of the Constitution.

May we not then most reasonably conclude that a delegation of power, which inevitably would lead to consequences so sadly dreadful, has not been made? Moreover, it is certain that the one, consolidated community, (to whom alone the transfer, if made at all, has been made,) great and mighty as it would be, in possession of such a power-supreme and competent for all the powers of government, as sovereignty must be cannot, in fact, add to or detract from our state constitutions one single power, or amend one syllable of the compact, except in the mode directed by the separate people of the states. If this be true, (as it is notoriously,) how is it possible to imagine that the sovereignty of the states has been transferred and concentrated into one community? It is not so; it cannot be so. To the American mind, the idea of a sovereign community subjected to forms of government by the will of others than their own, and possessing no power to alter or abolish those forms of government, is most monstrous and revolting.

Again, the separate existence of the states is recognized by the Constitution, over and again, from beginning to end, and that, too, not in occult insinuations, but in language clear, and indubitable-language around which even the mightiest minds, striving with all the politician's tact, and the demagogue's deceptive ingenuity, have failed to weave the web of mystery. The Constitution, in first words of its preamble, proclaims as its creators, and its high authority, not the people of the United State, but the people of “the United States." The 2d sect. of the 1st art. requires that representatives and direct taxes (those powerful

instruments to control governments) shall be apportioned, not equally among a consolidated people, but among the several states, and that according to a standard, which ill accords with the idea of a single people-a standard, the basis of which is neither wealth, extent of territory, nor absolute numbers, but altogether arbitrary, and evidently the effect of compromise between sovereign states. Besides, in apportioning to each state its number of representatives, unrepresented fractions must always remain, which together constitute a number too vast and important to be unrepresented, if ours is the representative government of a single community. Again, the 3d sec. of the same article commences with the declaration that "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the Legislature thereof," thereby recognizing the equality of small and large states, which, unjust as it would appear, considering them as mere districts of one vast empire, is yet in perfect accordance with the idea of their sovereignty, and with that idea only. By the clause cited, the existence of the state governments, under the control of none other than the states themselves, is rendered absolutely necessary for the existence of the federal government, and consequently, for the operation of the compact. Thus we see that the separate and continued existence of the parties, without which the compact must be void, is clearly and firmly established by it.

The 1st sec. 2d article also furnishes a strong and powerful defence of the position we take. It places the choice of President entirely under the control of the states, and fixes a standard of influence, alike ar

bitrary with those for the election of representatives and senators-a standard by which even a minority of the collective people are impowered to elect, even in defiance of majorities. So it will appear from the following table, prepared from the census of 1840.

So it is shown, regarding the white population alone, or the total, the last mentioned states containing a population far less than the others, appoint a majority of electors, and are thereby enabled to elect the President. This furnishes a most powerful argument in support of the theory we advance. For it is a circumstance that cannot be reconciled with any other, and especially with that of a consolidated community. Deeming the doctrine of distributed sovereignty sufficiently established by the arguments already advanced, we omit

the examination of many other clauses equally strong in support of it.

In view of the facts alluded to already, notorious as they are, it is strange indeed that any are found advocating the doctrine of consolidation, yet stranger still to find in the lead of such some among the greatest of our countrymen-men of gigantic talent, extensive erudition, and transcendent genius, whose integrity and patriotism cannot be doubted, attested as it is by most distinguished services, and lives of devotion to their country. How comes it then-can it be to mislead? There is not a thought of them but awakens gratitude, and assures us they would have scorned to deceive. How then is it to be accounted for? Can it be party prejudice? Their liberal views would seem to answer otherwise; but yet perhaps they may have been unconscious victims of its power, for oft it seeks the mightiest minds as such and steals upon the most observant, unobserved. Still charity inclines to solve the question otherwise, and trace its answer in their needless jealousies, unfounded fears and mistrust of the union as it is. Leaving this subject, we now turn to examine the distribution of the delegated powers among the three departments of the agent or government, provided by the compact for its execution.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT.

ALL governments consist of a combination of three great and fundamental powers-the executive, the legislative, and judicial. The mode and extent of

their exercise constitute the distinctive features of all governments. In a despotic government they exist to an unlimited degree. If exercised by the will of a single person, the government is termed an absolute monarchy. If confided in the same degree, to a particular class of persons, it may be termed an absolute aristocracy. If exercised by the people at large, it is an absolute democracy. If each of these powers be exercised by distinct functionaries, the government is then said to be mixed-this is the most general denomination, and applicable to most governments. If the executive be hereditary, and vested in a single person, it may be termed a mixed monarchy. If hereditary, and vested in particular persons, or select classes, it is called a mixed aristocracy. If it be delegated to a representative, chosen by, and from the community at large, it may be termed a mixed democracy or republic. This last class, and indeed all others, except an absolute monarchy, may be divided into simple and compound-simple when it is purely national, or federal, and compound when it partakes the nature of both. Our government may be properly classed in this last division, which will hereafter more clearly appear. The division of these three great powers has been esteemed among enlightened statesman as indispensable to a free government. So well persuaded were the framers of the Constitution, of the truth of this principle, that their first resolution was, that “a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive." Some have even proposed that these powers should be entirely separated. But this doctrine, though