bailees without hire, and their liability seems to be governed by the same rules and will be further considered under the head of negligence. Carrier of live stock cannot limit liability for its own neglect. A common carrier of live stock cannot by special contract procure exemption from responsibility for losses arising from its own neglect of the duties incident to such employment. There is a conflict in the decisions on this point, but it is unreasonable to hold that a party who has received property to transport from one point to another may so indifferently perform the service that the property will be injured or destroyed. 1 CIVIL DAMAGE LAW. In many of the states laws have been passed which give a wife, and others named, a right of action, for injuries sustained by her or them, against any person who, by furnishing intoxicating liq 1 In Chicago R. I. R. Co. v. Witly, 49 N. W. R. 185, it is said: We do not doubt that a carrier may, by contract fairly entered into, limit in some respects its liability as an insurer, or its common law liability, where the restriction imposed is reasonable. But on grounds of public policy the law has wisely prohibited a common carrier of freight from in any manner contracting against its own negligence. This doctrine was distinctly held and applied in Railroad Co. v. Washburn, 5 Neb. 117; Gantt, J., in the opinion, says: "The common law fixes the degree of care and diligence due from railroad companies, as common carriers, and a failure to exercise this care and diligence is negligence, without any legal distinction as being gross or ordinary, and the better rule of law, sustained by the weight of authority, is that it is against the policy of the law to allow stipulations which will relieve the company from the exercise of that care and diligence, or which, in other words, will excuse them for negligence in the performance of that duty. Decisions are to be found which lay down a contrary doctrine, but the better reason, uors, has caused, or assisted in causing, the intoxication of the husband. As this right is based on a statute it must be consulted in framing a petition. One of the principal grounds of the action, where it is brought by a wife, is for loss of means of support. A wife has an interest in her husband's capacity to perform labor as a means of support. A husband is morally and legally bound to supply his wife with the necessaries and comforts of life so far as he is able. If he has no other resource it is his duty to contribute his labor and its proceeds to her support. And the wife has a corresponding right to be maintained and supplied, and to that end she has an interest in all her husband's resources. 1 Need not state kind of liquor. The kind of intoxicating liquors furnished need not be stated-the essential facts are that the liquors which the defendant dispensed to the husband had produced or aided in producing his intoxication, whereby the plaintiff had sustained damage.2 The business of a saloon-keeper is to sell intoxicating drinks; therefore, if he has sold or given away liquor at his place of business, the presumption is that it was such as his business authorized him to keep and furnish to his customers—intoxicating liquors. A petition which shows that the defendant has furnished intoxicating liquors to another, whereby he became intoxicated, and while in that condition his wife and family were deprived of their means of support during the time of such intoxication, states a good cause of action. 4 So, if the person, while in 1 Schnerder v. Hosier, 21 O. S. 98; Peterson v. Knoble, 35 Wis. 80; New v. McKechive, 95 N. Y. 632; Volans v. Owen, 74 Id. 526; Welch v. Jugenheimer, 56 Iowa, 11; Fox v. Wanderlick, 64 Iowa, 187. In the latter case the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that, during the period mentioned in the petition, her husband was in the habit of becoming intoxicated, and that his intoxication was caused in part, at least, by intoxicating liquors-beer and whisky-sold him by the defendant, and that when so intoxicated he neglected his business, and at one time abandoned his family for the period of one month, for which time he contributed nothing to the plaintiff's support, and that during his toxicated, commits an injury, either to person or property, the statute in most cases gives redress. Liable for injuries to wife. A wife may maintain an action against a liquor dealer for personal injuries received by her from her husband while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor unlawfully furnished to him by the defendant, and it need not be alleged that the wife was free from contributory negligence. And under the Michigan statute a wife has a right of action against a saloon-keeper for loss of means of support, caused by her husband, while intoxicated, engaging in a scuffle with another, who was also intoxicated, and breaking his leg. 2 A license is no justification, therefore it need not be alleged in the petition that the defendant had no license. 8 Measure of recovery. The amount of recovery is to be determined by the value of the means of support of which the plaintiff has been deprived. The right of support is not limited to the bare necessities of life. 4 Not proper elements of damage. Injury to the health of the wife from overwork or labor beyond her strength are not proper elements of damage, neither is wounded pride nor injury to her feelings. Frame of petition by wife. First. The plaintiff should state facts showing her right to bring the action, as by alleging that, at the date of the injury hereinafter mentioned, she was, and now is, the wife of C D. Second. That at said date G H and I J were engaged in business, in the retail traffic in intoxicating liquors, at Third. That on the 1 Beem v. Chestnut, 22 N. E. R. 303. The court very clearly states the law applicable to such cases, "When the wrong-doing of the defendant is merely negligence, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff may, as is well understood, operate as a defense, but when the defendant does that which amounts to an unlawful invasion of the plaintiff's right of personal security or of private property, the doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply." 2 Thomas v. Dansby, 41 N. W. R. 1088; Mayers v. Smith, 13 N. E. R. 216, 217. 