which the plaintiff alleged serious pecuniary damage, and framed its
bill like the ordinary bill of a private person to restrain a nuisance.
Missouri v. Illinois, 598.
2. Solicitor's fee for witnesses examined before examiner.
The solicitor's fee of $2.50 for each witness examined before the examiner
and admitted in evidence was properly allowed as fees for depositions
under § 824, Rev. Stat. Ib.
1. Power to issue mandatory injunction.
Courts have no power to issue a mandatory injunction requiring a mu-
nicipality to construct a sewer, in a particular manner irrespective of
the exercise of discretion vested in the municipal authorities to deter-
mine the practicability of the sewer, the availability of taxation for
the purpose, and like matters. Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 453.
2. Discretion to permit withdrawal of original bill and strike out testimony.
As a general rule, and so held in this case, it is discretionary with, and
under the control of, the trial court to permit the withdrawal by an
intervenor of its original bill, and to strike out testimony taken con-
cerning the same. Ib.
3. Power to mitigate penalties imposed by Congress.
Where Congress has provided a specific penalty for failing to comply with
a statutory provision and obligation, it is not within the province of
courts of equity to mitigate the harshness of the penalty or forfeiture or
to grant relief running directly counter to the statutory requirements.
United States v. Dieckerhoff, 302.
4. Interference with administration of Land Department.
It is not the province of the courts to interfere with the administration
of the Land Department, and until the land is patented inquiry as to
equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the Department and
the courts will not anticipate its action. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 60.
5. Effect of absence of formal order of court to prevail over its essential action.
The absence of a formal order by the court need not necessarily prevail
over its essential action. Where appellant's only assignment of error
on an appeal from the Supreme Court of a Territory is that the court
had not acquired jurisdiction of the property in that suit because it
was in its custody in another suit in which a receiver had been ap-
pointed, and the receivership had not been extended or the actions
consolidated, but the record clearly shows that the District Court
considered the cases as consolidated, and empowered the receiver
appointed in the first suit to sell the property and apply the proceeds
as directed in the second suit, and that such decree was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the Territory and by this court, the assignments
are without foundation and the decree will be affirmed. Gila Bend
Co. v. Water Co., 270.
6. Supreme Court of District of Columbia as a court of the United States.
Without deciding whether the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
is or is not an inferior court of the United States within the meaning
of § 1 of Art. III of the Constitution of the United States, it is a court
of the United States within the meaning of § 714, Rev. Stat., the pro-
visions whereof apply to judges of that, and of any other, court of the
United States holding office by life tenure. In so deciding the court
follows the evidently correct construction given to the statute by the
legislative and executive departments of the Government since the
original enactment of the statute. James v. United States, 401.
7. Salary of justice of Supreme Court of District of Columbia during retire-
ment.
A justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, retiring during
the year ending June 30, 1893, is entitled to receive during his retire-
ment five thousand dollars per annum that being the salary of the office
as fixed by the appropriation act for the previous year, and the appro-
priation act for the year ending June 30, 1893, while only appropriating
a lump sum for all the justices of the court amounting to four thousand
dollars each will not be construed as reducing the salary to that amount
in view of the subsequent deficiency appropriation act appropriating an
amount sufficient to make the salaries for that year five thousand
dollars. Ib.
8. Power of Congress to retroactively fix salary of justices.
Congress has power wholly irrespective of prior legislation retroactively
to fix the salary payable to a justice of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and as the effect of the act of 1895 was a determina-
tion of Congress that the salary of the justices of that court for the
year ending June 30, 1893, was five thousand dollars this court cannot
disregard the retroactive effect of the statute. Ib.
1. Challenges; right of Government to.
The passage of the act of July 20, 1840, 5 Stat. 394, and of § 800, Rev. Stat.,
granting peremptory challenges to the Government in criminal cases,
has not taken away the right to conditional or qualified challenges when
permitted in the State, and where it has been adopted by the Federal
court as a rule or by special order. The exercise of the right is under
supervision of the court which should not permit it to be used unreason-
ably or so as to prejudice defendant. It is not an unreasonable exercise
of the priviege where, notwithstanding its exercise, neither the Govern-
ment nor the defendant exhausted all of their peremptory challenges.
Sawyer v. United States, 150.
2. Trial; remarks by counsel; cure of impropriety.
While a remark by the District Attorney in summing up that "a man
under such circumstances who could drink a cup of coffee ought to be
hung on general principles," is improper, if, on protest of defendant's
counsel, the court stops the District Attorney, who apologizes and
withdraws the remark, an exception by defendant is frivolous and
the court is not open to censure for so describing it. Ib.
3. Trial; statement by court constituting error.
There is no reversible error in the court stating in a trial for murder of
several persons that defendant was not charged with the murder of a
person whose name is stated in the bill as having been murdered, the
court also saying that if he was so charged there was no evidence to
support the charge. Ib.
