Not only describing the systems, but the details of the management and operations of those systems. I think you are familiar at least with the medical supply. To the best of my knowledge, you haven't been into the subsistence supply as an example. We were taking it by major categories of matériel, and setting down and cataloging, if you will, the facts of life: What is the system now in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and in the Marine Corps? How do they operate? How do they get their matériel? How do they account for it? How do they manage it? How do they determine their requirements? In other words, you will find detailed studies, at least on those two subjects, in the Munitions Board.

MUNITIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS

Mr. DONOHUE. And were any conclusions reached as a result of those conferences?

Colonel DYER. You will also find the detailed conclusions and recommendations in the Munitions Board records.

Mr. DONOHUE. What were the conclusions as you recall them?
Colonel DYER. On medical supply?

Mr. DONOHUE. On the many phases of

Colonel DYER. Recommended specific uniformity in several segments of the problem, in the stock-record accounting, as an example, in the requisitioning procedure, in the reporting procedure, in the financing procedure. They were specific recommendations.

RESULTS OF MUNITIONS BOARD SUPPLY STUDIES

Mr. DONOHUE. To your knowledge, was anything ever done as a result of these conferences? And the conclusions that were reached? Colonel DYER. Yes; there was.

Mr. DONOHUE. And what were they?

Colonel DYER. Some if it you could see evidenced in the operation of the Armed Forces medical procurement center, the manner and basis on which it operates, serving as a joint procurement agency.

Other evidences of it I think you will find in the transition that is taking place in the Navy right now relative to integrating medical supply in the Navy with the other common type supply in the Navy organization. In other words you will find greater cohesiveness in the Navy organization. You will find that there-where there were not standardized procedures in the other services, that it influenced the redirection of effort toward that extent.

Now as far as the recommendations on subsistence supply are concerned, I have seen no concrete results from those recommendations yet. But there were very definite steps taken in the medical-supply field as a result of that. That doesn't mean to say that there are not additional steps that can be taken.

Mr. DONOHUE. In other words, the only concrete results from your studies were in the medical field.

Colonel DYER. In the comprehensive sense, yes; but not in the specific detailed sense at all. There are detailed reports in the Munitions Board covering the other subjects.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Meader?

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SEPARATE SYSTEMS FOR COMMON ITEMS

Mr. MEADER. Colonel Dyer, I was impressed by your summary of the five reasons why the directive of June 8 establishing, as of various target dates, these technical services within the Air Force itself. Now I wonder, because of your experience with the Munitions Board, and perhaps beyond that, with supply in the Army, whether you could balance that with the statement of the disadvanges of this separation. Colonel DYER. I think I have covered those only in general terms. I think they are covered in detail on this chart which I mentioned I will give you

Mr. MEADER. In other words, I am asking you for the arguments on the other side of the picture, please.

Colonel DYER. I covered it from the standpoint of what I referred to as single service cross-servicing assignments on a department-wide basis. I have listed here 23 points on that particular question, if you would like to go through all of them, or a sampling of them.

Mr. MEADER. I wonder if you could furnish them for the record (see Wiesbaden Exhibit 8, p. 1011).

Colonel DYER. I will be glad to give you copies of them. There are copies of this thing; just as an example one point here on depot construction, assuming the Army is providing this support to itself as well as to the Air Force, what is the result of that type of a mission? It results in a single depot construction program, yes; because the Army provides the whole depot plant facility. What is the military result or the impact from it? Well, naturally, it emphasizes, we think, the Army viewpoint in locating, designing, and the phasing of those depot facilities. In other words, it emphasizes the need of the service providing the support. Well, the next question arises: Is that good or bad? We think it is not too good if the predominance of viewpoint is reflected by the Army in locating that facility. We don't think it would be good if we were in the same position of having to decide for them as to location of facilities.

Mr. MEADER. Well, I don't suppose there is any way you can give us a figure or a percentage or anything concrete, but it isn't any question but what this separation of the supply services is going to increase the cost of supporting combat troops. Isn't that true, Colonel? Colonel DYER. Frankly, I don't think it will, sir.

