punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment; for Christianity is part of the laws of England." The publication of a blasphemous libel on the Old Testament has been held to be indictable offense at common law.11 Some cases admit that Christianity is so far a part of the common law, or the law of the land, that the law will not permit the essential truths of religion to be ridiculed and reviled, and that blasphemy was an indictable offense at common law.12

§ 2892. Statutory definition.-An early Massachusetts statute provided "that if any person shall wilfully blaspheme the holy name of God, by denying, cursing or contumeliously reproaching God, his creation, government or final judging of the world, etc." In commenting on this subject the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said: "In general, blasphemy may be described as consisting in speaking evil of the Deity with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God. It is purposely using words concerning God, calculated and designed to impair and destroy the reverence, respect and confidence due to him, as the intelligent creator, governor and judge of the world. It embraces the idea of detraction when used toward the Supreme Being; as 'calumny' usually carries the same idea, when applied to an individual. It is a wilful and malicious attempt to lessen men's reverence of God, by denying his existence, or his attributes as an intelligent creator, governor and judge of men, and to prevent their having confidence in him as such."13 The Pennsylvania statute provided "that whosoever shall wilfully, premeditatedly, and despitefully blaspheme, and speak loosely and profanely of Almighty God, Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit,

10 4 Blackstone Comm. 59; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 394; State v. Chandler, 2 Har. (Del.) 553; Aikenhead's Case, 13 State Tr. 918; Williams' Case, 26 State Tr. 654; Eaton's Case, 31 State Tr. 927; Taylor's Case, Vent. 293; Rex v. Woolston, 2 Str. 834, Fitzg. 64; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 8 E. C. L. 12; Cowan v. Milbourn, L. R., 2 Exch. 230; Nayler's Case, 5 State Tr. 802; Reg. v. Justice of Lancashire, 7 Cox Cr. Cas.

76; Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 217.

11 Reg. v. Hetherington, 5 Jur. 529; Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 217; Williams' Case, 26 State Tr. 654.

12 Andrew v. New York Bible &c. Soc., 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 156; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 394; Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. (U. S.) 126, 198.

13 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290.

or the Scriptures of Truth, and is legally convicted thereof, shall forfeit, etc."14

§ 2893. Character of language used. However explicit and definite the statutes may be it is not always necessary, in order to establish the offense, to prove that the name of the Deity or any appellation thereof was used. It has been held that where "any words importing an imprecation of divine vengeance or implying divine condemnation so used as to constitute a public nuisance would suffice."15 And the Supreme Court of Tennessee said: "A single act of profanity would not ordinarily be sufficient to convict a defendant. But, as we have said, even a single oath, either by its terms, its tone or manner, or the circumstances under which it was uttered, might be a nuisance."1" In an indictment for blasphemy, it must be charged, and the proof must show that the words were spoken profanely. This was held to be the gist of the offense.17

§ 2894. Words used in hearing of others-Proof.-It is not sufficient to establish the offense of blasphemy to prove the speaking of the words only. And it has been held that a person could not be convicted on such an indictment on proof of his confession that he had made use of the words charged in the indictment. In order to establish the offense the state must prove that the defendant used the language alleged to be blasphemous and that it was so used in the presence and hearing of other persons.18 The rule adopted by a recent case is "that profane swearing and cursing in a loud and boisterous tone of voice, in the presence and hearing of citizens of the commonwealth passing and repassing on the public streets and highways of

"Updegraph V. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 394; a very complete collection of the statutes of the various states on the subject of blasphemy, together with cases on the sufficiency of the indictment and the constitutionality of such statutes is found in the notes in, 22 L. R. A. 353.

"Gaines v. State, 75 Tenn. 410; Isom v. State (Tenn.) Sept. Term 1880; Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 Conn. 375.

15 Young v. State, 78 Tenn. 165.

17 Commonwealth V. Spratt, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 365; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. (Pa.)

394.

18 People v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 14; State v. Chandler, 2 Har. (Del.) 553; Goree v. State, 71 Ala. 7; State v. Pepper, 68 N. Car. 259; State v. Barham, 79 N. Car. 646; Commonwealth v. Linn, 158 Pa. St. 22, 27 Atl. 843, 22 L. R. A. 353; Bell V. State, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 42; Young v. State, 78 Tenn. 165.

the commonwealth to such an extent as to be a common nuisance to all citizens being present and hearing the same, is an indictable offense at common law."19 But under some statutes in prosecutions for blasphemy or profanity it is not necessary to prove that the profane language was used publicly.20 Under a statute which makes it a crime to "profanely swear and curse in a public place," it has been correctly held that "the indictment should set out and the proof should show the words spoken."21 And according to the rule in some states a single act of profanity, or profane swearing, is punishable as against good morals.22

§ 2895. Profanity-Nuisance.-According to the statutes and decisions in some states it must be stated in the indictment and proved on the trial that the profanity charged was uttered in the hearing of divers persons, and the proof must be sufficient to show that the act constituted a nuisance. As said in one case: "To render the crime indictable, the acts must be so repeated and public as to become a nuisance and inconvenience to the public, for they then constitute a public nuisance. It has been repeatedly decided by this court that profane swearing is not punishable by indictment in this state. when committed in single acts; but to make it so, as has been intimated by several judges, it must be perpetrated so publicly and repeatedly as to become an annoyance and inconvenience to the citizens at large."23 The Supreme Court of Tennessee adopted the same rule and held that whenever, upon a trial under a sufficient indictment, there is evidence that the swearing, or profane language was a nuisance to the public, the offense is made out.24 From these holdings it must not