4. Waiver by accused of privilege of silence.
Where defendant takes the stand in his own behalf he waives his constitu-
tional privilege of silence and the prosecution has the right to cross-
examine him upon his evidence in chief with the same latitude as though
he were an ordinary witness as to circumstances connecting him with
the crime, and even if, as claimed in this case, the subject matter of
the cross-examination has no tendency to connect the witness with
the crime if it is plain that there is no injury the exception is not avail-
able. Ib.
5. Indictment; sufficiency to acquaint accused with nature and cause of ac-
Where the indictment clearly discloses all the elements essential to the
commission of the offense charged, and the averments are sufficient in
the event of acquittal, to plead the judgment in lieu of a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense, the defendant is informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion and according to the rules of pleading;—and in this case the evi-
dence was sufficient to justify the case being sent to the jury and the
court below did not err in refusing to direct an acquittal, nor was
there any error in the court's charge to the jury. Burton v. United
States, 844.
6. Interest of United States under § 1782, Rev. Stat.
The United States is interested, either directly or indirectly within the
meaning of § 1782, Rev. Stat., in protecting its mails and postal facili-
ties from improper and illegal use and in enforcing statutes regulating
such use. Ib.
7. Pleading-When plea of autrefois acquit maintainable.
A plea of autrefois acquit must be upon a prosecution for the same identical
offense, and where defendant on a former trial was acquitted of having
received compensation forbidden by § 1782, Rev. Stat., from an indi-
vidual described as an officer of a certain corporation, and at the same
time was found guilty of having received such compensation from the
company, he cannot plead the former acquittal as a bar to a further
prosecution of the charge that he had received such compensation from
the company. Ib.
8. Sentence; effect of, under § 1782, Rev. Stat., to vacate seat of Senator con-
victed.
Including in the sentence of a Senator convicted of an offense under § 1782,
Rev. Stat., that he is rendered forever thereafter incapable of holding
any office of trust or emolument of office under the Government of
the United States is simply a recital of the effect of the conviction,
and the conviction does not operate ipso facto to vacate his seat or
compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him as expelled. Ib.
9. Separate offenses under § 1782, Rev. Stat.
Under § 1782, Rev. Stat., an agreement to receive compensation, whether
received or not for the prohibited services, is made one offense, and the
receiving of compensation, whether in pursuance of a previous agree-
ment or not, is made a separate and distinct offense. Ib.
10. Review-Jurisdiction of this court in habeas corpus.
Where petitioner's term of imprisonment has expired, but he is still con-
fined until a fine of $100 and costs has been paid, and there is nothing
in the record to show whether it has been collected on execution as
authorized by the sentence, but if not collected or collectible the peti-
tioner can shortly be discharged on taking the poor debtor's oath, the
case is practically a moot one, upon which the time of this court should
not be spent. Conceding the full jurisdiction of this court in habeas
corpus, and although the writ has been granted, in view of the special
circumstances therein involved, in a case similar in some respects to
the one at bar, it is a question in every case whether the exercise of
that jurisdiction is appropriate. The ordinary procedure for correction
of errors in criminal cases by writ of error should be pursued unless
special circumstances call for a departure therefrom; and so held in
regard to a petition for habeas corpus of one convicted in a District
Court of the United States for selling liquor to Indians in Indian country
who could and should have proceeded by writ of error from the Circuit
Court of Appeals. In re Lincoln, 178.
See CONGRESS, B 1;
JURISDICTION, B 2; E.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
See CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1;
TREATIES.
CUSTOM AND USAGE.
See BOUNDARIES, 2.
1. Imports from Cuba; accrual of right to reduction of duties.
Under the treaty between the United States and Cuba of December 11,
1902, and the act of Congress of December 17, 1903, imports from Cuba
were not entitled to reduction of duties imposed by the tariff act of
July 24, 1897, until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the
President of the United States and the President of Cuba for the com-
mencement of the operation of the treaty. United States v. American
Sugar Co., 563.
2. Rate of duty on goods in bonded warehouse withdrawn for consumption.
Under 20 of the Customs Administrative Act as amended December 15,
1902, 32 Stat. 753, merchandise in bonded warehouse on which duties
are paid and permits for delivery issued to the storekeeper is thereupon
withdrawn from consumption and subject to rate of duty in force at that
time; this is not affected by the fact that the merchandise may remain
in the warehouse after such permit is issued and if directly exported
the owner will under § 2977, Rev. Stat., be entitled to drawbacks.
Under § 20 of the Customs Administrative Act merchandise in bonded
warehouse is subject to the rate of duty in force at the time of with-
drawal for consumption and not to the rate in force at time of liquida-
tion. Cuban sugar in bonded warehouse on which duty was paid and
for which withdrawal permits were issued and delivered to the store-
keeper prior to December 27, 1903, but which remained in the ware-
house after that date were, subject to full duty, and not entitled to
the 20% reduction under the act of December 17, 1903, and the treaty
with Cuba. Franklin Sugar Co. v. United States, 580.
See ADMIRALTY, 2;
BONDS;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
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