Wedemeyer mission to endorse their opposition to the communists and to pave the way for increased aid from the United States. General Wedemeyer left China and went to Korea where he made a brief study of conditions in that country. The discussion of his criticisms of the Nationalist Government was featured prominently in the press of both the United States and China, often overlooking many of the encouraging things he had said about the loyalty and earnestness of some Chinese officials. State Department withholds Wedemeyer report from public The report which General Wedemeyer, assisted by the staff of his mission, drew up was presented to President Truman on September 19, 1947. The American press, and probably the Congress, expected that the report, or at least a summary of it, would be made public at once. This was not done, and on October 20, 1947 the State Department said that it would be "inadvisable, actually harmful, to the interests of the countries concerned, including the United States, to publicize such a document at this time." Rather than stilling the speculation over the contents of the report, such an announcement only served to make more persons anxious as to what it contained. It was not until the report was finally made public in 1949 in the State Department's "China White Paper" (as the volume United States Relations with China was popularly called) that the administration gave an explanation of the reasons for withholding it from publication in 1947. To begin with, said the State Department, the mission was regarded from the outset as a confidential one to obtain information for the President to supplement the regular information and that gained by Secretary Marshall. Moreover, the State Department continued, one of General Wedemeyer's recommendations called for the UN to create a 5-power guardianship or a UN trusteeship for Manchuria. "It was the conviction of the President and the Secretary of State that any such recommendation, if made public at that time, would be highly offensive to Chinese susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, Later reasons given by State Department for delay in publication of Wedemeyer report U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XVII:887, Nov. 2, 1947. Report of the Wedemeyer mission GENERAL WEDEMEYER'S REPORT ON HIS MISSION TO CHINA, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBFR 19, 1947: . . . Notwithstanding all the corruption and incompetence that one notes in China, it is a certainty that the bulk of the people are not disposed to a Communist political and economic structure. Some have become affiliated with Communism in indignant protest against aggressive police measures, corrupt practices and maladministration of National Government officials. Some have lost all hope for China under existing leadership and turn to the Communists in despair. Some accept a new leadership by mere inertia. Indirectly, the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East . . . at the Yalta Conference. There were justifiable reasons for these policies. the United States should suggest to China that she inform the United Nations officially of her request to the United States for material assistance and advisory aid. . . . This will demonstrate that the United Nations is not being circumvented, and that the United States is not infringing upon China's sovereignty. . . . The United Nations might take immediate action to bring about cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as a prelude to the establishment of a Guardianship or Trusteeship. . . . The economic deterioration and the incompetence and corruption in the political and military organizations in China should be considered against an all-inclusive background lest there be disproportionate emphasis upon defects. . . . It was assumed by the Generalissimo that China would support to the limit of her ability an American program for the stabilization of the Far • United States Relations with China, op. cit., p. 260. 10 See ibid., pp. 764-814, for the portions of the report relating to China. East.... the Generalissimo is sincere in his desire to attain... [the] objectives [of instituting reforms and providing democratic government]. I am not certain that he has today sufficient determination to do so if this requires absolute overruling of the political and military cliques surrounding him. Yet, if realistic United States aid is to prove effective... that determination must be established. Adoption by the United States of a policy motivated solely toward stopping the expansion of Communism without regard to the continued existence of an unpopular repressive government would render any aid ineffective. "Part IV-Conclusions" observed that "The Soviet Union and her satellites give no evidence of a conciliatory or cooperative attitude in. developments" jeopardizing the "peaceful aims of freedom-loving peoples." It added that "The United States is compelled. to initiate realistic lines of action in order to create and maintain bulwarks of freedom and to protect United States strategic interests." With respect to China, the conclusions continued: The bulk of the Chinese are not disposed to Communism and they are not concerned with ideologies. They desire food, shelter and the opportunity to live in peace. . . . The spreading internecine struggle within China threatens world peace. . . . It is apparent that positive steps are required to end hostilities immediately. The most logical approach . . . would be to refer the matter to the United Nations. . . Continued