portion of Europe; and which would lay a foundation, if not resolutely and vigorously opposed, of future and incalculable misery. Such resistance, he trusted, it would be the glory of this country effectually to accomplish. He did not think it practicable, by any other and better means, to procure from the population of the country a force sufficiently large to meet the magnitude of the dangers with which we are menaced. If the volunteer plan were abandoned, compulsory means, however obnoxious, must be resorted to, or the security of the country would be precarious. At all events, whatever might be the imperfections of the system, he felt that he could not be contradicted in the assertion, that none other could now be looked to as a substitute. The institution cannot be abolished. The danger is too near and immiment to admit of a total change. Without inquiring into the general conduct of ministers towards the volunteers, he conceived it proper to observe, that they should have been more attentive to the regulation of the corps. They should have communicated, through the Jord lieutenants of counties, more precise instructions, with respect to the best method of training the volunteers, procuring regular attendance at drills, and enforcing a due attention to military discipline. No minor difficulties, no mistaken or narrow notions of economy, -should impede such an important object as the improvement of the -volunteer force in military discipline, as far as the nature of the institution, the peculiar character of its members, and the proximity of our dangers, would admit. This alone would enable us to contend against our powerful and inveterate enemy with such effect, as not only to accomplish his final discomfiture, but to convince him and his infatu ated adherents, that any attempt to invade and subjugate England can only originate in the wildest ambi tion, and must terminate in their ruin and disgrace. Mr. Pitt said, he felt the most perfect conviction that much re mained to be done, for which the bill before the house made no provision. It was with regret that he perceived the volunteer system was still exceedingly deficient as a military institution. It appeared to him extremely inadequate to its ob ject, and the proper means for promoting discipline had not been adopted. The means which he deemed most material, were, the opportunity of regular instructions, the securing of attendance at drill, and the enforcement of silence and steadiness when at drill. The number of days appointed for attending drill, he considered insuf ficient even to acquire a knowledge of the simplest part of military instruction. In order to promote their efficiency, he proposed that volunteer corps should be encou raged to go on permanent duty, as had been the case last summer in particular districts on the coast; always taking care to assemble the corps in the place convenient to their general residence. For this purpose, he proposed that a small bounty of seven shillings per week, indepen dently of one shilling per day, should be given to each volunteer who would consent to march on such permanent duty. This plan he was persuaded would do more towards promoting discipline and military habits, than drilling at diffe rent and detached periods. Attendance at drill, he conceived, might be enforced by proper regulations imposing fines on defaulters, and rendering rendering inattention at parades liable to arrest and detention, until tried before a magistrate, who should have the power of commuting any fine for a short imprisonment of two or three days. Such regulations, he thought, were called for by absolute necessity. As to the right of electing officers, he hoped that, upon vacancies, commanding officers would judiciously consult the sentiments of the corps, but not take their individual suffrages in any thing like the form of a popular election. He contended that the volunteer establishment was not injurious to the recruiting service; but, on the contrary, might, under proper modifications, be made to contribute to the progressive augmentation of the regular force. For this purpose, he should propose, that the militia should be gradually reduced from its present establishment to its old standard; and that, according as vacancies arise in that body, a ballot should take place for an equal number, not to fill up these vacancies, but to go to the regular augmentation of a military body formed somewhat upon the principle of the army of reserve, and calculated to afford supplies for the recruiting of the regular army. He recommended the introduction of a plan to limit the bounties for substitutes to a sum inferior to the bounty given to the regular recruit; and he thought it would be proper to allot a certain number of regiments to be recruited in certain counties, in proportion to the population of such counties. He also expressed himself in favour of the erection of fortifications, and dwelt on the propriety of improving our naval defence, which he represented to be very defective; and in this representation he disclaimed all in fluence of any personal prejudice. This was not a time for the operation of party spirit. Every mind should be engaged, every heart should be devoted to the defence of the state. It was not enough that our preparations were great; they ought to be complete. Mr. Windham, in opposition to the argument that the volunteer system was necessary, because, from the urgency of danger, no measure of equal advantage could be devised, observed, that we were not called on merely to provide for an immediate