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§ 3141. Definition-Elements.-Seduction, as such, was not an indictable crime at common law. It is now made such, however, by statute in nearly all, if not all, jurisdictions. Seduction is defined by the statutes of most states as the act of persuading or inducing a woman of previous chaste character (or of good repute for chastity, according to some of them), to depart from the path of virtue and obtaining her consent to illicit intercourse, by means of promises and persuasions. It is generally necessary to show that the intercourse was accomplished by some artifice or deception, and the law will not

1 Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527; People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 46 N. E. 1040, 60 Am. St. 592; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. (Va.) 627, 16 Am. Dec. 776; 87 Am. Dec. 405, note.

2 See, People v. De Fore, 64 Mich. 693, 31 N. W. 585, 8 Am. St. 863; Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Ore. 238, 21 Pac. 129, 11 Am. St. 822; Phillips v. State, 108 Ind. 406, 9 N. E. 345; Callahan v. State, 63 Ind. 198; Norton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, 16 So. 264, 87 Am. Dec. 405, 406, note. This does not mean, however, that there cannot be seduction where a woman, although once fallen, has reformed

and is chaste at the time of the alleged seduction. Perhaps no better general definition of seduction as a crime can be given than that suggested in the note in 76 Am. St. 659, 682, although even that definition does not include every element essential under some statutes. It is as follows: "The act of a man in seducing a woman of previous chaste character or good repute to have unlawful sexual intercourse with him, either by means of promises, persuasions, or arts of deception, or by means of a promise of marriage, or by means of a promise of marriage and some other persuasion."

inflict the penalty visited upon seduction as a crime where it is shown that only an appeal to the woman's passion was indulged in by the man. In many, but not all, of the states there must also be a promise of marriage. Essential elements, under all the statutes, however, are the illicit intercourse," and the consent of the woman, which, if not obtained by a false or feigned promise of marriage, must generally be obtained at least by some kind of arts, wiles, enticement or persuasion. It is also essential in many of the states that the woman should be unmarried."

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§ 3142. Burden of proof.-The burden is upon the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and, of course, the essential elements of the crime must be proved. We have already

State v. Hemm, 82 Iowa 609, 48 N. W. 971; People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112; State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268, 19 N. W. 202; State v. Patterson, 88 Mo. 88, 57 Am. R. 374; see, however, Powell v. State, (Miss.) 20 So. 4.

Mills v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863; Barker v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 820, 20 S. E. 776; Callahan v. State, 63 Ind. 198; 87 Am. Dec. 408, note; see also, People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112; Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542; Cole v. State, 40 Tex. 147; People v. Kehoe, 123 Cal. 224, 55 Pac. 911, 69 Am. St. 52; West v. State, 1 Wis. 209; Wright v. State, 62 Ark. 145, 34 S. W. 545, 76 Am. St. 670, note.

* Cunningham v. State, 73 Ala. 51; Cheaney v. State, 36 Ark. 74; People v. Hubbard, 92 Mich. 322, 52 N. W. 729; State v. Reeves, 97 Mo. 668, 10 S. W. 841, 10 Am. St. 349; Safford v. People, 1 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 474; State v. Horton, 100 N. Car. 443, 6 S. E. 238, 6 Am. St. 613; State v. King, 9 S. Dak. 628, 70 N. W. 1046; Bailey v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 540, 38 S. W. 185; Gorzell v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 82, 63 S. W. 126.

"Jones v. State, 90 Ga. 616, 16 S. E. 380; People v. Gibbs, 70 Mich. 425, 38 N. W. 257; People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 46 N. E. 1040, 60 Am. St. 592; State v. Horton, 100 N. Car. 443, 6 S. E. 238, 6 Am. St. 613; Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 320, 39 S. W. 684; Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 444. In most of these cases seduction is distinguished from rape mainly on this ground. See also, State v. Lewis, 48 Iowa 578, 30 Am. R. 407; Hodges v. Bales, 102 Ind. 494; People v. Royal, 53 Cal. 62; People v. De Fore, 64 Mich. 693, 31 N. W. 585, 8 Am. St. 863; and compare, State v. Kingsley, 39 Iowa 439. 7 See note in 76 Am. St. 676, and authorities referred to there and in subsequent sections in this chapter. Essential elements under the statutes of several different jurisdictions are referred to in La Rosae v. State, 132 Ind. 219, 221, 37 N. E. 789. See, People v. Krusick, 93 Cal. 74, 28 Pac. 794; State v. Marshall, 137 Mo. 463, 36 S. W. 619; Snodgrass v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S. W. 366; see also, Smith v. State, 107 Ala. 139, 18 So. 306; Suther v. State, 118 Ala. 88, 24 So. 43; State v. Fisher, 162 Mo. 169, 62 S. W. 690;

