internal state half so well as we knew hers, the war would have terminated differently. Despicably weak as Spain was, sheer luck only, the most marvellous luck, brought us off unsinged. As cited in another connection, a brief delay in the surrender of Santiago would have given time for the conquest of our army by a foe greater than Spain -disease. The Spaniards would then have annihilated the army as a man tramples a worm. After the surrender things grew so bad with our men that at length the officers mustered up courage to rebel and the “roundrobin" was written to Gen. Shafter, a memorial in which the higher officers of the force united in declaring,

that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future. We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move into the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move, if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season, without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, and who understand the situation absolutely.

Col. Roosevelt in a preceding letter said:

If we are kept here, it will in all human probability mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die. This is not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of the military efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large though it is, exceeding 4,000, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army. Not 10 per cent. are fit for active work.

As we look back at these terrible conditions every reason for exalting ourselves departs. We did all that we could to fail. Every effort conceivable was made by our commanding men at home to send an army into Cuba that would be destroyed before it could win a battle. It

was prepared neither with proper food nor with clothing nor medicine nor any of the appurtenances necessary for a campaign in a torrid fever-breeding land, thanks to the idiocy and infamy at Washington. But through equal imbecility on her part Spain fell into incontinent panic and ran at the first blow, although her army, accustomed to the climate, could have resisted us successfully for weeks even if our men had all enjoyed the impossible luck of perfect health. Gen. Blanco gave vent to the deepest sorrow and humiliation that his great force of soldiers should have been ordered home sound and whole, with only one chance to display their fighting metal, which approved itself to be brave and stubborn metal. When leaving Havana he said, “I believed in contesting to the last ditch. I still believe I was right. I could have withstood, I believe, an assault upon Havana from an army five times our size; but that is an idle thought." And Gen. Pando, former commander of the Spanish troops at Manzanillo, being asked his opinion of the war, replied 'with a gesture of derision,' "Why, there has been no war. There are 200,000 soldiers in Cuba who have not seen an American soldier. My opinion is that the Spanish and American soldiers were simply inveigled into a war by the politicians of the two countries. The politicians made fools of the soldiers; they sold them."

But if Spain had waited a little nature would have wiped out the American force without the aid of Blanco, unless the army had succeeded in scudding home before the thunderbolts of fever struck down half in death and prostrated all. Here is no room for imagination or exaggeration, the grim words of the American officers announce that already on August 3 'the efficiency of the army is destroyed' by malaria; furthermore this army contained "the great bulk of the regulars" and its destruction would have given Spain the heartiest consolation and probably enabled her to procure continental allies. For in from five to fifteen days after the battle of Santiago when the scourge had weakened our soldiers,

the Spanish would have crushed them in battle and taken the rest prisoners, to die of malaria and yellow fever later on. This climax could only have been averted by turning tail and taking to the transports and protection of the fleet. If it is said that we should soon have sent thousands of reinforcements to Shafter, the answer is that the fever would have shortly sent these new men also to their graves, and swelled the disaster and multiplied the dead.

No sense or sagacity of ours preserved us from that drastic defeat: we were saved only by the surpassing folly of Spain. This is the hairbreadth basis for the cyclone of conceit that has swelled us into dizzy swaggerbags. We are boasting of what is ground for pride in neither nation nor individual.

We have likewise gloated on our sea victories and conferred upon ourselves the degree of peerless sea heroes. But although we are mad now history will be calm. If a man were fighting an Indian in the woods who should come and lay himself at the white man's feet to be killed, would it be called a glorious victory? And what else was our victory over the Spanish admiral? By telegraphic order from Spain, flatly against his military judgment, without a solitary chance of success or escape, perfectly knowing that he was sailing into the mouth of death, Cervera brought his fleet out of safety and laid it down before the American ships for annihilation. We destroyed it and sailed up to the seventy-seventh heaven of astonished admiration of our prowess. Yet there was nothing for us to do but smash those ships, unless we swung about and ran from the thing that was running away from us. And our conceit rose the next day to the size of four worlds. It was a child's victory, and we followed the simple ways of children and praised ourselves blind for it.

What of Dewey? The whole continent transforms itself into a crash of laudation over him, but what did he

do? He performed a very ordinary commonplace feat, which any commander of an American, English, German, Russian or French squadron would have done equally well. Now it is the 'incomparable Dewey,' the naval colossus of the age. Any strong and disciplined man ought to be able to thrash a boy or a quaking ancient swaying on the grave. Spain was the latter; the Manila fleet was one of Spain's trembling emaciated arms. The worms of Spanish government had eaten the iron of her ships in every sea, which remained only hollow emblems of strength. Their destruction may be likened to the conquest of floating hogsheads. If Dewey had encountered an equal number of English or German men-of-war would our inebriate Uncle Sam be strutting nowadays in dusky regions with his gaseous stomach far frontward?

If we could realize that in fighting Spain we were whipping a zero, that it was only a sham war to salve Spain's 'honor,' that she expected ruin and went through the forms like a duellist with blank cartridges in his gun, that her home sins, her system of robbing the many for the few which had undermined the health of the State, made her an ally for her overthrow, we should see that we have grown into a hectoring monstrosity through the crazed balloon flights of our escaped imagination. The one intrinsic merit of our proud performance was the first intention of helping Cuba, which some private citizens honestly felt; yet this sentiment was so mutilated by the passion of revenge for the Maine and garbled with the conspiring of the commercial world for new pastures, that it soon lost the savor of virtue. Had we been proud of anything to be proud of it would not have turned us into fools and given us as prey to the deviltry of consummate foreign tacticians.

3. Beresford's Flattery Palaver.

English statesmen took good heed of our inflation and supplied us with flattering gas ad libitum. On the ears

of uncorrupted common sense the late "lord" Herschell's blandishments would have fallen flat: "We can rejoice as much as you rejoice today in the fact that you are one of the leading nations of the world." Raising his eyes to the intertwined flags of the two countries, he said, "I rejoice to see them united in concord, not in any spirit of arrogance towards other people, not as desiring to infringe the rights of any other Power; but because I see in that union a real safeguard for the maintenance of peace in the world and because I see more than that—I see the surest guarantee of an extended reign of liberty and justice." He saw us entering upon a career of pocketbook conquest like England's, when our national morality would be no better than her's, when we should need an ally and in return be forced to give ourselves as an ally.

The soft words of that great lord, Charles Beresford, paid officer (admiral) of her majesty's navy, who has been junketing from China to America to tell us of our duties in Asia, would have had cool greeting from a morally poised people. 'Lord' Charles was sent to teach us how we may serve as England's helper and tool in China in this great emergency. He would induce us to construct a massive army and navy for England's support by the following emaciated arguments:*

I. Flattery and philanthropic palaver.

"Everything I can do to advance this friendly feeling between the two nations [America and England] I will always do. It means civilization, it means trade, it means the good of the world, as well as that of the two great nations."

2. England's real purpose stated.

'Mr. Jordan-What of the future of China?

Mr. Beresford-If China goes on as she is doing she must break up pretty soon, owing to disturbances among her own people. The Government has not enough troops to keep them in order. They will interfere with the trade and commerce of those nations who have vested interests there. That being so, the countries will probably adopt the policy of spheres of influence. If that policy is followed, Great Britain can't have everything. That is absolutely so.'

*Taken from a newspaper interview with Beresford by David Starr Jordan in the S. F. Examiner, Feb. 14, 1899, and an address to the San Francisco merchants of the same date. The quotations are not arranged as they occurred, but according to the logical development of the argument.