The Supreme Court on State Conservation of Natural Re- sources J. A. Fairlie, State Supervision of Local Finance . Governor La Follette, Taxation of the Property of Railway Henry C. Adams, Tendencies in Railway Taxation Governor La Follette on Protection of the State Treasury. George W. Curtis, Education and Local Patriotism . Jacob Gould Schurman on the Government of State Universities Governor Folk on the Saloon and the Law F. C. Iglehart, The Nation's Antidrink Crusade F. C. Iglehart, Another Year of Defeat for the American Saloon VIII. ELECTIONS AND NOMINATIONS Philip Loring Allen, The Multifarious Australian Ballot Richard S. Childs, The Short Ballot . Governor La Follette on Majority Nominations Charles K. Lush, An Essential Amendment to the Primary Law George H. Haynes, Popular Control of Senatorial Elections How the People are using their New Power of Nomination Governor Garvin, The State Boss IX. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS J. H. Hamlin, The New York Constitutional Convention J. A. Fairlie, The Michigan Constitutional Convention. CALIFORNIA READINGS ON AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT I THE GOVERNOR THE POWER OF THE GOVERNOR1 BY GOVERNOR W. E. RUSSELL [The power of the governor in the New England states has been affected by historical conditions. The early period from which the constitutions of these states date, and the large powers reserved to the assembly, cause the position of the New England executive to be comparatively weak. Also, because of the complexity of conditions consequent upon the industrialization of the New England states, the commission movement has been stronger there. In different parts of the country it is often the experience of a strong executive to find his projects weakened by legislative opposition or indifference. However, on the whole, the governor as head of the administrative departments and of the state government has a growing influence over legislative action.] Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives : Profoundly grateful to the people of the commonwealth for the renewed confidence which has again intrusted me with important public duties, I enter upon their discharge by submitting to you such suggestions and recommendations as seem to merit your consideration and action. This privilege of addressing the legislature, accorded the governor by long-established custom, is not, in my judgment, best used in a perfunctory statement of the recommendations of the various departments of the commonwealth, all of which are set forth fully in their reports to you. I believe it better to make this the occasion for a broader treatment of public questions, for giving expression to the people's wishes and wants, and for suggestion to the legislature, and through it to the public, of any policy or reform which seems to the governor wise and necessary, and for which he is ready to assume responsibility. Department recommendations can be called to your attention in a later message, if necessary, 1 Address to the Massachusetts Legislature, January, 1892. with such indorsement or criticism as they suggest. This cause separates more clearly the views of the executive and of the departments, and gives to both greater emphasis and responsibility. It requires the chosen representative of the people, as his first duty, to submit to you their opinion, indicated by their votes, upon such public matters within your jurisdiction as demand your attention. So will elections mean a choice between principles and measures rather than between men. The close dependence of the people upon their state government, the great and immediate control it exercises over them and their liberty, property, and welfare, make the duty imperative of keeping that government efficient and responsible in its work, and of adopting any changes or reforms necessary to this end. With the tendency each year to increase its duties and to multiply its subjects, and thus to enlarge its power over public and individual interests, the greater is the necessity that this power should be restrained by such official responsibility as will keep it well within the control of the people and make every administrative officer answerable to them. "The first requisite of efficient administration," says an experienced writer, " is power with responsibility to a constituency which can readily call it to account." Machinery of government which worked easily and well when its duties were comparatively few and simple may be too cumbersome to meet its many and complicated duties of later days, and entirely inadequate to bring the government, now more and more felt by the people, within their control. Faithful and efficient service may make a bad system work well, or mitigate its lack of responsibility; but sound administration cannot permanently be had under such conditions, nor until the system itself is changed and corrected. In my judgment the time has come when the attention of the legislature ought to be directed to the executive branch of our government, to the great increase of its duties, the lack of uniformity or system in the organization created for their discharge, and its entire absence of responsibility, except in the high character and conscientious service of officials in its various departments. My criticism is not of officials, but of a system; and the test of that system is not the faithful work which they have done, but the unfaithful work others might do without adequate responsibility to call them to account. If danger lurks in the system, if it can permit arbitrary acts without control, misconduct without correction, or official administration without responsibility, it is wrong. A year ago in my inaugural address I briefly considered this subject. The experience of the year has strengthened my conviction upon the views and recommendations then expressed. As the subject has been constantly before the people in the meantime, by executive action, debate in the legislature, and discussion through the press and in the last political campaign, and the people may fairly be considered to have formed and expressed their opinion upon it, I deem it my first duty to urge upon you a thorough examination of our