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has taken up arms. Europe, faithful to its treaties, will know no other king of France except ourselves. Twelve hundred thousand men are about to march, to assure the repose of the world, and, a second time, to deliver our fine country.

"In this state of things, a man, whose whole strength is at present made up of artifice and delusion, endeavours to lead astray the spirit of the nation by his fallacious promises, to raise it against its king, and to drag it along with him into the abyss, as if to accomplish his frightful prophecy of 1814If I fall, it shall be known how much the overthrow of a great man costs."

"Amid the alarms which the present danger of France has revived in our hearts, the crown, which we have never looked upon but as the power of doing good, would to our eyes have lost all its charms, and we should have returned with pride to the exile in which twenty years of our life were spent in dreaming of the happiness of the French people, if our country was not menaced for the future with all the calamities which our restoration had terminated, and if we were not the guarantees for Franée to the other sovereigns. The sovereigns who now afford so strong a mark of their affection cannot be abused by the cabinet of Buonaparte, with the machiavelism of which they are acquainted. United by the friendship and interests of their people, they march without hesitation to the glorious end where Heaven has placed the general peace and happiness of

nations.

"Thoroughly convinced, in spite of all the tricks of a policy now at its last extremity, that the French nation has not made itself an accomplice in the attempts of the army, and that the small number of Frenchmen who have been led astray must soon be sensible of their error, they regard France as their ally. Wherever they shall find the French people faithful, the fields will be respected, the labourer protected, and the poor succoured. They will reserve the weight of the war to let it fall on those provinces, who, at their approach, refuse to return to their duty.

"This restriction, directed by prudence, would sensibly afflict us if our people were

less known to us; but whatever the fears may be with which it is endeavoured to inspire them with respect to our intentions, since our allies make war only against rebels, our people have nothing to dread: and we rejoice to think that their love for us shall not have been altered by a short absence, nor by the calumnies of libellers, nor by the promises of the chief of a faction, too much convinced of his weakness not to caress those who burn to destroy him.

"On our return to our capital, a return which we consider to be near at hand, our first care shall be to recompense virtuous citizens, who have devoted themselves to the good cause, and to labour to banish even the very appearance of those disasters which may have withdrawn from us some of the French people.

(Signed)

"LEWIS."

It had been supposed, as well in France and in the army, as in other parts of Europe, that Buonaparte meant to suffer the allies to commit the first hostile act, by entering the French territory. And although the repu tation of being the actual aggressor was of little consequence, when both parties had so fully announced their hostile intentions, it was still supposed that a defensive war, in which he could avail himself of the natural and artificial strength of French Flanders, might have worn out, as in the early part of the revolution, the armies and spirits of the allies, and exposed them to all those privations and calamities peculiar to an invading army in a country which is resolutely defended. But the temper of Buonaparte, ardent and impetuous, always aiming at attack rather than defence, combined with the circumstances of his present situation to dictate a more daring system of operations.

His power was not yet so fully established as to ensure him the national support during a protracted war of various chances, and he needed now more than ever the dazzling blaze of decisive victory, to renew the charm once attached to his name and fortunes. Considerations peculiar to the approaching campaign, united with those which were personal to himself. The forces now approaching France greatly exceeded in num

bers those which that exhausted kingdom could levy to oppose them; and it seemed almost impossible to protect her frontiers at every vulnerable point. If the emperor had attempted to make head against the British and Prussians in French Flanders, he must have left open to the armies of Russia and Austria the very road by which they had last year advanced to Paris. On the other hand, if, trusting to the strength of the garrison towns and fortresses on the Flanders frontiers, Napoleon had conducted his principal army against those of the emperors of Russia and Austria, the numerous forces of the duke of Wellington and Blucher might have en, abled them to mask these places by a covering army, and either operate on the flank of Napoleon's forces, or strike directly at the root of his power, by a rapid march upon the capital, Such were the obvious disadvantages of a defensive system.

