In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law.

The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives and not in the Senate, and to sustain the contention appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention the case of Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question proves that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution, $880. And the act of Congress which was there passed on illustrates the meaning of the language used. The act involved was one providing a national currency, and imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation. The provision was assailed for unconstitutionality because it originated in the Senate. The provision was sustained, this court saying:

"The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest, primarily, upon the honor of the United States and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose, by the act or by any of its provisions, to raise revenue to be applied

in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government."

This language is applicable to the acts of Congress in the case at bar. Whatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act.

The legality of those purposes is attacked in the other contentions of appellant. All of the contentions rest upon the correctness of the allegation that the moneys provided to be paid to the railroad companies are for the exclusive use of the companies, "which is a private use and not a governmental use."

The titles of the acts are the best brief summary of their purposes, and those purposes are obviously of public benefit. We do not think that it is necessary to enter into a discussion of the cases which establish this. The scheme of improvement provided by the acts required a removal of the railroads from their situations, large expenditures of money by the companies, and the surrender of substantial rights. These rights are recognized and their surrender expressed to be part of the consideration of the sums of money paid to the companies. Indeed there is an element of contract not only in the changes made but in the manner and upon the scale which they are required to be made. As remarked by Mr. Justice Morris, speaking for the Court of Appeals:

"The case is practically that of a contract between the United States and the District of Columbia on the one side. and the railroad companies on the other, whereby the railroad companies agree to surrender certain rights, rights of property as well as other rights, and to construct a work of great magnitude, greater perhaps than their own needs require, but which Congress deems to be demanded for the best interest of the national capital and by the public at large; and for this surrender of right and this work of magnitude commensurate with the public demand, Congress agrees to pay a certain sum, partly out of the funds of the United States and partly out of the funds of the District of Columbia. It is a simple case of bargain and sale, like any other purchase."

We have assumed that appellant, as a taxpayer of the District of Columbia, can raise the questions we have considered, but we do not wish to be understood as so deciding.

Decree affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result only.

SANTA FE PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. HOLMES.

ERROR TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 235. Argued April 18, 19, 1906.-Decided May 21, 1906.

The duty of the master to furnish safe places for the employés to work in and safe appliances to work with is a continuing one to be exercised wherever circumstances require it. While the duty of the master-in this case a railroad company-may be, and frequently is, discharged by one exercise it may recur at any moment in keeping trains in safe relation. A train dispatcher is not relieved, nor does he relieve the company, by the promulgation of an order; he must at all times know and guard against possible changes, and, under the circumstances of this case, held that a collision causing injuries to an engineer was the result of the dispatcher's negligence in failing to take into account and do what a prudent man would have taken into account and done.

In this case the dispatcher was the representative of the company to promulgate orders for the running of trains and not a fellow servant of the engineer.

ACTION brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Ninth Circuit, Southern District of California, by defendant in error, for damages for injuries received by him in a head-on collision of two trains, on one of which he was an engineer. The answer alleged negligence upon the part of defendant in error, by disobeying the orders, rules and regulations of the company, and also alleged that the collision was

caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. The action was tried without a jury, and the Circuit Court found for defendant in error in the amount of $9,000, and entered judgment against the company for that sum. The judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 136 Fed. Rep. 66. The company, being a Federal corporation, then sued out this writ of error.

The colliding trains were regular passenger trains, and are denominated in the testimony as train No. 3 and train No. 4, the former being westbound and the latter eastbound. Defendant in error was the engineer on No. 4, or rather one of the engineers, the train being hauled by two engines. He was the engineer of the second engine. Both trains were run on regular schedule or time cards, when on time or slightly delayed, No. 4 having the right of track. On the morning of the collision, November 20, 1901, train No. 3 was unusually delayed, and special orders became necessary for the operation of the trains on the Arizona division. The first order was issued before train No. 4 had left Needles. The order was as follows: "No. 3 eng. 482 has right of track over No. 4 eng. 444 and 452 to Needles, but will run 1 hour 50 minutes late Kingman to Needles." The copy of the order was delivered to train No. 4 before 4.22 A. M., before its departure from Needles, and to No. 3 upon its arrival at Kingman at 4.21 or 4.22 A. M. Train No. 4 ran east to Mellen, a distance of 11.9 miles, where it stopped upon signal. In the meantime the second order (No. 23) was issued by the train dispatcher, train No. 3 having been more delayed in arriving at Kingman than had been expected. This order was delivered to train No. 4 at Mellen. It read as follows: "No. 3 eng, 482 will run two (2) hours late Kingman to Needles." A copy of the order was delivered to No. 3 at Kingman. The effect of these orders and the general rules of the company was that No. 3 was to run according to the time card, except that it was to run two hours late and was to have the right of track over No. 4, the latter to look out for No. 3, and run with refer

ence to its movement as provided for by the special orders in connection with the time-table. The orders and the timetable would have made Franconia the proper place of passing of the trains, No. 3 being due to arrive there at 5.17, No. 4 at 5.06, or eleven minutes ahead of No. 3. Train No. 3 should have left Kingman at 4.25. It left at 4.31, six minutes late. It passed Yucca, however, at 4.55 (this is disputed, but upon what evidence we shall presently consider), it should not have passed until 4.57; and it passed Franconia six minutes ahead of time. The operator at Yucca (the only night telegraph office between Kingman and Franconia) at 4.58 or 59 reported to the train dispatcher that No. 3 had passed at 4.55.

No. 4 left Mellen, which was the only night office between Needles and Franconia, between 4.45 and 4.47, and ran 6.8 miles to Powell, arriving there at 5 o'clock. A stop was made of three or four minutes for the purpose of adjusting the flow of oil in the leading locomotive, and then proceeded towards Franconia. In the meantime No. 3 had arrived at Franconia six minutes ahead of the schedule time under the special order for leaving that station. On approaching the station the engineer signalled an inquiry for orders and received by semaphore signal from the operator the reply: "No orders from the train dispatcher." He did not stop at Franconia, and while the train was going at a speed of from sixty to seventy miles an hour, about one and one-quarter miles from Franconia it collided with No. 4, which was running from forty to fifty miles an hour. Both trains were wrecked, the engineer of the leading locomotive of No. 4 and several others were killed, and the defendant in error sustained serious injuries. The operator at Franconia had no orders that morning for either No. 3 or No. 4. But for the collision No. 4 would have reached and have been placed on the siding at Franconia, notwithstanding the delay at Powell, two or three minutes before No. 3 was due at Franconia. Plaintiff in error's rule No. 385 only requires the train not having the right of