called attention to those that are prescribed by most of the statutes, but the local statutes and decisions must be consulted upon the subject. The statutes of most states make it a crime to seduce a female of good repute for chastity or of previous chaste character, under promise of marriage, or the like; therefore it is held to be the duty of the state in these cases, to prove her good repute or previous chaste character, as the case may be, affirmatively. The burden is upon the state to prove the age of the female, her previous chaste character, the promise of marriage and the seduction because of the promise, and where the state has done this, a prima facie case is established.1o The burden is also upon the state, in many jurisdictions at least, to show that the prosecutrix was an unmarried woman at the time of the alleged seduction.11. In some states the female must be under the age of twenty-one years.12

§ 3143. Presumptions. It is frequently said that in a prosecution for seduction the chastity of the one seduced at the time of the

State v. Brown, 64 N. J. L. 414, 45 Atl. 800. But in some jurisdictions the presumption of chastity has been carried so far that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the character of the prosecutrix for chastity was bad, in order to escape conviction on that ground, and that a reasonable doubt by the jury on that subject is insufficient to acquit. See, State v. Hemm, 82 Iowa 609, 48 N. W. 971; State v. Brown, 86 Iowa 121, 53 N. W. 92.

'Oliver v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 215, 47 Am. R. 704; Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640, 39 Am. R. 610; State v. McCaskey, 104 Mo. 644, 16 S. W. 511; West v. State, 1 Wis. 209; People v. Wallace, 109 Cal. 611, 42 Pac. 159; Norton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, 16 So. 264, 18 So. 916, 48 Am. St. 538; State v. Eckler, 106 Mo. 585, 17 S. W. 814, 27 Am. St. 372; see also, Harvey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 156, 65 Pac. 837; State v. Horton, 100 N. Car. 443, 6 S. E. 238, 6 Am. St. 613; contra,

State v. McClintic, 73 Iowa 663, 35 N. W. 696; also see, State v. Thornton, 108 Mo. 640, 18 S. W. 841; Barker v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 820, 20 S. E. 776; Mills v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863; Caldwell v. State, (Ark.) 83 S. W. 929. This may depend somewhat upon the language of the particular statute.

10 State v. Lockerby, 50 Minn. 363, 52 N. W. 958, 36 Am. St. 656; State v. Thornton, 108 Mo. 640, 18 S. W. 841; People v. Wallace, 109 Cal. 611, 42 Pac. 159; Oliver v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 215, 47 Am. R. 704.

"People v. Krusick, 93 Cal. 74, 28 Pac. 794; West v. State, 1 Wis. 209; State v. Wheeler, 108 Mo. 658, 18 S. W. 924.

12 Burns Ind. Rev. Stat., § 2070; New York Penal Code, 284; Connecticut Gen. Stat. 1526; Iowa Code, 3867; Michigan Hore. Sts. 9283; Missouri Rev. Stat. 3486; Ohio Rev. Stat. 7022; Rhode Island Pub. Stat. 244.

seduction will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 13 and, in a sense this is true. This presumption, however, may be rebutted by circumstances surrounding the case or by proven or admitted facts.14 Though the law presumes the prosecutrix chaste, still the burden is upon the state, under many of the statutes at least, to allege and prove her previous chaste character or good repute, for every one is presumed innocent until proved guilty.15 This is believed to be the better rule, at least as to good repute, although as shown in the first note to the last preceding section, there is some conflict among the authorities. A presumption of reformation may arise where a reasonable time has elapsed after the first seduction or intercourse, but where the act is committed frequently, no such presumption can well arise, and the burden is upon the state.16

§ 3144. Question of law or fact.-Every case of seduction, it is said, must be determined by the jury upon the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, for what would be sufficient to overpower the mind of one woman would have but litttle influence upon the mind of another; therefore, the age, advantages in life, the intelligence of the parties and their condition are circumstances to be considered and weighed in the balance in determining whether there has been seduction. It has been held that a witness will not be allowed to testify that the defendant acted as a lover of the girl, as this question is for

