 | New Jersey. Court of Chancery - 1880 - 942 страница
...S2T); for the affirmation of what oue does not know or believe to be true, is equally, in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. Anslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 21 ; Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. g W. 401 ; Doggelt v. Emmerson, 3 Story C.... | |
 | Joseph Story - 1839 - 658 страница
...immaterial; for the affirmation of what one does not know, or believe to be true, is equally in morals and law as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. 5 And even if the party innocently misrepresents a fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive; for it... | |
 | Alabama. Supreme Court - 1846 - 1178 страница
...immaterial, for the affirmation of what one does not know, or believe, to be true, is equally in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. So if a party innocently misrepresents a fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive ; for it operates... | |
 | John William Smith - 1847 - 438 страница
...immaterial, for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true in equally, in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false; and even if the party innocently misrepresents a fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive, for it... | |
 | William Paley - 1847 - 732 страница
...immaterial ; for the affirmation of what one does not know, or believe to be true, is equally in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. And even if the party innocently misrepresents a fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive ; for it... | |
 | Great Britain. Court of Chancery - 1847 - 634 страница
...immaterial ; for the affirmation of what one does not knnw, or believe to be true, is equally in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positive, ly false. And even if the party innocently misrepresents a fact by mistake, it is equally... | |
 | Robert Henley Eden Baron Henley - 1852 - 680 страница
...knowing; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true, is equally in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. Aud even if the party innocently mis-states a material iact, it is equally conclusive, because it operates... | |
 | John William Smith - 1853 - 488 страница
...editor, that " the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true, is equally in morals and law as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false;" while it is not at all inconsistent with the language quoted from Ormrod v. Huth, that " if the representation... | |
 | Oliver Lorenzo Barbour, New York (State). Supreme Court - 1865 - 726 страница
...immaterial ; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is, equally in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be false." "Whether a party thus misrepresenting a fact," &c. Read the previous section, 192: "When the... | |
 | New York (State). Court of Appeals, Erasmus Peshine Smith, George Franklin Comstock, Henry Rogers Selden, Francis Kernan, Joel Tiffany, Samuel Hand - 1867 - 644 страница
...immaterial; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is equally, in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false." (1 Story Eq., § 193, and see note.) In the case before us the representations of the defendant's agent... | |
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Whether the party thus misrepresenting a fact knew it to be false, or made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or false, is wholly immaterial; for the affirmation of what one does not know, or believe to be true, is equally, in morals and... 