A sudden irruption into Belgium, as it was more suited to the daring genius of Na poleon, and better calculated to encourage the ardour of his troops, afforded him also a more reasonable prospect of success. He might, by a rapid movement, direct his whole force against the army of England or Prussia, before its strength could be concentrated and united to that of its ally. He might thus defeat his foes, the one after the other, as he had done on similar occasions, with the important certainty that one great and splendid victory would enable him to assemble a levy en masse, and thus bring into the field almost every man in France capable of bearing arms. Such an advantage, and the imposing attitude in which it would place him, might have affected the very elements of the coalition, and secured to Buonaparte time, means, and opportunity, to intimidate the weak and seduce the stronger members of the confederacy. In Belgium, also, if he were successful, he might hope to extend and recruit his army by new levies, drawn from a country which had been so lately a part of his own kingdom, and which had not yet been formally attached to the powers to whom it was assigned. The proposed advance into Belgium would relieve the people of France from the presence of an army which, even upon its native soil, was a

scourge of no ordinary severity. The supe riority which protracted war, and a train of success, had given to the military profession in France, over every other class of society, totally reversed in that country the wholesome and pacific maxim, " Čedant arma toga." In the public walks, the coffeehouses, and the theatres of Paris, the conduct of the officers towards a Pekin (or peaceful citizen) was, in the highest degree, insolent and overbearing. The late events had greatly contributed to influence the selfimportance of the soldiery. Like the prætorian bands of Rome, the Janizaries of Constantinople, or the Strelitzes of Moscow, the army of France possessed all the real power of the state. They had altered the government of their country, deposed one monarch, and restored another to the throne which he had abdicated. This had abdicated. This gave them a consciousness of power and importance, neither favourable to moderation of conduct nor to military discipline. Even while yet in France, they did not hesitate to inflict on their fellow subjects many of those severities which soldiers in general confine to the country of an enemy. These excesses were rarely checked by the officers, some of whom indulged their own rapacity under cover of that of the soldiers, and the looseness of discipline was naturally followed by dissensions and quarrels among the troops themselves. The guards, proud of their fame in arms, and of their title and privileges, were objects of the jealousy of the other corps of the army, and this they repaid with contumely and arrogance, which led in many cases to bloody affairs. The cavalry and infantry remembered their former quarrels, and the recollection occasioned mutiny and confusion.Above all, the licence of pillage led to perpetual animosities, and one regiment or body of troops who were employed in plundering a village or a district, was frequently interrupted by another who desired to share in the spoils obtained by the aggression.These abuses may be traced to Buonaparte's total disuse in this, as in more fortunate campaigns, of the ordinary precautions for maintaining an army by the previous institution of magazines. The evils, however, arising from the presence of his army, were now to

be removed into the territories of an enemy. In the same day, and almost at the same hour, three large armies: that from Laon, commanded by the emperor himself; that of Ardennes, headed by Vandamme; and that of the Moselle, commanded by general Gerard. The good order and combination with which these grand and complicated movements were arranged, so as to secure the conjunction of the troops on the frontiers of Belgium, were received by the French officers as the certain augury of future suc

cess.

Buonaparte having expedited all his civil affairs, such as the installation of his chambers of commons and of peers, informed them that his first duty called him to meet the formidable coalition of emperors and kings that threatened their independence, and that the army and himself would requite themselves well: recommending to their protection the destinies of France, his own personal safety, and, above all, the liberty of the press.

On the 14th of June, the anniversary of the victories of Marengo and Friedland, he issued a proclamation, assuring his troops that he had fallen during former wars into the generous error of using his conquests with too much lenity. He reminded his soldiers of the victory over Prussia at Jena, and expatiated on the inhumanity with which the French prisoners had been treated during their confinement in England. He expressed his conviction that they possessed the private good wishes of the Belgians, Hanoverians. and soldiers of the confederation of the Rhine, although for the present forcibly united with the enemy's ranks; and concluded by asserting that the moment was arrived for every courageous Frenchman to conquer or to die. These representations were repeated in the speeches addressed to the troops on his journey from Paris to the frontiers; and on the morning of the 5th of June, his collected army was in motion to enter Belgium.

CHAP. XI.-1815.

First advantages of the French. They are defeated at Quatre Bras.-The 42d regi ment.-Gallantry of the 92d.-Arrival of the guards, &c.-Retreat of the FrenchDeath of the duke of Brunswick.-Battle of Ligny-Repulse of the Prussians.-Danger of Blucher-Retreat of the duke of Wellington.-Affair at Genappe.-Letter of Lord Anglesea.-Dreadful night before the battle of Waterloo.