Mr. MEADER. You don't?

Colonel DYER. No; I think it is a saving in the long run.

Mr. MEADER. In other words, it should cost less to furnish supplies

Colonel DYER. Please—

Mr. MEADER. Under this three-pipeline system than it would under the two-pipeline system that existed until the direct

Colonel DYER. Under a situation of the character which I have laid out there, where the bulk of your operation is in one geographical vicinity, and where you have a surrounding area here of support requirement for major Air Force units, I think that it is more economical to separate the two. I am not answering your question in a sense for the Department of the Air Force and Department of the Army as a whole. I answered that a while ago in the sense that I felt that there were certain classes of matériel such as subsistence that could be sup

plied just as effectively by the Army for the Air Force and the Navy and the Marine Corps, just as well as they could do it for themselves as far as depot back-up support in the States is concerned.

Mr. MEADER. And apparently up to the present time that is true of medical service?

Colonel DYER. I think it is technically possible. As to the operational effectiveness

Mr. MEADER. No

Colonel DYER. I'll leave that up to the people who have to work under the surgeons.

Mr. MEADER. In other words, rations and POL and medical services will continue to be supplied to the Air Force by the Army, unless some new directive comes out?

Colonel DYER. We have no specific directives, and as far as I know no intentions at the present time of assuming that burden.

Mr. MEADER. Well, the question that remains in my mind is why, if they do serve you in those fields, why in other common items they cannot do just as effective a job?

Colonel DYER. Technically they can do the job. I think I have 23 points here which will indicate why it is not advisable in an area of this character. I'll be glad to select more of them or go into all of them. Mr. MEADER. Well, now is that

Colonel DYER. In the conference.

Mr. MEADER. I was asking for the arguments on the other side, but apparently your 23 items are simply the 5 plus 18 more. Is that what

Colonel DYER. Essentially

Mr. MEADER. Well, I think we should have that, but I also wanted to get the arguments on the other side so the

Colonel DYER. As to why

Mr. MEADER. Committee could have a balanced picture

Colonel DYER. Why we should?

Mr. MEADER. Why there is an advantage in not separating the supplies

NAVY AND MARINES ALSO USE COMMON ITEMS

Colonel DYER. Well, first, you don't have the technical capacity to consolidate the support for many of your items as between the Army and Navy and Air Force. You tend to come back only as between Army-Air Force here. We try to look at this thing from a threeservice viewpoint at all times, a balanced viewpoint. We have to work with the Navy the same as the Army. We have to work with the Marine Corps in many instances, Marine Corps aviation as a specific example. So we are not looking at this thing from the ArmyAir Force relationship standpoint; we have to bring in the other factor of consideration here.

Mr. MEADER. Well, I-as long as you have raised the question of the Navy and the Marine Corps, I would just like to toss into this discussion the suggestion that we had heard somewhere, at some of the points on this trip, that perhaps what ought to be done is to have a single supply for all three services. What do you have to say about that?

Colonel DYER. What character of single supply do you have in

PROPOSAL OF SINGLE SYSTEM FOR COMMON ITEMS FOR ALL SERVICES

Mr. MEADER. A Department of Supply for the three combat arms. Colonel DYER. Under the present concept of organization of three military departments? I don't believe in it. Under an entirely new concept I might believe in it. It would depend on the concept of that organization.

Mr. MEADER. Well, I think it has been presented as one where the personnel would be drawn from the three services and any differences could be compromised and ironed out so that there would be a real common supply for all of the three services.

Colonel DYER. I would be strongly opposed to it as a practical matter. It would be in substance a ministry of supply to support the Armed Forces. You might as well make it a civilian ministry separate from the Armed Forces because there would be only one toplevel coverage, namely the Secretary of Defense. Yes; he could influence it to a degree, but major decisions are made in lower echelons of that organization, major decisions that can stop your effectiveness and your capacity to operate.