1 Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 Am. Dec. 708; People v. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134; People v. Squires, 49 Mich. 487, 13 N. W. 828; McTyier v. State, 91 Ga. 254, 18 S. E. 140; O'Neill v. State, 85 Ga. 383, 11 S. E. 856; Mills v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863; Ferguson v. State, 71 Miss. 805, 15 So. 66; State v. McClintic, 73 Iowa 663, 35 N. W. 696, holds that the previous chaste character of the prosecutrix is presumed and the state is not required to prove it; see and compare, State v. Wenz, 41 Minn. 196, 42 N. W. 933; Norton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, 18 So. 916, 48 Am. St. 538.

14 State v. Bowman, 45 Iowa 418; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. R. 17; McTyier v. State, 91 Ga. 254,

VOL. 4 ELLIOTT Ev.-30

18 S. E. 140; Mills v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863.

15 State v. McCaskey, 104 Mo. 644, 16 S. W. 511; West v. State, 1 Wis. 209; State v. Wenz, 41 Minn. 190, 42 N. W. 933; State v. Eckler, 106 Mo. 858, 17 S. W. 814, 27 Am. St. 372; see also note to, People v. De Fore, 8 Am. St. 871; note to, State v. Carron, 87 Am. Dec. 407; Bishop Stat. Crimes (2nd ed.) 648; Suther v. State, 118 Ala. 88, 24 So. 43.

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the jury, and the witness must confine himself to a description of the acts and will not be allowed to draw inferences.18 The competency of corroborative evidence is a question for the court, but the weight or sufficiency of the evidence is for the jury.19 And the question of the chastity of the prosecutrix is a question for the jury.20

§ 3145. Chastity. The statutes of many of the states provide that the woman seduced shall have been of a previous chaste character.21 The question of the virtue of the prosecutrix is an important question to be considered in determining whether the defendant is guilty of seduction.22 The previous chaste character referred to in the statutes of most states is held to have reference to the time immediately preceding the act, and under no circumstances will evidence be allowed which has reference to the woman's character after the offense.2 23. There is some conflict in the several states as to just how long before the act the defendant may show improper relations with other men, but evidence upon the subject of previous chaste character must not extend to a time that is too remote. The chastity of the female under such statutes may be impeached by evidence of

18 Carney v. State, 79 Ala. 14; Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177.

19 State v. Bell, 49 Iowa 440; State v. Kingsley, 39 Iowa 439; State v. Brinkhaus, 34 Minn. 285, 25 N. W. 642; State v. Curran, 51 Iowa 112, 49 N. W. 1006; State v. Smith, (Iowa) 100 N. W. 40; Jones v. State, 90 Ga. 616, 16 S. E. 380; see, however, Mills v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863; Cunningham v. State, 73 Ala. 51.

20 McTyier v. State, 91 Ga. 254, 18 S. E. 140; State v. Hemm, 82 Iowa 609, 48 N. W. 971.

21 Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192, 15 Am. R. 664; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. R. 17; People v. Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90, 46 N. E. 1040, 60 Am. St. 592; note to, State v. Carron, 87 Am. Dec. 408; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. R. 17, holds in substance that even where the statute did not

provide that the woman seduced should have been of previous chaste character, still this is a matter of investigation; see also, Putman v. State, 29 Tex. App. 454, 16 S. W. 97; Norton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, 18 So. 916, 48 Am. St. 538.

22 Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 Am. Dec. 408; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. Ga. 474, 20 S. E. 211; State v. Deitrick, 51 Iowa 467, 1 N. W. 732.

23 Bracken v. State, 111 Ala. 68, 20 So. 636, 56 Am. St. 23; People v. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134; State V. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151, 51 Am. R. 234; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644; State v. Clemons, 78 Iowa 123, 42 N. W. 562; People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112; State v. Dunn, 53 Iowa 526, 5 N. W. 707; Mann v. State, 34 Ga. 1; State v. Wells, 48 Iowa 671; see. Brock v. State, 95 Ga. 474, 20 S. E. 211; Smith v. Commonwealth, (Ky.) 32 S. W. 137.

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