democratic republic substituted in the place of the ancient Dutch constitution. At the same time the Belgic provinces, which had long been united to the Austrian monarchy as a co-ordinate State, were conquered by France, and annexed to the French republic by the treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville. On the restoration of the Prince of Orange, in 1813, he assumed the title of Sovereign Prince, and afterwards King of the Netherlands; and by the treaties of Vienna, the former Seven United Provinces were united with the Austrian Low Countries into one State, under his sovereignty. (a) Here is an example of two States incorporated into one, so as to form a new State, the independent existence of each of the former States entirely ceasing in respect to the other; whilst the rights and obligations of both still continue in respect to other foreign States, except so far as they may be affected by the compacts creating the new State. In consequence of the revolution which took place in Belgium, in 1830, this country was again severed from Holland, and its independence as a separate kingdom acknowledged and guarantied by the five great powers of Europe, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg having been subsequently elected king of the Belgians by the national Congress, the terms and condition of the separation were stipulated by the treaty concluded on the 15th of November, 1831, between those powers and Belgium, which was declared by the conference of London to constitute the invariable basis of the separation, independence, neutrality, and state of territorial possession of Belgium, subject to such modifications as might be the result of direct negotiation between that kingdom and the Netherlands. (b) $25. If the revolution in a State be effected by a prov- Province ince or colony shaking off its sovereignty, so long as the or colony asserting its independence of the new State is not acknowledged by independother powers, it may seem doubtful, in an international considered point of view, whether its sovereignty can be considered as complete, however it may be regarded by its own gov ence, how by other States. Lord Russell's speech, May 6, 1861; Mr. Canning to Lord Granville, June 22, 1826; Wheaton's Hist. Law of Nations, 492. A. Wheaton's Hist. Law of Nations, 538-555. 3 ernment and citizens. It has already been stated, that whilst the contest for the sovereignty continues, and the civil war rages, other nations may either remain passive, allowing to both contending parties all the rights which war gives to public enemies; or may acknowledge the independence of the new State, forming with it treaties of amity and commerce; or may join in alliance with one party against the other. In the first case neither party has any right to complain so long as other nations maintain an impartial neutrality, and abide the event of the contest. The two last cases involve questions which seem to belong rather to the science of politics than of international law; but the practice of nations, if it does not furnish an invariable rule for the solution of these questions, will, at least, shed some light upon them. The memorable examples of the Swiss Cantons and of the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, which so long levied war, concluded peace, contracted alliances, and performed every other act of sovereignty, before their independence was finally acknowledged, that of the first by the German empire, and that of the latter by Spain, go far to show the general sense of mankind on this subject. The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States of America by France, coupled with the assistance secretly rendered by the French court to the revolted colonies, was considered by Great Britain as an unjustifiable aggression, and, under the circumstances, it probably was so. (a) But had the French court conducted itself with good faith, and maintained an impartial neutrality between the two belligerent parties, it may be doubted whether the treaty of commerce, or even the eventual alliance between France and the United States, could have furnished any just ground for a declaration of war against the former by the British government. The more recent example of the acknowledgment of the independence of the Spanish American provinces by the United States, Great Britain, and other powers, whilst the parent country still continued to withhold her assent, also concurs to illustrate the general understanding of nations, that where a revolted province or colony has declared and shown its ability to maintain its independence, the recognition of its sovereignty by other foreign States is a question of policy and prudence only. (a) Wheaton's Hist. Law of Nations, Part III. § 12, 220–294. Ch. de Martens, Nouvelles Causes Célèbres du Droit des Gens, tom. i. 370-498. tion of its ence by other for § 27. This question must be determined by the sover- Recognieign legislative or executive power of these other States, independand not by any subordinate authority, or by the private judgment of their individual subjects. Until the inde- eign States. pendence of the new State has been acknowledged, either by the foreign State where its sovereignty is drawn in question, or by the government of the country of which it was before a province, courts of justice and private individuals are bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered. (a) 16 (a) Vesey's Ch. Rep. ix. 347, The City of Berne v. The Bank of England; Edwardss Adm. Rep. i. 1, The Manilla, Appendix IV. Note D.; — Wheaton's Rep. 124 Hoyt r. Gelston;- Ib. 634, The United States v. Palmer. | Rempation of Independence. — It is an established general principle that each tation is to settle for itself the form in which it will live; and, when that is settled, foreign nations recognize it. So, it is purely an internal matter whether a commaty previously one, shall divide itself by force or by agreement, and become two or more States. When that matter is settled, foreign nations recognize it as a fart. No questions can arise on either of these points when the parties to the change have agreed or acquiesced, and the fact has passed into history. Doubts arse where a foreign State does some act which, to a greater or less extent, recogEs a new dynasty in a State, before the old dynasty has surrendered its claim, or recognizes a new State created by rebellion, before the parent government has used. It would be a wrong view, and lead to false results, if we assumed that the foreign State is to recognize every thing possible in the new State, once for aŭ, or to recognize nothing. There are, in truth, stages and degrees of recogWhere the purpose of the foreign State is just and friendly, it will go no farther than its own necessities require. We have already seen [Note 15 to § 19] that these necessities may require it to recognize belligerent rights in the insurgent government Another stage in the contest may require it to treat with that goverriment with reference to its de facto revenue and commercial regulations, and the rights of foreign subjects, in their persons or property, being within the territory wer the control of that government, or for reparation for past and prevention of future wrongs. If the necessities of the foreign State require these acts to be dne, the parent government has no cause of complaint. It is her misfortune that the insurrection has dimensions and power which exclude her authority for the time, and compel foreign nations to deal with an intruding government that Las authority de facto. The cardinal rule is, that, while they must not interfere to affect the contest, foreign nations may and must live and trade, notwithstanding the contest. The test is, - did the necessities of the foreign State require the art, and did the act recognize no more than existed and than those necessities repared' The acts referred to are special and casual and temporary, and are na nesrsistent with a recognition of the fact, that the contest is still undecided. But, if the foreign State makes a general treaty with the new State, substantially as with an in dependent nation, with terms looking to general and permanent relations, that act is a general recognition of independence. Whether this final step is justifiable, de pen is upon the same tests: namely, the necessities of foreign States, and the truth of the fact implied, that the State treated with was, at the time, in the con Interna tional effects § 28. The international effects produced by a change of a change in the person of the sovereign or in the form of government of any State, may be considered: in the per son of the sovereign or in the internal constitution of the State. I. As to its treaties of alliance and commerce. III. Its public domain and private rights of property. dition de facto of an independent State. Where the necessities of the foreign State are spoken of, the term is to be understood in a liberal sense. It refers to a state of things when a just regard to the duties and rights of a government, in reference to the interests confided to it, requires its action. It is among the duties of a government to keep open to its subjects commercial intercourse with all practicable parts of the world, the privileges of travel and sojourning, and all the forms of intercourse beneficial to humanity; and to make arrangements for the protection of its citizens in these pursuits. To that end, among the frequent convulsions of States, it is often necessary for a foreign power to deal with the party in possession of a portion of the State. To wait till the question of right is determined, would be to suspend no small part of the life of nations. The justification of special acts short of absolute and formal recognition of sovereign independence, must depend upon the circumstances of each case, and little light can be thrown upon them by abstract statements further than have been already made. But, with reference to the final recognition by a general treaty, or by the establishing of full diplomatic intercourse, a more positive rule can be laid down. The only test required is, that the new State shall be in fact what the recognizing state assumes it to be; for it may be conceded, once for all, that it is among the necessities of nations to have treaties and diplomatic intercourse with existing States. The practice of nations furnishes the best definitions and limitations of the condition of things in the new State, which will justify such a recognition. It is not necessary that the parent State or deposed dynasty should have ceased from all efforts to regain its power. On the other hand, it is necessary that the contest should have been