Colonel PATTISON. As far as the United States side is concerned, the regional over here [indicating on chart], militarily speaking it is the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Secretariat's responsibility on the NATO side to decide when there are additional organizations to be developed and where. I might offer this personal opinion, in desperation, that people sometimes care to solve problems by reorganizing. That is a problem for the Council in which, of course, any one or several of our secretaries represent the United States and influence such matters there.

Mr. BROWNSON. Thank you very much, Colonel.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Curtis.

Mr. CURTIS. I am not clear-not quite certain just how this organization works in relation to the headquarters of General Eisenhower. I presume from what you said that there is a sort of liaison arrangement but actually General Eisenhower as SHAPE could issue no orders to this group, could he?

Colonel PATTISON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CURTIS. On the other hand, this group at any level could not issue orders to him. His orders solely come from the Council. Isn't that correct?

Colonel PATTISON. That is correct, Congressman.

Mr. CURTIS. And a similar set-up which is very obviously different one might very well exist in France or Great Britain and their methods for setting up their cooperation in this North Atlantic Treaty organization.

Colonel PATTISON. That is true, except that—but you must remember that where the country is a giver.

Mr. CURTIS. Yes, as I say-as far as actual stuff we give; but what we give is so much more-theoretically each country would have set up-would have to set themselves up something along this line. Colonel PATTISON. Not necessarily, Mr. Curtis.

Each country does have its own national military representative in Paris and the size of those staffs vary. In the United Kingdom you mentioned that that has one of 12 or 13 activities. However, that is an administrative group handling all the officers they have on the SHAPE staff, as well as the representatives.

Mr. CURTIS. Well, the real point I am getting across is that General Eisenhower as SHAPE could not issue orders to them any more than I could here. He, again, has to go back to the Council, who is really the Council is the only point of coordination that I can see, and I think I am probably right between-let's say, where General Eisenhower can actually get a command that would go down the line to a French division, British division, or American division.

Colonel PATTISON. That would go to the Standing Group which is the formal executive agency of the North Atlantic Committee, our representative being General Bradley. The standing group which is-General Eisenhower's command channel is through the Standing Group to the North Atlantic Council's Military Committee.

Mr. CURTIS. He is-these-his other capacity is not as SHAPE, isn't he?

Colonel PATTISON. Yes, sir; he is there as SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

r. CURTIS. Now when he saw this chart-this is the point at which n possibly confused. He has placed himself in his organization taken his command in his own organization, and I thought that what that was.

olonel PATTISON. This line represents the region and regional plang groups and the commands that have been established under the itary side of NATO.

Ir. CURTIS. Yes, that is what I mean. General Eisenhower took mmand himself in his own organization.

Colonel PATTISON. Oh, I see

Ir. CURTIS. And I thought that was what that was [indicating]. ink that is what it is, but it seems to me the only real coordinating y is your North Atlantic Treaty Council.

Ir. CURTIS. The only real coordinating body is your North Atlantic eaty Council. It can be, that to carry out orders involving deternation, they would have to come there. In the same way, any hority would come from the council back to the United States in w of this organization. I just wanted to clarify that.

Colonel PATTISON. That depends on the problem as you go higher o the political policy.

Mr. CURTIS. The other is done more or less by agreement or a workit out rather than by any formal machinery.

Colonel PATTISON. That is true when you have 12 nations trying to rk together-things move at a snail's pace and when you add the oblems of three services of the 12 nations the complexities are veloped and they are multiplied in mathematical progression. Mr. CURTIS. I recognize it as a very difficult procedure. I can see

at.

Colonel PATTISON. In spite of the complexity of it, I think it is a icere statement that a tremendous amount of progress has been made the period since I came to Europe. It does sound simpler since e Western Union days of the international cooperation and planning. Mr. BONNER. Mr. Donohue?

Mr. DONOHUE. No questions.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Dorn?

Mr. DORN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe I have one question. Who it in the British Government or military who treats on the subject certain other nations being admitted to this North Atlantic Treaty rganization? For instance Spain, Turkey, and Greece. Is it e military who have the say so, Colonel, or is it the political group f the government concerned?

Colonel PATTISON. Candidly I am afraid that I don't have that

nswer.

Mr. DORN. Thank you, Colonel.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Holmes did you have something you would like > add?

Mr. HOLMES. I think I can answer that question, Mr. Chairman. The British have not objected to the admission of Greece and Turkey. They have supported that all along.

Mr. DONOHUE. Among these nations that make up the general outlines of NATO supposing or assuming some other nation, not included in those 12, desires to become a part of NATO, can any one nation veto the admission of that applicant?

Mr. HOLMES. Yes, Mr. Congressman, under the treaty it could. Mr. DONOHUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BONNER. Mrs. Harden?

Mrs. HARDEN. No questions at this time.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Meader?

Mr. MEADER. No questions.

Mr. BONNER. Do any members of the staff have any points to develop?

RELATIONSHIP OF MSA AND NATO

Mr. ROBACK. Under the recently enacted Mutual Security Act of 1951, the State Department's foreign policy responsibility is not impaired. At what point is the State Department in a position to assert that policy in relation to those other agencies!

