its ships, in its service, and set up a right, an immunity so to do. They do not, and should not assert such right; but they say, and rightfully, to the party which attempts to redress its wrongs, or to assert its rights in this mode, you cannot take the law into your own hands. If wrong has been done by the United States, it shall be compensated; the nation, in its sovereign capacity, is the dispenser of its own justice; it will not do, and cannot suffer wrong; it cannot leave to the casual, irregular, and accidental arbitrament of another, the redress of its supposed wrongs. In this particular, and upon this subject, it may well be said, our system, our principles, have exerted an influence, which has not been surpassed by that of any other nation. The right of exemption, the immunity from search, has been conceded by France, in a treaty made with the United States. England has not yielded the position, so far as I know, by express stipulation, but her statesmen have yielded the pretension. It may now be regarded as settled, as a well established principle of international law, that the right of visitation and search, in time of peace, under any pretext, cannot be sustained ; that the flag of every country, in time of peace, must be regarded as a safeguard and protection to those over whom its folds are spread. In the assertion of this principle, in the ascertainment of neutral rights, the United States and its system have done much. The freedom which American citizens boast as their inheritance, the liberty regulated by law, which is the result of their system, have done much, have had an influence upon the institutions, upon the thoughts of other nations. It is for you to say, whether you will, by holding fast to your integrity, to your principles, to your system, continue to give force and effect to this influence. You must answer this for yourselves; not by your professions, but by your. conduct, by an adherence to the union, by which your political rights, as one of the nations of the earth, have been recognized and upheld, without which they must inevitably become the sport of every wind. The examination which I have made of our system, in its treaty negotiations, has increased in my mind the importance of maintaining our free institutions. It has disclosed its power and adaptation to any and every well educated, intelligent, well disposed people. God grant that it may be perpetual! LECTURE III. THE EXTERNAL POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.-AMBASSADORS. THE WARMAKING POWER. -THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY. THE relation of nations is in its character individual. It is the intercourse of government with government; it is entirely distinct from the privileges which a nation within its own territory, as matter of comity or contract, may extend to the citizens of another. Upon this ground, a nation does not, de jure, officially or judicially know the internal character of the government, or of the institutions of other nations. A nation learns these particulars, so far as it may be fit and essential to learn them, so as to determine whether the condition of any particular nation is such as to render an intercourse with it practicable or desirable, and only so far as may be essential to determine whether political or commercial arrangements can be made, with a reasonable certainty of the existence of some power or authority adequate to make, to perform them. Whenever governments which exercise an absolute power, negotiate with each other, they may contract at pleasure. Not so when limited governments contract with each other, or with absolute governments. In such case, the unlimited or absolute government must regulate its official intercourse so as to conform to the construction and limited power of the government with which it con tracts. The external power of a government is, therefore, naturally and ordinarily executive in its character, and is exercised by the person or department which is intrusted with its political duties or associations. The treaty-making power in its exercise, as has been shown, is not confided exclusively to the executive, but is subject to the consent of an independent body, (a portion of the legislative department,) and may, in some instances, as has been shown, be controlled or defeated by the neglect or refusal of the legislative department to furnish the means of execution. The same distrust, or caution, the same limitation of power, is manifest in the appointment of diplomatic and commercial agents. By the constitution of the United States, the president has power to nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. During the recess of the senate, he may fill any vacancy which may occur in such offices; and appointments thus made may continue until the end of the next session of the senate. The president has the exclusive power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers from other nations, accredited to the United States. This discrimination is worthy of note. The character of a foreign minister is in accordance with the character of the sovereignty which he represents; his appointment is the exercise of an act of sovereignty. The nation to which he is accredited cannot regard the mode of his appointment as material to itself. The character of a minister sent from a country is material to the party by which he is sent. He He may discredit his principal, may endanger the peace of his country, and be the means of producing disastrous collis * Constitution of United States, art. ii. sections 2 and 3. ion. These difficulties are obviated, as the senate is required to pass upon the fitness of those delegated to represent the sovereignty of the United States and its institutions at foreign courts. The privileges and duties of ambassadors and other public ministers, the matters which may rightfully be the subject of diplomatic correspondence, are not conferred or regulated by local or municipal law, but by the law of nations. In this particular our system has no peculiarity, but its influence is felt abroad through our diplomatic agents and correspondence. Prior to the fifteenth century, the intercourse of nations with each other, was irregular and casual. During that century and the next succeeding, it assumed a different character, became more frequent, regular, and permanent. During the period referred to, combinations and alliances were entered into between the European powers; some of which were for peaceful, some for warlike purposes. These gave rise to alliances, which to some extent have been continued to the present time, which were entered into to maintain a supposed or assumed balance of power, to prevent the acquisition by one nation of too much territory, or the attainment of a power not easily resisted, or which might become dangerous and alarming. These alliances were entered into by the executive, by the governments as such, acting independent of the people, and not as the representatives of the people, or of their will. As these alliances and combinations had no direct and immediately perceptible bearing upon the daily individual or domestic life of the people, they operated ultimately as the means of oppression, and as the means of sustaining, in different governments, the existence of an absolute power. In the seventeenth century, Louis XIV., by his diplomacy, added to his absolute power no less than by his arms, and by the wars in |