this issue). The two charts which follow show the status of these bills at the close of the Session. In the field of Administrative Law, numerous bills were introduced, including the proposals of the American Bar Association to judicialize further the administrative procedures. Many of these bills are still in Committee, and none has been enacted into law. Most of them are listed in the summary which follows the charts. NEW LAWS PUBLIC LAW 85-99 (AN ACT) 85TH CONGRESS, S. 937 (JULY 11, 1957) Common Carriers. Charges: Long and Short Hauls To amend section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended (49 U. S. C. 4 (1)), is amended to read as follows: "(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to this part or part III to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, or to charge any greater compensation as a through rate than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of this part or part III, but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this part or part III to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, That upon application to the Commission and after investigation, such carrier, in special cases, may be authorized by the Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property, and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated carriers may be relieved from the operation of the foregoing provisions of this section, but in exercising the authority conferred upon it in this proviso, the Commission shall not permit the establishment of any charge to or from the more distant point that is not reasonably compensatory for the service performed; and no such authorization shall be granted on account of merely potential water competition not actually in existence : Provided further, That any such carrier or carriers operating over a circuitous line or route may, subject only to the standards of lawfulness set forth in other provisions of this part or part III and without further authorization, meet the charges of such carrier or carriers of the same type operating over a more direct line or route, to or from the competitive points, provided that rates so established over circuitous routes shall not be evidence on the issue of the compensatory character of rates involved in other proceedings: And provided further, That tariffs proposing rates subject to the provisions of this paragraph requiring Commission authorization may be filed when application is made to the Commission under the provisions hereof, and in the event such application is approved, the Commission shall permit such tariffs to become effective upon one day's notice." Approved July 11, 1957. (71 Stat. 292) PUBLIC LAW 85-246 (AN ACT) 85TH CONGRESS, S. 939 (AUGUST 31, 1957) Quotations of Rates for U. S. Government (I. C. C. Recommendation No. 3) To amend section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended (49 U. S. C., sec. 22), is amended as follows: (a) By inserting "(1)" immediately after "Sec. 22." (b) By inserting at the end of such section the following: (2) All quotations or tenders of rates, fares or charges under paragraph (1) of this section for the transportation, storage, or handling of property or the transportation of persons free or at reduced rates for the United States Government, or any agency or department thereof, including quotations or tenders for retroactive application whether negotiated or renegotiated after the services have been performed, shall be in writing or confirmed in writing and a copy or copies thereof shall be submitted to the Commission by the carrier or carriers offering such tenders or quotations in the manner specified by the Commission and only upon the submittal of such a quotation or tender made pursuant to an agreement approved by the Commission under section 5a of this |