19 Commonwealth V. Linn, 158 Pa. St. 22, 27 Atl. 843, 22 L. R. A. 353.

20 Bodenhamer v. State, 60 Ark. 10, 28 S. W. 507; Taney v. State, 9 Ind. App. 46, 36 N. E. 295.

21 Walton v. State, 64 Miss. 207, 8 So. 171; State v. Freeman, 63 Vt. 496, 22 Atl. 621; State v. Ratliff, 10 Ark. 530; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 394; Rex v. Sparling, 1 Str. 497; Rex v. Popplewell, 1 Str. 686; 2 Bishop Cr. Proc.,

123.

22 Delaney, Ex parte, 43 Cal. 478.

23 State v. Jones, 9 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 38; State v. Deberry, 5 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 371; State v. Brown, 3 Mur. (N. Car.) 224; State v. Waller, 3 Mur. (N. Car.) 229; State v. Baldwin, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 195; State v. Ellar, 1 Dev. (N. Car.) 267; State v. Pepper, 68 N. Car. 259; State v. Powell, 70 N. Car. 67; Delaney, Ex parte, 43 Cal. 478.

24 State V. Graham, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 134; State v. Steele, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 135; Gaines v. State, 75 Tenn. 410; Young v. State, 78 Tenn. 165.

be understood that it would be required to prove a succession of separate and distinct acts or occasions of profanity. Such a rule would defeat the purpose of all such statutes. But consistently with these cases, where the procf shows that on a single occasion, the continued and public use of profane oaths frequently and boisterously repeated for the space of five minutes, was held sufficient under an indictment charging a public nuisance. 25 Under the common law, as held and administered in some of the states, in order to establish a case of profanity the proof must show that it was so public as to be a nuisance.26

§ 2896. Words used-Illustrations.-The general definitions of blasphemy must be relied on principally as precedents. Of the many cases sustaining indictments for such offense, very few of them profess to give the language used. Some, however, have stated the substance of the charge. Thus in one case, it was held a sufficient charge of blasphemy where the accused, among other things, used in substance, the following: "That the holy scriptures were a mere fable, that they were contradictions, and that although they contained a number of good things, yet they contained a great many lies."27 In another case it was held sufficient where the accused used the wicked and blasphemous words, to wit, "Jesus Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore."28 Another expression held sufficient was as follows: "That the virgin Mary was a whore and Jesus Christ was a bastard."2 Another charge was held sufficient where it stated that the accused did "unlawfully and profanely curse, swear, aver and imprecate by and in the name of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost, by then and there unlawfully saying 'God damned.' "30

"State v. Chrisp, 85 N. Car. 528; State v. Jones, 9 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 38; State v. Brewington, 84 N. Car. 783.

1 Archibald Pl. & Pr. 607; Clark Cr. Law 303; 2 Wharton Cr. Law, § 1431; State v. Jones, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 38; State v. Powell, 70 N. Car. 67; Gaines v. State, 75 Tenn. 41

27 Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 394.

29 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290.

"State v. Chandler, 2 Har. (Del.)

553.

30 Taney v. State, 9 Ind. App. 46, 36 N. E. 295.

§ 2897. Generally.-Bribery has been defined as the voluntary giving or receiving of anything of value in corrupt payment for an official act done or to be done.1 Another definition that has frequently been approved is that bribery is the receiving or offering any undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, whose ordinary profession or business relates to the administration of public justice, in order to influence his behavior in office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity.2 But even at common law a similar giving, offering or receiving of money or any undue reward to an election officer or even to a voter to corruptly influence him might constitute bribery; and, under some of the modern statutes, the term has a still broader meaning.*

12 Bishop Cr. Law, § 85; State v. Pritchard, 107 N. Car. 921, 12 S. E. 50; Honaker v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 170, 175, 24 S. E. 544, 57 Am. St. 847, 32 L. R. A. 413; as to instigating and soliciting bribe, see Note III, 25 L. R. A. 434.

21 Russell Crimes, 154; Watson v. State, 29 Ark. 299, 302; State v. Davis, 2 Pen. (Del.) 139, 141, 45 Atl. 394; Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 65, 16 Am. R. 569; see also, State v. Miles, 89 Me. 142, 36 Atl. 70; as to embracery, see, 1 Russell

Crimes 264; 1 Hawkins P. C., Chap. 85,7; 4 Blackstone Comm. 140.

3

Rex v. Plympton, 2 Ld. Raym. 1377; Russell Crimes 154; Simpson v. Yeend, L. R. 4 Q. B. 626; Bayntun v. Cattle, 1 Mood. & R. 265; see also note in, 5 L. R. A. 217.

See, United States v. McBosley, 29 Fed. 897; Thompson v. State, 16 Ind. App. 84, 44 N. E. 763; State v. Williams, 136 Mo. 293, 38 S. W. 75 (bribery of witness); Berry V. Hull, 6 N. Mex. 643, 30 Pac. 936.