laws of several states, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privileges of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence, or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another state, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the state proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be provided against. The new constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.

The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each state, shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other states, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate; and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established, n.ay be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous states, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.

The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the states, can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

PUBLIUS.

No. XLIII.

BY JAMES MADISON.

The same view continued.

THE fourth class comprises the following miscellaneous

powers:

1. A power to "promote the progress of science and useful "arts, by securing for a limited time, to authors and inventors, "the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover"ies."

The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The states cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of congress.

2. "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoev"er, over such district, (not exceeding ten miles square,) as may by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; "and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by "the consent of the legislature of the state, in which the same "shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock"yards, and other needful buildings."

The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general government on the state comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonourable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationa

laws of several states, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privileges of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence, or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another state, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the state proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be provided against. The new constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the. United States.

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.

The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings o each state, shall be proved, and the effect they shall have i other states, is an evident and valuable improvement on t clause relating to this subject in the articles of confederati The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate; can be of little importance under any interpretation whi will bear. The power here established, may be rende very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly ficial on the borders of contiguous states, where the effe ble to justice may be suddenly and secretly translate stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.

The power of establishing post-roads must, in e be a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judicio ment, become productive of great public convenie ing which tends to facilitate the intercourse betwe can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

THE FEDERALIST.

No. XLIII.

BY JAMES MADISON.

The same rid

THE fourth class comprises the full wing 2.powers:

1. A power to promote the progress of sono MÀ LO "arts, by securing for a limited time, to authors and aver "the exclusive right to their respective writings and d.svg "ies."

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2. "To exercise exclusive leg-lat on in all cas what er. over such district, (not exceeding ten miles square, as may " by cession of particular states, and the acceptor-of com gress, become the seat of the government of the United St " and to exercise like authority over all places purchased hout its "the consent of the legislature of the state, in which the s "shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenal, dinction of "yards, and other needful buildings."

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The indispensable necessity of complete authenty seat of government, carries its own evidence with it, belonging to power exercised by every legislature of the union, g of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. The any claims of not only the public authority might be insulted a ceedings be interrupted with impunity, but a dep and required by the members of the general government on the the propriety of hending the seat of the government, for protectia in itself, and va ercise of their duty, might bring on the natively ealousies and imputation of awe or influence, equally disently know overnment and dissatisfactory to the other Confederacy. This consideration has the gradual accumulation of public impro

ry residence of the government, would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single state, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the state ceding it; as the state will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights, and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest, to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government, which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the state, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the state, in their adoption of the constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated.

The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, &c., established by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require, that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular state. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the states concerned in every such establishment.

3. To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder "of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, ex"cept during the life of the person attainted."

As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it; but as newfangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free governments, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof neces