exigency, but to consi der what species of force would be adequate to our permanent defence. He agreed with Mr. Pitt in thinking that terror was not a likely mode of procuring a continuance of voluntary service, and approved of the option given to volunteers to withdraw, as being the best means to encourage a continuance of their engagements. But he was apprehen sive that many would resign from the unpalatable conditions annexed to this option. He entertained an opinion decidedly in favour of an armed peasantry. They would not require that proficiency and skill, without which the volunteers, by mingling with the regulars, would impede and confuse, rather than serve any useful purpose. He was not desirous that the volunteers should ever become so completely effective, as to give to this country the character of an armed nation; nor, however paradoxical it might appear, should he then deem it more secure. France and Geneva were armed nations, and that circumstance was one of the first causes of the destruction of their liberties. tory obtained with a force of this description by general Dumourier at Jemappe. With respect to the loyalty, integrity, and patriotism of the volunteers, not the slightest doubt could be entertained. Their connection with the crown, and with the laws of their country, should remove every apprehension respecting their principles. The solitary instance of the irregular proceedings of the volunteers at Chester could by no means furnish an argument against the propriety of their general conduct. Instances of insubordination sometimes occurred amongst the best disciplined troops in the world. Adverting to the state of the navy, which appeared unsatisfactory to Mr. Pitt, his lordship enumerated the most prominent details of our maritime force. In the first year of the war, he stated, that we had 91 ships of the line, 129 frigates, and 191 armed vessels of inferior force manned and fit for service. In the last war, we had not the same number of ships of the line, until we were considerably advanced in the third year; our frigates and other vessels did not equal the present number until the fourth year of that war. We have also a numerous flotilla of vessels, not regularly engaged in his majesty's service, but ready to be employed when necessary. The East-India company had furnished 600 vessels of this class, and the dock-yards 370; 200 also were stationed on the coast of Ireland. We have now 77,012 seamen, and 11,990 marines, on actual duty. In the last war we had not an equal number of seamen till the year 1795, and of marines until the year 1796. Mr. Pitt shortly objected to the principle of these comparative stateThere appeared to him to ments. be no fair ground of comparison between the first years of a war, when the previous peace establishment had been only 18,000 men, and that in which it had been 50,000; where they had passed to war from a state of profound peace, and where hostilities were resorted to after a considerable apprehension of war. Mr. Whitbread spoke at some length against several of the prominent measures of ministers with respect to the volunteer institution. Mr. secretary Yorke said a few words in explanation, and Mr. Tierney stated the circumstances of irregularity which had arisen in the Southwark corps. At two o'clock, Mr. Fox rose. At that late hour, he expressed an intention of adverting only to a few points. With respect to our naval force, he observed, that the question was not what was our naval strength considered with reference to former wars, but what were the means, and the necessities of service, by which our exertions were now to be regulated. Precisely the same mode of defence was adopted by the admiralty in the American war, when for two years our navy had been inferior to that of France. If it were true, according to the statement of ministers, that, ever since the peace, the French government had never ceased from insult and aggression, our state of preparation should be adequate to what the result of such a situation required. Mr. Fox proceeded to comment on the attorney general's opinion with regard to the right of resignation; and made a variety of remarks on what appeared to him to be inconsistent in the proceedings and declarations of the ministers on that subject. He expressed surprise that, after the volunteer establishment had been formed above seven months, it should now be necessary to make new regulations, notwithstanding the system had been resorted to on the ground of immediate danger. It would be necessary, he conceived, to resort to other measures in order to give permanency to the institution, It might be proper to dispense with some of the perfection which more frequent attendance would bestow, lest the volunteers should be so harassed as to be induced to abandon the service altogether. The right of election, he thought, might have been left to the good sense of the people. But the conduct of ministers in menacing those who should not accommodate them selves to the wishes of government, was calculated to lay a foundation for much dissatisfaction. The chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Gray, and captain Markham spoke shortly upon the subject; when the question for the second reading of the bill was put and carried. On the 29th of February the bill was read a third time. Upon this occasion, Mr. Francis express ed his disapprobation of the bill, on the ground of inefficiency; and laid considerable stress upon the magnitude of the danger to which he conceived the country was exposed. He was anxious