1775-1783.] Bibliography of the Revolution.

69

CHAPTER IV.

UNION AND INDEPENDENCE (1775-1783).

Bibliographies.

34. References.

Winsor's Narrative and Critical History, vi. passim, vii. 1-214, viii. App.; Winsor's Readers' Handbook of the Revolution; E. B. Andrews's Brief Institutes of our Constitutional History, Appendix vii.; W. F. Allen's History Topics, pp. 107, 108; A. B. Hart's Introduction to the Study of Federal Government, § 36; W. E. Foster's References to the Constitution of the United States, pp. 11-14.

Historical Maps. - Nos. 2 and 3, this volume (Epoch Maps, Nos. 4 and 5); Lodge's Colonies, frontispiece; Scudder's United States, pp. 193, 207, 223; Scribner's Statistical Atlas, Pl. 12; Rhode's Atlas, No. xxviii.; Bancroft's History of the United States (original edition) v. 241; Labberton's Atlas, lxiv.; Hinsdale's Old Northwest, i. 176, 180 (republished from MacCoun's Historical Geography); Ridpath's United States, p. 306; Barnes's United States, p. 101; Gilman's United States, p. 234; List of contemporary maps in Winsor's Handbook, p. 302.

General Accounts.-G. T. Curtis's Constitutional History of the United States, i. chaps. i. -iv. (History of the Constitution, i. 28-123); Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. iv. chap. iv.; Bancroft's History of the United States, vol. vii. chap. xxvii. (last revision, vol. iv. chaps. ix.-xxviii.; vol. v.); Hildreth's History of the United States, iii. 57-373, 411-425, 440-444; Lodge's Washington, vol. i. chaps. v.-xi.; Holmes's Annals of America, ii. 199-353; Bryant and Gay's Popular History of the United States, iii. 377-623, iv. 1-74; Winsor's Narrative and Critical History, vol. vi. chaps. ii.-ix., vol. vii. chaps. i., ii.; Green's History of the English People, iv. 254-271; Adolphus's History of England, ii. 333-433 passim, Story's Commentaries, §§ 198-217; Pitkin's Political and Civil History of the United States, i. 282-422; ii. 37-153. Special Histories. G. W. Greene's Historical View of the American Revolution; Frothingham's Rise of the Republic, pp. 403568; Fiske's American Revolution; Ludlow's War of American Independence, chaps. v.-viii.; Lodge's Washington, i. 125-341; Pellew's

John Jay, pp. 59-228; Weeden's Economic and Social History of New England, vol. ii. chaps. xx., xxi.; W. G. Sumner's Financier and Finances of the American' Revolution, vol. i.

Contemporary Accounts. - Niles's Principles and Acts of the Revolution; Journals of Congress; Secret Journals of Congress; John Adams and Abigail Adams's Familiar Letters; Goodloe's Birth of the Republic, pp. 205-353 (extracts from Acts and Resolutions); Paine's Common Sense; Crevecoeur's Letters from an American Farmer [1770-1781]; J. Anbury's Travels in the Interior of America [17761781]; Chastellux's Voyage de Newport [1780-1781]; Donne's Correspondence of George III. with Lord North [1768-1783]; Almon's Remembrancer; Francis Hopkins's Essays and Writings; Philip Freneau's Poems relating to the Revolution; Frank Moore, Diary of the American Revolution.

Britain.

35. The Strength of the Combatants (1775).

WHEN We compare the population and resources of the two countries, the defiance of the colonists seems almost foolhardy. In 1775 England, Ireland, Power of Great and Scotland together had from eight to ten million souls; while the colonies numbered but three millions. Great Britain had a considerable system of manufactures, and the greatest foreign commerce in the world, and rich colonies in every quarter of the globe poured wealth into her lap. What she lacked she could buy. In the year 1775 the home government raised ten million pounds in taxes, and when the time came she was able to borrow hundred of millions: in all the colonies together, two million pounds in money was the utmost that could be raised in a single year by any system of taxes or loans. In 1776 one hundred and thirty cruisers and transports brought the British army to New York: the whole American navy had not more than seventeen vessels. In moral resources Great Britain was decidedly stronger than America. Parliament was divided, but the king was determined. On Oct. 15, 1775, he wrote: "Every means of distressing America must meet with

1775-1

Strength of the Combatants.

