can be gained by resort to the lexicons. If we turn to the Century Dictionary we find it defined to mean "Appertaining to the subject alone; not including, admitting or pertaining to any other or others; undivided; sole; as, an exclusive right or privilege; exclusive jurisdiction." We think, therefore, it requires no resort to implication or intendment in order to give a construction to this phase of the contract; but, on the other hand, the city has provided and the company has accepted a grant which says in plain and apt words that it shall have an exclusive right, a sole and undivided privilege. To hold otherwise in our view would do violence to the plain words of the contract, and permit one of the contracting parties to destroy and defeat the enjoyment of a right which has been granted in plain and unmistakable terms. On the authority of the Walla Walla case, the city had the power to exclude itself for the term of this contract, giving the words used only the weight to which they are entitled, without strained or unusual construction, and we think it was distinctly agreed that for the term named the right of furnishing water to the inhabitants of Vicksburg under the terms of the ordinance was vested solely in the grantee, so far at least as the city's right to compete is concerned. Any other construction seems to us to ignore the language employed and to permit one of the parties to the contract to destroy its benefit to the other. We think the court below did not err in reaching this conclusion.

The court decreed as to a sewer, which the record discloses was originally a surface-water sewer, that the city should refrain from permitting future connections therewith for the conveyance of house sewage. The company complaining that this sewer entered into the source of supply above the intake of the waterworks, the court by a mandatory injunction required the city of Vicksburg to extend the sewer and construct an outlet therefor, so as to discharge sewage into the Yazoo or Mississippi river, below the intake of the complainant, provided, if the city was unable to construct such sewer within

HARLAN, J., dissenting.

202 U. S.

twelve months from date application might be made to the court for an extension of time. The error assigned in this behalf is as to the award of the mandatory injunction. We think the court erred in this respect and that it had no authority to issue a mandatory injunction requiring the city to construct a sewer, irrespective of the exercise of discretion vested by law in the municipal authorities to determine the practicability of the sewer ordered, the availability of taxation for the purpose, and the like matters; and we think that the exercise of this authority is primarily vested in the municipality and not in the courts.

We find no error in the decree of the Circuit Court enforcing the contract rights of the complainant and enjoining the city from erecting its own works during the term of the contract, but error in granting a mandatory injunction as to the sewer, and in that respect the decree will be modified, and, as so modified,

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. I cannot agree to the opinion and judgment in this case.

In my opinion the city of Vicksburg had no authority, under the constitution and laws of Mississippi, to give an exclusive right to any person or corporation to maintain a system of waterworks for the benefit of that city and its people.

But if I am wrong in this view, it ought not, in my judgment, to be held upon the present record that the city has, by ordinance or otherwise, precluded itself from establishing and maintaining, at its own expense, a system of waterworks for the benefit of its people. The contrary cannot be maintained, unless we hold that a municipal corporation may, by mere implication, bargain away its duty to protect the public health and the public safety as they are involved in supplying the people with sufficient water. Nothing can be more important or vital to any people than that they should be supplied with

pure, wholesome water. And yet it is now held that it was competent for the city of Vicksburg, by mere implication, to so tie its hands that it cannot perform the duty which it owes in that regard to its people.

NAGANAB v. HITCHCOCK.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 247. Argued April 25, 1906.-Decided May 21, 1906.

A suit brought by a Chippewa Indian on behalf of himself and other members of his tribe against the Secretary of the Interior, to enjoin him from executing the act of June 27, 1902, and to compel him to account under the act of January 4, 1889, in regard to sale and disposition of lands, the title to which is still in the Government, is in effect a suit against the United States, and in the absence of any waiver on the part of the Government of immunity from suit, the courts have no jurisdiction of such a suit. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60 followed; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373 distinguished.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Tracy L. Jeffords for appellant.

Mr. William C. Pollock, Assistant Attorney, with whom Mr. Frank L. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, was on the brief, for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

In this suit a bill was filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by Joseph Naganab against Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Secretary of the Interior. Complainant brought the suit as a citizen of the United States and a member of the band and tribe of Chippewa Indians of the State of Minnesota,

suing for himself and other members of the band and tribe. The bill is quite voluminous, but in substance sets out the alleged right of the Indians who had conveyed certain lands under the act of Congress of January 14, 1889, to the United States to have them administered for their benefit. The bill averred that under the act of Congress the Indians of the State of Minnesota had conveyed to the United States upwards of 3,555,771 acres of land, constituting certain reservations named, all of which lands and reservations were held by the United States under conveyances in trust for the benefit of the Indians; that the Secretary of the Interior had caused the lands to be classified as required by the act, and that approximately 1,500,000 acres thereof were classified as pine lands, 1,855,000 acres as agricultural lands-600,000 acres of the lands, classified under the said act as pine lands, were situated in certain reservations, to wit, Chippewas of the Mississippi, Leech Lake, Cass Lake and Lake Winnibigoshish; that upon said last-mentioned area, there was and is growing a large amount of merchantable pine. timber, reasonably worth $10,000,000. The value of the lands classified as agricultural lands to be sold under said act for $1.25 per acre is $2,318,750. And it is averred that it is the right of the Chippewa Indians to have certain of the lands sold, the proceeds to draw five per cent interest for fifty years, and the interest money to be used for the benefit of the Indians as provided in the act, and at the expiration of the fifty years the balance of the principal sum remaining to be paid to the Indians.

The complaint is of the act of June 27, 1902, amendatory of the act of January 14, 1889. It is averred that at the time of the passage of the latter act there yet remained 600,000 acres of pine lands, and 200,000 acres of agricultural lands, which ought to be disposed of in pursuance of said trust in favor of the Indians; that the pine lands are worth upwards of $10,000,000, and the agricultural lands $1.25 per acre; that without the consent of the Indians a portion of the pine lands were set off as a forest reservation, the timber on this land being of the

value of $3,000,000; that the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior for the selling and removal thereof would reduce the value of the pine timber to an amount exceeding $1,000,000; that the Secretary is about to sell and has advertised for sale the pine timber on 300,000 acres of said lands; that said act of June 27, 1902, if carried out, will deprive the complainant and other Chippewa Indians of the State of Minnesota of their property without compensation and without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The bill prays that the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, may be temporarily enjoined from any further act or acts in execution of the act of Congress of June 27, 1902; that he be required to execute the trust in favor of the Indians, and account to the complainant, as required by the act of January 14, 1889, and for general relief.

The defendant demurred on three grounds, viz.: 1. That there is a defect of parties complainant. 2. That the bill is bad in substance, in that it does not set out any facts sufficient to entitle the complainant or the real party in interest, the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota, to the relief prayed for, or to any relief. 3. That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill. This judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals.

It is apparent from the above statement of the allegations of the bill that the defendant Hitchcock, Secretary of the Interior, has no interest in this controversy and that it is in effect a suit against the United States to control the disposition of the lands and for an account of the proceeds of the sales of certain lands conveyed by the Indians to the United States under the act of January 14, 1889. Without considering whether the courts would have power to control the action of the Secretary of the Interior in this matter, or whether the power and authority so to do is purely political and subject to the control of Congress without judicial intervention, as was held in the Court of Appeals, we are of opinion that there is no jurisdiction to enter