Mr. DORN. Will the gentleman

Colonel DYER. I think it is a highly dangerous approach to the problem.

Mr. DORN. Will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. MEADER. I'd be glad to.

Mr. DORN. Because I believe this might be worthy of consideration right there. Now we had instances in the last war, in the northern French campaign, where Army commanders just demanded practically that the transportation system transport artillery when the need for bombs at your advanced tactical air units-bombs were needed just as badly or probably more so, but due to the fact that the Army was more or less geared to the Army Ordnance and Quartermaster, they got priority, priority on artillery shells over the Air Force. Now you see those are problems that have to be considered there, too. Of course, that can be worked out.

Mr. MEADER. That is a command decision though, of the commander of the area, regardless of who furnishes the supplies. He could make the same decision if the Air Force was furnishing them.

Colonel DYER. Again, there are many of those major decisions that never get to that headquarters echelon. They have to be made immediately. You can't wait to go through three or four echelons of command. You have to have on-the-spot responsiveness to requirements as well as top-level responsiveness.

Mr. BROWNSON. Will you yield at that point, Mr. Meader?
Mr. MEADER. Yes.

IMPERATIVE NEED FOR LOWERING MILITARY COST

Mr. BROWNSON. I think there is one point that I wish our chairman were here to bring out, but he isn't; and it has been hinted at, but I think it has to be put quite bluntly. On the basis of our worldwide travels we have talked to a lot of countries that consider that they are absolutely strapped; and in considering that they are at the bottom economically, they have come before us and tell us, "we are spending 37 percent," or "we are spending 39 percent," or "we are spending 40

percent of our complete national revenue our complete national budget on arms." I think it is very important to note at this point that in the United States we are spending six-sevenths of our total national budget on preparation for war and on the cost of the last war. And that thing makes us very worried because in the opinion of our financial experts of both parties, in both the Senate and the House, and outside economists of repute and world-wide standing, we have absolutely hit the top figure which we can raise by taxation this year. We can go no further. We are already, for those of you who haven't been in the States recently, we are already stifling enterprise. There are hundreds of little businesses that are just folding up because the combination of having their materials withdrawn from them and the tax structure make it no longer desirable for them to operate. Those independent businesses are folding up and their management are taking employment with other organizations. The situation is extremely critical. We have a lot of confidence in the men of the armed services. We have to have, because we just wrote a $57 billion blank check. We don't know what that money is going for. We appropriated that money on the good faith and the confidence that we have in the armed services. But there comes a point where the armed services are going to have to weigh the ultimate in combat effectiveness and the ultimate in administrative effectiveness against the ultimate in financing. And that is the point of view that we are trying to present as we appear before you. We want you to have combat effectiveness, but we can't help but be convinced that there must be a way of getting more defense for the dollar because we know the time has come when we don't have any more dollars for defense.

Mr. DONOHUE. Are there any more questions? Mrs. Harden?

WOMEN IN THE AIR FORCE, USAFE

Mrs. HARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have a very great interest in the women of the Armed Forces, and I should like for Colonel Gray to make a statement for the subcommittee at this time in regard to the activities and problems of the Wafs. Colonel Gray?

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. PHYLLIS GRAY, WAF, USAF, DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, USAFE

Lieutenant Colonel GRAY. Mr. Donohue, Mrs. Harden, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, I think I owe it to you to tell you that what I have to say doesn't come under the primary interest of this committee, and I would be very glad to make a statement for the record at a later date rather than interrupt what you are all assembled to hear.

Mr. DONOHUE. Will that be satisfactory to you, Mrs. Harden? Mrs. HARDEN. Well, I thought the committee perhaps would be interested in knowing just what is the strength of the Wafs here. Lieutenant Colonel GRAY. We have a total figure of 155, only a handful.

Mrs. HARDEN. And what type of jobs do they

Lieutenant Colonel GRAY. The 122 enlisted women fall primarily into five categories: Administration, personnel, supply-and the sup