Colonel PATTISON. The Ambassador in each country is chief of the country's mission, which is made up of the country's MAAG, the ECA mission and the State Department's mission. The Ambassador is the senior representative there. Mr. Spofford is the United States Deputy and has a direct channel to those Ambassadors and a direct channel to the State Department [indicating chart], also at this level, this successor to the old ISAC committee the State Department has in effect no policy matters in that committee. Negotiations for contracts and all that sort of thing-I don't know any exceptions so farare always done by the Ambassadors for the State Department and other agencies in each of those countries. Does that answer your question?

Mr. BONNER. I should like to suggest that all should speak a little louder in order that it can be recorded on the tape.

Mr. ROBACK. But where the State Department takes issue with any of the policies of these agencies, what does Mr. Spofford do in handling that?

Colonel PATTISON. When the State Department takes issue with any policies that would be at the policy level in Washington and in many, many cases, I doubt if we could even hear of it in the regional area. I hope that Mr. Holmes will correct me if I make any mistatement in this regard here.

Mr. HOLMES. You are correct, sir. It is in the Washington coordination between the various departments of Government that have an interest in this whole organization. It was formerly done in the committee known as ISAC, and it will now be done in a new committee under the supervision of Mr. Harriman, as Director of Mutual Security. That will occur there. Of course, if you trace back far enough all of these things flow from the constitutional executive power of the President. So that the ultimate umpire in the event of disagreement is the President who has the executive power under the Constitution, but in practice it is done by the usual interdepartmental coordination either in committee or by correspondence or meetings.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD. No questions.
Mr. BONNER. Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. KENNEDY. No questions.
Mr. BONNER. Mr. Brodsky.
Mr. BRODSKY. No questions.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you very much, Colonel Pattison.

MDAP

Major General KIBLER. Our primary task under the mutual defense assistance program (MDAP) is the programing of military matériel for our military allies, in Europe. I am now going to call upon Lt. Col. John H. Holliday of JAMAG to outline the objectives, developments, and general status of service end-item programs of MDAP.

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JOHN H. HOLLIDAY, USAF, JOINT
AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. I am Lt. Col. John H. Holliday, USAF, JAMAG. In this presentation I will very briefly review developments, objectives, and general status of end-item programs. The most of what I will say is classified as restricted; however, there are a few areas of higher classification which I will identify as I

reach them.

The original program which we now know as the fiscal 1950 end-item program had its beginnings in November 1948, when the Western Union countries prepared an interim supply plan showing deficiencies in arms and equipment for forces then in being ** This pro

gram was submitted informally to Washington at that time. This served as a basis for determining the necessity for military aid to Western Union countries. During the ensuing year the plan underwent extensive revisions, finally emerging in late February 1950 as an approved program *. The fiscal year 1950 program was developed largely on the basis of forces then existing in these countries, and its immediate objective was to equip and modernize those forces and to increase their ability to expand by furnishing them training equipment.

My statement is classified as secret.

That was taken to Washington and used in developing integrated military-aid programs by country and service. Within the monetary ceilings assigned by the United States services to each country, the MAAG's-which had by this time been activated in conjunction with JAMAG-then prepared tentative end-item programs which, following coordination with the military authorities of the countries concerned, were reported to Washington and there used in developing the legislative program for presentation to Congress. The over-all objective of the 1951 program was to further modernize and expand existing Army and Navy forces beyond that permitted by the 1950 program and in order to provide a supporting tactical Air Force in balance for these forces. Considering that the current status of deliveries under this program since the regular and supplemental fiscal

94756-52-87

year 1951 program have been recently consolidated in order to simplify reporting and accounting procedures, I will treat the status of delivery of both programs as a consolidated item following the discussion of the supplemental 1951 program.

As a result of the worsening world situation, JAMAG was directed on July 22, 1950, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare as a matter of urgency deficiency lists for these countries to be used as a basis for a supplemental fiscal year 1951 program. Accordingly, these lists were discussed with these countries. What follows is secret material.

*

The next chart shows by percentage of dollar value the steps in enditem deliveries under a consolidated program.

The status of the 1952 matériel program, I am sure, is well known to you, it having recently received congressional and Presidential approval.

In the next chart there is a summary by services of the dollar value of matériel programed in all programs for the first year 1952 and in the left-hand column the service totals of such funds. Initial planning for a mutual security program for the fiscal year 1953 was begun in JAMAG following receipt of a directive from the Department of the Army on July 14 last which contains the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning criteria for the new program. At that time all the title I MAAG's were devised that the planning for 1953 end item programs would commence in the very near future. On July 17 a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive covering the procedures and criteria for developing, screening, and refining for 1953 mutual security programs was received. This served as a basis for furnishing instructions to the MAAG's for the preparation of matériel deficiency lists. This is secret which follows.

*

Mr. DONOHUE. What is the over-all budget to take care of, say the 1951 program?

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. Broken down, sir?

Mr. DONOHUE. For the NATO countries.

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. Well, it includes matériel which was discussed at length.

Mr. DONOHUE. Dollarwise?

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. [Indicating on chart). Excuse me, I am checking on my classified material.

Mr. HOLMES. As to the question of what they are contributing in money, sir, our money is spent to equip forces which they will generate for us; that is, generate for you under the NATO Council."

Mr. BONNER. What is the over-all total cost? [Indicating chart.]

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. This represents, sir, the amount of money in all of the approved programs including 1952.

Mr. BONNER. Irrespective of year.

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. All of the years, sir. Fiscal outlines 1952 which will be devoted to the provision of matériel. Mr. BONNER. Is that the program's estimated cost?

Lieutenant Colonel HOLLIDAY. Not the whole program, just the matériel program.