deterioration of the situation may result in the early establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the evolution of a Communist-dominated China. . . . A program of [United States] aid . . . would bolster opposition to Communist expansion. Until drastic political and economic reforms are undertaken United States aid cannot accomplish its purpose. General Wedemeyer's report ended with a series of recommendations. These included the suggestions made in "Part I-General Statement" regarding the provision by the United States of "moral, advisory, and material support to China,” furnished upon China's advice to the UN that such aid was being requested. The recommendations also included the proposal for a guardianship or trusteeship for Manchuria. Part V concluded as follows: That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to a reduction of budgetary deficits. That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented. That China accept American advisors as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended. Before the Wedemeyer report of 1947 was released in 1949 a series of events took place which deserve brief delineation. In China the first Chinese communists increase hold on territory national elections were held in November 1947 to choose a National Assembly. These elections were hardly democratic and were not popularly supported. They resulted in prearranged victories for Kuomintang candidates. The constitution drawn up in 1946 was to go into effect on December 25, 1947 with the elected Assembly coming into session at that time. The government postponed the meeting of the Assembly until March 29, 1948. Meanwhile the Communist military forces gained wider control throughout various regions of China. In the United States, the marked advance of the communists caused alarm and demands for aid to China's Nationalist government. The needs of Europe remained paramount, but the advocates of aid to China grew more vocal in the Congress, in the press, and in public statements. The administration, although prodded by the opposition party and by the well-financed "China lobby," preferred to keep money support to Chiang's regime on a moderate basis, at least until the program of the Marshall Plan for help to Europe gave evidence of passing the Congress in the form and to the extent intended by the administration. After the European program was well advanced, on February 18, 1948, President Truman asked Financial aid to Chinese Nationalists requested for $570,000,000 from Congress for loans or grants to China over a period from April 1948 through June 1949. Congress objected in some degree to confining the aid to China to the economic field. Many Congressional leaders, their opinions endorsed by military men, favored aid in the form of military supplies. As finally passed and signed by the President on April 3, 1948, the act provided $463,000,000 for one year, divided $338,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 for direct military aid. This appropriation, therefore, Reds conquer Manchuria The new Chinese National Assembly met on March 29, 1948, with 1639 of the 3045 elective seats filled. (68) The unwieldly size of the assembly and its non-representative character created difficulties from the outset. The Assembly elected Chiang Kai-shek President of China on April 19 in spite of his announcement that he was not a candidate to succeed himself in that office. Throughout the country the civil war went on. In October 1948 the Red armies completed their conquest of Manchuria. The Nationalist armies were demoralized and some of their troops went over to the communists in large numbers. In America the debate went on. Should American aid to Nationalist China be increased in the hope that Chiang Kai-shek would be able to regroup his forces and beat back the Reds? Or was the aid already voted being dissipated through the corruption, inefficiency, and lack of will to win evident in the Nationalist ranks? The administration continued a policy of caution because of the domestic political campaign in progress during the autumn of 1948. Governor Thomas E. Dewey, candidate of the Republican party for president, was one of the principal critics of the administration's Far Eastern policy, but both he and President Truman avoided making foreign policy a basic issue in the campaign. Moreover, the strength of the Henry Wallace progressive movement was largely unknown.(69) Both major parties were hesitant to tangle with the issue of communism in the Far East when they were both committed to strong support of European aid programs which they did not wish to endanger. ProNationalists disappointed by Truman victory in 1948 After the victory of the Democrats in November 1948, it was clear to the Chinese Nationalists that their hopes for increased American aid from an expected Republican ad ministration wherein vigorous proponents of a China-aid program such as Senators William Knowland and Styles Bridges, Congressman Walter Judd, William C. Bullitt, the Henry Luce periodicals,11 and others would have much power, were doomed to disappointment. As a somewhat desperate measure Madame Chiang Kai-shek was sent on a mission to Washington in December 1948 to plead for help. She was received politely but coolly by the administration and accomplished nothing remarkable for her cause. Deprived of expectations of extensive American aid and beset at home by continuous Red victories as well as by divisions within his own party, Chiang Kai-shek announced his reChinese Reds tirement