methods of executive and administrative work, and the adoption of such changes as will bring into it complete responsibility to the people, and will simplify machinery at present complex, without system or uniformity. A brief examination of the gradual but large growth of executive work and executive offices in the more than one hundred years of our constitutional government is necessary for an intelligent consideration of this matter. For some years after the adoption of our constitution in 1780 there were few administrative officers to be appointed or supervised by the governor. While the constitution definitely fixed the appointment and tenure of judicial and military officers, it left to the legislature the power to provide by fixed laws for the naming and settling all civil officers within the commonwealth, the election and constitution of whom are not in this form of government otherwise provided for, and to set forth the several duties, powers, and limits of the several civil and military officers of the commonwealth." It was not then foreseen, nor has it been at any time since, how great would be the growth of executive work, and how varied and intricate the subjects of public and private interest with which it would deal. Consequently, neither by the constitution nor by any legislative act has there been established any uniform system; but, as the exigency of the moment demanded, an office has been created, apparently without much thought of its relation to the executive machinery already or thereafter to be established. As in the multiplicity of laws it becomes imperative at last to codify and systematize them, so in the multiplicity of offices the same necessity may exist. The growth of the commonwealth, the creation and increase of her penal, reformatory, and charitable institutions and of new subjects of public supervision or control, have compelled the legislature, under the authority conferred upon it, to establish numerous offices and departments as the necessary machinery for the administration of this work. Most of these are of comparatively recent date, created with little regard to uniformity of government or direct responsibility. There are to-day in the executive department of the commonwealth over three hundred officers, commissioners, and trustees, not including clerks and other subordinate officers, participating by statute authority in the administration of our government. There are over twenty-five state commissions (some, however, not purely executive) and more than one hundred trustees of public institutions. Whether this number can be reduced by abolition or consolidation of offices has been considered by a special committee of the last legislature, who will submit to you the result of its investigation. In my judgment that question is rather one of detail than of principle, and by no means as important as the question of uniformity and responsibility in the administration of these public trusts. At present there is neither. The tenure of some commissioners and trustees is three years; of others, five; of others, seven; and of one board, eight. This tenure is fixed by law, and gives the occupant a right to hold the office for its full term, in the absence of express statute provision for removal. In many of the statutes there is no such provision, and where it exists there is no uniformity. Members of four commissions and the medical examiners can be removed for sufficient cause by the governor with the consent of the council; members of eleven commissions can be removed with or without cause by the governor, but only with the same consent. Only eight officers, outside of the district police, can be removed by the governor alone, upon his own responsibility. That is the extent of his effective and responsible executive control. Five boards of trustees are removable "for sufficient cause," but without any provision as to who shall exercise this power. Of the remaining administrative boards and officers appointed for a fixed term, including the boards of lunacy and charity, of health, of education, of prisons, the state members of the board of agriculture, and other officers holding important public trusts, there is no power of removal in anybody, except by the cumbrous machinery of impeachment. More than one hundred and twenty important executive officers are thus, during a tenure of office varying from three to eight years, beyond the reach and control of any executive power. All of these officers perform public duties, expend public money, and administer public trusts. In some way they should be made responsible to the people; otherwise there is danger of friction and conflict. Arbitrary acts cannot be controlled, misconduct cannot be punished, nor can any one be held directly and properly responsible for official action. As an illustration of our irresponsible system I again call the attention of the legislature to our method of prison management. At present the warden in charge of the prison has no power over his principal subordinates, either in their appointment or removal, except with the concurrence of the prison commissioners, with an appeal to the governor and council in case of conflict; the commissioners in charge of the institution have no power over the appointment or removal of the warden; and neither the governor nor any one else has any power over the commissioners. In case of mismanagement, inefficiency, or trouble and insubordination within the prison, such as have occurred in times past, where lies the responsibility or the remedy? In my judgment the warden should be given power over his subordinate officials, the prison commissioners power over him, and the governor power over them, and for its exercise, he should answer to the people. A bill to this effect was reported to the last legislature by one of its committees. In the house it was amended by a provision that the power of the governor should be exercised only with the consent of the council, thus destroying the most important link in the chain of responsibility, and the one which brought this executive power within the control of the people, and its exercise under responsibility to them. The bill as amended was properly defeated in the senate. |