to impress this subject on the house, as he was apprehensive, however frequently the critical state of the country was alluded to, we were not sufficiently sensible of the very alarming situation of affairs. Colonel Craufurd succeeded. The present bill appeared to him to be totally inadequate to its object. The regulations which it proposed were no way calculated to call forth the energies of the nation, and to give them a proper direction. He contended that the security of the country was by no Without in means provided for, even if the existing force were somewhat greater than during the last war. For, at no period of the late war, nor, in fact, at any period of the history of England and France, had we so powerful an enemy to contend with as threatens us at present. No part of our force, therefore, should be deficient. tending to say that there was any general deficiency in that great and powerful force, the navy of England, he believed a sufficient supply had not been provided of vessels of a smaller description, which, probably, would be more efficient than a formidable fleet, in opposing that description of force which the enemy were likely to bring against us. The parts of our coast most liable to attack, he asserted, were left in a state of comparative insecurity. In order to render even the regular force more efficient, he recommended that a feeling of sympathy should be excited, with regard to great and glorious achievements. For this purpose, the old regiments which had distinguished themselves, should have been filled up, and the strength of our officers should be duly estimated; and instead of annexing to any particular regiment or battalion such a profusion of staff and other officers, they should be dispersed so as to render them of more effec tive service to the state. The number of officers which we had to a regiment, was deemed by foreigners to be a sufficient establishment for a body of 12 or 1400 men, He entirely disapproved of the whole constitution of the volunteer system, and gave a decided preference to an armed peasantry. Respecting the reference which had been made to the battle of Jemappe, in proof of the efficiency of a volunteer force, he asserted, that the D3 soldiers soldiers alluded to had been engaged from the beginning of the war, and had compelled the greatest commander, and the most formidable armament which Germany could bring against them, to retire. What an armed peasantry could accomplish was substantiated by the achievements of the people of La Vendée. Such a force might render the most essential service. They might attack the enemy as opportunities arose; if defeated, they might separate and reassemble. Their training should be simple; their weapon either a pike, or a musket. The principal thing necessary for them was to handle their arms with expertness. They should be taught the easiest movements; those which might be learned in a few days. One great object would be to move with expedition, in order to attack the cnemy's lines, and harass their progress. The mode of training now in use was first adopted by the king of Prussia. His soldiers had to act on great plains; with us, the field of action was different. We must come in contact with the enemy with whom we were to be engaged. Hedges, ditches, and the various improvements which the country had undergone, would render the regular manœuvres ineffectual. If the volunteers expected the enemy, would form a solid compact body like themselves, they would be deceived. The enemy would appear to be every where one moment, and the next dispersed. He thought, therefore, that the advocates for military perfection in the volunteer. system had conceived an erroneous opinion of such efficiency; for, in his opinion, the simple mode of tactics was preferable. He emphatically insisted on the propriety of arming with pikes the mass of the people who could not otherwise be furnished with arms. He forcibly objected to volunteer exemptions, the establishment of committees, and the armed deliberations of the corps; and again pointed out the indispensable necessity of fortifications. Whatever might be the inefficiency of the measure before the house, he placed the fullest confidence in the spirit of the country, which, in the moment of trial, would surmount any danger to which it might be exposed. England, he was con vinced, would show herself worthy of her antient name; and Britons would now, as they had ever done, resolve to defend their honour, or to lose their lives. General Maitland made a personal reply to colonel Craufurd. After enumerating a variety of topics, upon which he had conceived that the honourable officer would have dilated with much satisfaction, he proceeded to deprecate such speeches as he had just heard, upon the principle that they were calculated to give the strongest encouragement to the enemy. The effect represented to have been produced by the exemptions, he said, was decidedly contradicted by the fact. He confessed himself at a loss to understand what was precisely meant by an armed peasantry. After two or three campaigns, and after many disasters, the armed peasantry might perhaps be converted into pretty good soldiers; but they could by no means form so efficient a force as had been de scribed. They had been tried in America; a country better adapted for them than any other in the world, and under circumstances peculiarly favourable to their mode of warfare. The Americans, however, afterwards found it necessary to have recourse to a regular army. He agreed with colonel Craufurd, that |