from the presidency on offer January 21, 1949. The Communist armistice leader, Mao Tse-tung, on January 14th, had broadcast eight conditions upon which he would make peace, and on the 22nd Vice-president Li Tsung-jen, who succeeded Chiang, appointed delegates to open negotiations with the Reds. The Nationalists had lost the important cities of Tientsin on January 15, 1949 and Peiping on the 22nd. Formal peace negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists were commenced at Peiping on April 5, 1949. These talks accomplished nothing and the fighting went on through the spring and summer with the Reds almost invariably victorious. America continued a watch and wait policy, although a number of anti-administration con Limited gressmen, both Republican and Democratic, continued to demand action and aid to the Nationalists. The most the Congress would do, however, was to follow the State Department recommendation that $54,000,000 of unexpended ECA funds should be made available to areas of China outside the communist control. This was done in the new ECA act of April 19, 1949. American naval and marine units stationed at Tsingtao were removed and the military mission in China was withdrawn. The imminent collapse of the National government dictated a re-examination of American policy in the entire Far East area. 11 Such publications as Time and Life had long been outspoken in support of Chiang Kai-shek, and their publisher, Mr. Luce, who was born in China, was a powerful advocate of aid to the Nationalists. State Department re-examines U. S. China policy As a preliminary to this re-examination, the State Department as already indicated issued its detailed study of the background of the China situation in the form of a "China White Paper" in August 1949.(70) This publication ran to 1,054 printed pages and covered American relations with China since 1844 with special attention to the period from 1944 to 1949. Summarization of such a document is obviously impossible here and the student who has the leisure is strongly urged to study the document itself.12 Secretary of State Acheson submitted the document to the President under the cover of a long letter of transmittal, excerpts from which follow. Secretary Acheson submits "The China White Paper" ... SECRETARY ACHESON'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT: UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA, WASHINGTON, JULY 30, 1949: . . . In the years since V-J Day, as in the years before Pearl Harbor, military considerations have been secondary to an earnest desire on our part to assist the Chinese people to achieve peace, prosperity and internal stability.... Throughout this tragic period, it has been fully realized that the material aid, the military and technical assistance, and the good will of the United States . . . could not of themselves put China on her feet. ... that can be done only by China herself.... Representatives of our Government . . . who were sent to assist the Chinese in prosecuting the war soon discovered that . . . the long struggle had seriously weakened the Chinese Government not only militarily and economically, but also politically and in morale. . . . The mass of the Chinese people were coming more and more to lose confidence in the Government. .. When peace came the United States. ... faced the facts of the situation and attempted to assist in working out a modus vivendi13 which would avert civil war but nevertheless preserve and even increase the influence of the National Government. . . . The reasons for the failures of the Chinese National Government. . . . do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid. . . . Fully recognizing that the heads of the Chinese Communist Party were ideologically affiliated with Moscow, our Government nevertheless took the view. . . that. . . . internal 12 The "White Paper" was issued as Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30. It is available in most libraries and may be purchased from the U. S. Government Printing Office. It bears the title United States Relations with China, as indicated on p. 183 above. It is interesting to note that this phrase, modus vivendi, later became a favorite with Pres. Eisenhower who used it to refer to the need of reaching a way of coexistence with the Communists. See p. 172 above. peace and constitutional development required that progress should be rapid from one party government with a large opposition party in armed rebellion, to the participation of all parties. . . in a truly national system of government. None of these conditions has been realized. . . . A large proportion of the military supplies furnished the Chinese armies by the United States since V-J Day has . . . fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists through the military ineptitude of the Nationalist leaders, their defections and surrenders, and the absence among their forces of the will to fight. It has been urged that relatively small amounts of additional aid. to the National Government would have enabled it to destroy communism in China. The most trustworthy information available does not bear out this view. . . . the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of ... a ... Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. Such intervention would have required the expenditure of even greater sums than have been fruitlessly spent thus far, the command of Nationalist armies by American officers, and the probable participation of American armed forces in the resulting war. Intervention would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been condemned by the American people. . . . The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limit of its capabilities could have changed that result. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default. . . . In the immediate future. . . the implementation of our historic policy of friendship for China. .. will necessarily be influenced by the degree to which the Chinese people come to recognize that the Communist regime serves not their Meanwhile interests but those of Soviet Russia. ... our policy will continue to be based upon our own respect for the [UN] Charter, our friendship for China, and our traditional support for the Open Door and for China's independence and administrative and territorial integrity. This abbreviated summation of Secretary Acheson's defense of the State Department handling of the China problem is, of course, only a highlighted presentation of his detailed explanation. And the 1054 pages of the White Paper are a further exposition of the course of events, complete with official documentation. The White Paper did Reactions to the White Paper mixed not change American policy, nor did it, in the minds of opponents of the administration, explain it. It was accepted as special pleading by the proNationalist elements in American political and public life. But, even its critics, had to admit that it was an unprecedented disclosure of state documents from which serious students of the situation could gather information on what had been reported, observed, and decided at high levels of government on a problem of tremendous intricacy, (71) In China, matters had gone from bad to worse for the Nationalists during mid-1949. The Nationalist government fled to Canton from Nanking Chiang abandons the Chinese mainland in April 1949. In May the Reds captured Hankow and Shanghai. On October 1, 1949 the "People's Republic of China" was formally proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung at Peiping, with Chou En-lai as Premier and Foreign Minister and Mao as Chairman of the Central People's Administrative Council. This government was immediately recognized by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. On October 11th the Nationalists moved to Chungking from Canton. Chiang Kai-shek had once more come from retirement to resume the presidency earlier in the year. On November 30, 1949 he established a new capital at Chengtu. Finally, on December 8, 1949 the Nationalist government abandoned mainland China, removed its offices to Formosa and set up a capital at Taipei the chief city of that island 100 miles off the southeastern coast of China.14 In mid-December, Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow to negotiate an alliance with the Soviet Union. This treaty was signed February 14, 1950. With these events, the fall of China to the Communists was virtually completed. True, pockets of guerilla resistance remained on the mainland, and do to this day. But Some Western the control by the Reds was effecnations tive enough to secure recognition of recognize their regime by many of the leading Red China nations of the world, including the United Kingdom, France, and others. The United States continues to withhold 14 The Chinese favor the name Taiwan rather than the more widely accepted name Formosa, a designation used by the Jap anese who occupied the island from 1895 to 1945. Several smaller island groups-notably the Pescadores, Quemoy,_Matsu, Taichen, etc.-scattered through the China Sea and Formosa Straits, were retained by the Nationalists. recognition from Red China and deals with the government of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa as the legal government for China. American policy toward Nationalist China's occupation of Formosa at the time the government was moved to that island was stated by President Truman in these terms. Chiang's jurisdiction on Formosa recognized by the United States ... PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON FORMOSA, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 5, 1950: [Under the terms of the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Japanese surrender of 1945] Formosa was surrendered [by Japan] to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and for the past four years the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island. The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary to the defense of the Island. The United States Government proposes to continue ... the present ECA program of economic assistance. 15 With this statement we conclude our examination of Chinese-American relations prior to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. Much Questions on loss of China to Reds may never be answered ground has been covered, but much has had to be left unsaid. In an era less dominated by partisan political debate, it may be possible to assess the balance of acts of commission and omission which lost China to the communist cause. The record is voluminous, yet it is strangely unsatisfying, especially insofar as it does not measure the wills of individuals and nations in these trying years of the search for peace. Words in documents and facts in print are not in themselves sufficient to supply the information millions are seeking. Did the United States, as represented not only by its diplomats and its military men, do everything that 15 The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of Oct. 6, 1949 had allocated $75,000,000 for use in the "general area" of China. |