71

my concurrence." in England, and interfered little with her prosperity. How was it in America? Canada, the Floridas, the West Indies, and Nova Scotia held off. Of the three Weakness millions of population, five hundred thousand of America were negro slaves, carried no muskets, and caused constant fear of revolt. John Adams has said that more than a third part of the principal men in America were throughout opposed to the Revolution; and of those who agreed with the principles of the Revolution, thousands thought them not worth fighting for. There were rivalries and jealousies between American public men and between the sections. The troops of one New England State refused to serve under officers from another State. The whole power of England could be concentrated upon the struggle, and the Revolution would have been crushed in a single year if the eyes of the English had not been so blinded to the real seriousness of the crisis that they sent small forces and inefficient commanders. England was at peace with all the world, and might naturally expect to prevent the active assistance of the colonies by any other power.

Down to 1778 the war was popular

The two armies.

When the armies are compared, the number and enthusiasm of the Americans by no means made up for the difference of population. On the average, 33,000 men were under the American colors each year; but the army sometimes fell, as at the battle of Princeton, Jan. 2, 1777, to but 5,000. The English had an average of 40,000 troops in the colonies, of whom from 20,000 to 25,000 might have been utilized in a single military operation; and in the crisis of the general European war, about 1780, Great Britain placed 314,000 troops under arms in different parts of the world. The efficiency of the American army was very much diminished by the fact that two kinds of troops were in service, - the Con

tinentals, enlisted by Congress; and the militia, raised by each colony separately. Of these militia, New England, with one fourth of the population of the country, furnished as many as the other colonies put together. The British were able to draw garrisons from other parts of the world, and to fill up gaps with Germans hired like horses; yet, although sold by their sovereign Hessians. at the contract price of thirty-six dollars per head, and often abused in service, these Hessians made good soldiers, and sometimes saved British armies in critical moments. Another sort of aliens were brought into the contest, first by the Americans, later by the English.

Indians.

These were the Indians. They

were intractable in the service of both sides, and determined no important contest; but since the British were the invaders, their use of the Indians combined with that of the Hessians to exasperate the Americans, although they had the same kind of savage allies, and eventually called in foreigners also. In discipline the Americans were far inferior to the EngDiscipline. lish. General Montgomery wrote: "The privates are all generals, but not soldiers;" and Baron Steuben wrote to a Prussian officer a little later: "You say to your soldier, 'Do this,' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say to mine, 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it." The British officers were often incapable, but they had a military training, and were accustomed to require and to observe discipline. The American officers came in most cases from civil life, had no social superiority over their men, and were so unruly that John Adams wrote in 1777: They quarrel like cats and dogs. They worry one another like mastiffs, scrambling for rank and pay like apes for nuts."

The success of the Revolution was, nevertheless, due to

1775-]

Two Armies.

73

the personal qualities of these officers and their troops, when directed by able commanders. In the early stages

Commanders.

of the war the British generals were slow, timid, unready, and inefficient. Putnam, Wayne, Greene, and other American generals were natural soldiers; and in Washington we have the one man who never made a serious blunder, who was never frightened, who never despaired, and whose unflinching confidence was the rallying point of the military forces of the nation. The theatre of the war was more favorable to the British than to the Americans. There were no Plans of campaign. fortresses, and the coast was everywhere open to the landing of expeditions. The simplest military principle demanded the isolation of New England, the source and centre of the Revolution, from the rest of the colonies. From 1776 the British occupied the town of New York, and they held Canada. A combined military operation from both South and North would give them the valley of the Hudson. The failure of Burgoyne's expedition in 1778 prevented the success of this manœu vre. The war was then transferred to the Southern colonies, with the intention to roll up the line of defence, as the French line had been rolled up in 1758; but whenever the British attempted to penetrate far into the country from the sea-coast, they were eventually worsted and driven back.

Conception of a Congress.

36. The Second Continental Congress (1775). Before the war could be fought, some kind of civil organization had to be formed. On May 5, 1775, three weeks after the battle of Lexington, the second Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia, and continued, with occasional adjournments, till May 1, 1781. To the minds of the men of that day a congress was not a legislature, but a diplo