Brown v. Easton.

conclusive of the rights of parties as to make such review either unjust or impracticable.

On the other hand, the order for delivery being one which the court had power to make, it should stand until it becomes apparent that a full consideration of the matters involved would have led to a different result. It is not enough to show that the court erred in its method of reaching a conclusion; the conclusion itself must be shown to be wrong. And just here is the impropriety of the order now under review: When, in the original cause wherein the bond was given, it was adjudged that the injunction was inequitable, the obligees became entitled to have the bond put in force for their indemnity, unless some special equities justified a denial of their claim. Whether the chancellor could himself have enforced the obligation need not now be decided, for having, after hearing the parties, delivered the bond for prosecution at law, that step, being merely a choice of forums, ought not to be retraced, unless special equities are shown. But the fact that hitherto the court has declined to consider whether such equities exist, does not indicate that a full examination would bring them to light. Neither in the petition presented, nor in the reasons given for the judgment below, are any grounds stated on which a rescission of the order for delivery can be justly based.

In my judgment, therefore, the order appealed from should be reversed, with costs, save that, to the extent of staying the suit at law until the respondents shall have reasonable opportunity for presenting equitable grounds for the rescission, on reasonable terms, of the order for delivery, it may stand.

Decree unanimously reversed.

This decree unanimously affirmed, for the reasons given by the chancellor in the case below, 2 Stew. 110.

JACOB KIMBLE, appellant,

and

ELIZABETH T. DENTON, respondent.

Mr. Lewis Cochran, for appellant.

Mr. Thos. Kays, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This decree affirmed for the reasons given by the vicechancellor in the case below. Denton v. Cole, 3 Stew. 244. For affirmance-BEASLEY, C. J., DALRIMPLE, DEPUE, DIXON, KNAPP, REED, SCUDDER, VAN SYCKEL, WOODHULL, CLEMENT, GREEN, LILLY, WALES-13.

For reversal-DODD, LATHROP-2.

THE MAYOR &c. OF JERSEY CITY and others, respondents.

Mr. Isaac S. Taylor, for appellant.

Mr. Leon Abbett, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This decree unanimously affirmed, for the reasons given by the chancellor in the case below, 1 Stew. 110.

WILLIAM M. DRAKE, appellant,
and

JACOB H. DAWSON, respondent.

Messrs. C. F. & C. E. Hill, for appellant.

Mr. Geo. F. Tuttle, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This decree unanimously affirmed, for the reasons given by the chancellor in the case below, 2 Stew. 383.

1. A mortgagee cannot avail himself of an assumption of a
mortgage inserted in a deed of the premises by the mis-
take of a scrivener in copying the grantor's deed; neither
of the parties to the deed intending or being aware of it.
Stevens Institute v. Sheridan,

222

2. A complainant alleged that he was induced to execute
certain deeds, by the false representations of the defend-
ants, and also through his own ignorance of the fact that
the lands had been owned by his mother, and devised by
her to him. The evidence utterly failed to substantiate
the bill.-Held, that he could not be allowed to change
his position and claim relief on the ground that, although
he voluntarily executed the deeds to the defendants, he
did so under a mistake as to the extent of his interest in
the lands conveyed. Pasman v. Montague,
385

3. Equity will reform written instruments for the correction
of mistakes, but to warrant the exercise of this power,
the court requires clear and convincing proof. Rowell v.
Flannelly,

612

4. In cases of mutual mistake the court will not reform, but
rescind. Id.,

612

See SOLICITOR; TRUSTS, 1; VEndor, 3.

Account.

1. A decree requiring a copartner to account, should be denied
in every case where it appears the party seeking the
account, has, by his laches, rendered it impossible for
the court to do full justice to both parties. Stout v. Sea-
brook,

187

2. If, in an action for an account, the court is satisfied nothing
is due to the complainant from the defendant, a dismissal
must be directed. Id.,

187

See LIMITATIONS, 4-7; PARTITION, 4.