virtually decided. It was nearly seventy years after the declaration of independence by the Netherlands that it was recognized by Spain, in the treaty of Munster, of 1648; but, at various stages during that period, the Netherlands were dealt with as a sovereign State by all the powers of Europe, except Austria. (Dumont, v. 507; vi. 429. Mackintosh's Works, iii. 444.) The new dynasty of Braganza was established over Portugal by a revolt against Spain in 1640, and was not acknowledged by Spain until the treaty of Lisbon, of 1688; but the King of England made a general treaty with the King of Portugal, as a lawful sovereign, in 1641, on the ground of "his solicitude to preserve the tranquillity of his kingdoms, and to secure the liberty of trade of his beloved subjects." (Dumont, vi. 238, vii. 238. Mackintosh's Works, iii. 446.) All the Continental powers treated with the Commonwealth as the English sovereignty, though the Stuarts were asserting their claim, which they afterwards made good. And, after the Revolution of 1688, and the establishment of the Orange dynasty, the refusal of France and Spain to recognize it, and their persistent recognition of the son of James II., were resented by England as acts of hostility, and led to her alliance with Holland and Germany against them. Mackintosh's Works, iii. 446. As to the recognition of the independence of the North American provinces by France and Holland, see Phillimore's Intern. Law, iii. § 15. Martens' Causes Célè IV. As to wrongs or injuries done to the government or citizens of another State. §29. Treaties are divided by the text-writers into Treaties. personal and real. The former relate exclusively to the persons of bres, i 103, 466. Canning's Speeches, v. 322. British Annual Register, 1776, 182; 1779, 249. Baron Van Zuylen to Mr. Pike, Sept. 17, 1861, U. S. Dip. Corr. 368. Correspondence between Mr. Adams and Earl Russell, April to September, 1865. The reasons assigned by England and other powers for not recognizing the French Republic of 1792 were the unsettled state of France, and the character of the acts of the Republic, and their alleged effect upon the internal affairs of neighboring nations; and the refusal of England to treat with Napoleon from 1808 to 1814 has been put upon special grounds, and not upon his want of competency to act as a sovereign. Phillimore's Intern. Law, i. § 390; ii. § 19. Canning's Speeches, v. 32. The European powers recognized successively the revolutionary governments of Louis Phillipe in 1830, of the Republic in 1848, and of the Empire in 1852 In the Greek war, Great Britain, France, and Russia, as early as 1827, made consular and commercial arrangements with Greece, and recognized her independence formally in 1832. The independence of Belgium was recognized at once, in 1830, without the consent of Holland. (But these cases of Greece and Belgium are both instances of forcible intervention, and not of mere recognition.) The independence of the South American republics was recognized first by the United States, and tardily by England, but by both upon the ground, that, after long-recognized belligerency and the practically unobstructed exercise by them of sovereign powers, Spain, separated by an ocean, had abandoned actual efforts for their reduction, and only clung to a nominal right. Canning's speech, Feb. 4, 1-25. Hansard, xii. 78. Mackintosh's speech, June 15, 1824. Mackintosh's Works, tii. 749. President Jackson's message, Dec. 21, 1836. In 1818, Mr. Cay proposed in Congress a mission to the South American provinces, to express the sympathy of the United States, and with a view to enter into friendly relations with them at a future day. The proposition was rejected by a vote of 115 to 45, on the ground of the still unsettled state of the provinces and the continuance of actual war. At the next session of Congress, in November 1818, President Monroe, in his annual message, referred to the condition of those provinces ; to the probable mediation of the allied powers; and expressed his hope and belief that they would not intervene by force, and his satisfaction with the course of neutrality adopted by the United States. In his message of December, 1819, he says that Buenos Ayres "still maintains unshaken the independence which it declared in 1×15, and has enjoyed since 1810. Like success has attended Chili and the provinces north of La Plata, and likewise Venezuela." He speaks of the situation and resources of the provinces as giving them advantages very difficult for Spain, so distant a power, to overcome; and adds: "The steadiness, consistency, and success, with whh they have pursued their object, as evinced more particularly by the undisputed sovereignty which Buenos Ayres has so long enjoyed, evidently give them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other nations. These sentiments on the part of the United States have not been withheld from other powers with whom it is destrable to act in concert. Should it become manifest to the world, that the efforts of Span to subdue these provinces will be fruitless, it may be presumed that the Spanast. Government itself will give up the contest. In producing such a determination, at cannot be doubted that the opinions of friendly powers who have taken no part in the controversy will have their merited influence." At the same time, the President |