3 Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 305: "The statute, in effect, says to every one engaged in the traffic, beware to whom you sell or furnish intoxicating liquor." Id. Walser v. Kerrigan, 56 Ind. 301. 4 Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304; Rafferty v. Buckman, 46 Iowa, 195; Hackett v. Smelsly, 77 Ill. 109. Elshire v. Schuyler, 15 Neb. 561-2. husband of plaintiff, became intoxicated and continued in that condition for —days, and that such intoxication was caused, in whole or in part, by intoxicating liquor furnished to him at said saloon by said defendants. Fourth. That because of said intoxication said C D became sick, and his illness continued (state the injury according to the facts) for —— weeks thereafter, and he was unable to perform any labor or earn means of support, and the plaintiff during all that time was wholly deprived of such means, to her damage, in the sum of $-. Add an appropriate prayer. CORPORATIONS. Corporations; how they may sue and be sued. At common law a corporation may sue in its corporate name without setting forth in the declaration the act of incorporation or averring that it is a corporation, if the act be private1. In an early day a suit was brought in the English courts by the Dutch West India Co.2 The objection was distinctly taken that a foreign corporation could not sue in the English courts, and the matter was carried into the highest appellate tribunal of that nation, which held that the company had the right to sue. That case has been followed generally, and is the common law rule. 3 The common law prevails in the code states, and, unless it has been changed by statute in a particular state, an action may be brought by a corporation in its corporate name, as “The Illinois Central Railroad Company," without alleging the manner in which it was incorporated. The object of the code is to simplify the procedure, not 1 Angell & A. on Corporations, 632; U. S. Bank v. Haskins, 1 Johns. Cas. 133; Utica Bank v. Smaley, 2 Cow. 770; Dutchess Manfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 245. In the last case, Thompson, Ch. J., says, "The only question of doubt that can arise is whether it is necessary for the plaintiffs to set forth in their declaration, by fit and proper averments, that they had been duly incorporated. But I am inclined to think that it was not." This decision was rendered before the change in the statutes of that state, which authorize a corporation to sue without alleging corporate existence. 21 Strange, 612; 2 Ld. Raymond,. 1532. 3 Bank of Michigan v. Williams, 51 Wend. 478; Gray v. T. Co., 4 Rand. 578; La Fayette Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 30 Barb. 491; Kennedy v. Cotton, 28 Id. 59; Union Ins. Co. v. Osgood, I Duer, 707; Miss. R. Co. v. Gaster, 20 Ark. 455; Emery v. E. R. Co., 13 Ind. 143. to create additional complications and render the practice more difficult and uncertain. De facto corporations. At the present time corporations are formed almost exclusively by complying with the provisions of the general law relating to corporations, and the essential requisities of that law must be complied with to create a corporation. If, however, a corporation has become a de facto organization, under color of law, the validity of the proceedings, provided they are colorable, cannot be inquired into except in a direct action on behalf of the state. 1 As a general rule, a person who enters into a contract with a corporation in regard to any matter within the scope of its corporate powers is estopped to deny its corporate existence in an action arising on the contract. 2 A corporation, being a distinct entity, may sue and be sued, employ attorneys to prosecute or defend actions in its favor, or against it, or do any other lawful act necessary to protect or enforce its rights. Capital stock must be subscribed. When the capital stock of a proposed corporation is fixed at a definite sum, as $1,000,000 divided into shares of, say $100 each, the entire amount of stock must, in good faith, be subscribed before the corporation can begin business or sue the subscribers to its stock on assessments thereon, unless there is a clear provision in the subscription contract to proceed with the accomplishment of the main design before all the stock is subscribed. 3 Stockholder may recover. It is the duty of the promoters and officers of a corporation to act in good faith with the subscribers and stockholders. If, by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealments, the directors of a corporation induce 1 Frost v. Frostburg, 24 How. 278; Freeland v. Penn. Cent. Ins. Co., 94 Penn. St. 504; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 198, and cases cited. 2 Bank of U. S. v. Lyman, 20 Wall. 666; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 666; Bank of Circleville v. Renick, 15 Ohio, 222; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 199. In Dutchess, etc., Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 245, it is said: "The defendant having undertaken to enter into a contract with the plaintiffs in their corporate name, he thereby admits them to be duly constituted a body politic and corporate under such name." Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Neb. 50; Salem Mill Dam Co. v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23, 9 Pick. 195; Shurtz v. S. & T. R. R., 9 Mich. 269; Provia, etc., R. Co. v. Preston, 35 Iowa, 118; Topeka Bridge Co. v. Cumming, 3 Kas. 76. |