NOTWITHSTANDING the fertility of Belgium, the maintenance of the numerous troops which were marched into that country from Prussia, and transported thither from England, was attended with great burthens to the inhabitants. They were there fore considerably dispersed, in order to secure their being properly supplied with provisions. The British cavalry, in particular, were encamped upon the Dender, for the convenience of forage. The Prussians held the line upon the Sambre, which might be considered as the advanced posts of the united armies. Another obvious motive contributed to the division and extension of the allied force. The enemy having to chuse his point of at

tack along an extended frontier, it was impossible to concentrate their army on any one point, leaving the other parts of the boundary exposed to the inroads of the enemy: and this is an advantage which an assailant must always possess over his antago nist who holds a defensive position. Yet the British and Prussian divisions were so posted, with reference to each other, as to present the means of sudden combination and mutual support. Without such an arrangement they could not have ultimately sustained the attack of the French, and Buonaparte's scheme of invasion must have been successful at all points.

But though these precautions were taken

it was generally imagined that they would not be necessary. A strong belief prevailed among the British officers that the campaign was to be conducted defensively on the part of the French, and when the certain tidings of the concentration of the enemy's forces upon the extreme frontier of Belgium threatened an immediate irruption into that kingdom, it was generally supposed that, as on former occasions, the road adopted by the invaders would be that of Namur, which, celebrated for the sieges it had formerly undergone, had been dismantled, like the other fortified places in Flanders, by the impolicy of Joseph II. It has been maintained by officers of judgment and experience, that Buonaparte would have gained considerable advantages by adopting that line of march in preference to crossing at Charleroi. It is probable, however, that these were compensated by the superior advantage of appearing on the point where he was least expected, and thus effecting a surprise,

The duke of Wellington had not neglected, upon this important occasion, the necessary means to procure intelligence. But, either the persons who were employed as his sources of intelligence were seduced by Buonaparte, or false information was conveyed to the English general, which induced him to distrust his own spies. A person bearing to Lord Wellington's head-quarters an authentic and detailed account of Buonaparte's plan for the campaign, was actually dispatched from Paris in time to have reached Brussels before the commencement of hostilities. This communication was en trusted to a female, who was furnished with a pass from Fouché himself, and who travelled with due dispatch in order to accomplish her mission. But having been stopped for two days on the frontiers of France, in consequence of her passport being suspected, she did not arrive till after the battle of the 16th, and the appearance of the French upon the Sambre was an unexpected piece of inpiece of intelligence.

The advance of Buonaparte was as bold as it was sudden. The second corps of the French attacked the out-posts of the Prussians, drove them in, and continued the pursuit to Marchienne de Pont, carried that

village, secured the bridge, and there crossing the bridge, advanced towards a large village called Gosselies, in order to intercept the Prussian garrison of Charleroi, should it retreat in that direction. The light cavalry of the French, following the movements of the second corps as far as Marchienne, turned to their right after crossing that river, and swept its left bank as far as Charleroi, which they occupied without giving the Prussians time to destroy the bridge. The third corps d'armée occupied the road to Namur, and the rest or the troops were quartered between Charleroi and Gosselies, in the numerous villages which every where occur in that rich and populous country, The Prussian garrison of Charleroi, with the other troops who had sustained this sudden attack, retired in good order upon Fleurus, on which point the army of Blucher was now concentrating. The advantages which the French acquired by this first success were some magazines, taken at Charleroi, and a few prisoners; but, above all, it contributed to raise the spirits and confirm the confidence of their armies. Upon the 16th, at three in the morning, the troops which had hitherto remained on the right of the Sambre had crossed that river, and now Buonaparte began to develope the daring plan of attacking on the same day two opponents worthy of himself Wellington and Blucher.

The left wing of the French army, consisting of the first and second corps, and of four divisions of cavalry, was entrusted to Ney, who had been suddenly called to receive this mark of the emperor's confidence. He was commanded to move upon Brussels, by Gosselies and Frasnes, overpowering such obstacles as might be opposed to his progress by the Belgian troops, and by the British who might advance to their support.

The centre and right wing of the army, with the imperial guards (who were kept in reserve), marched to the right, in the direction of Fleurus, against Blucher and the Prussians, the French being under the immediate command of Napoleon.

On the evening of the 15th of June, a courier arrived at Brussels, from Marshal Blucher, announcing that hostilities had commenced menced The duke of Wellington was sit

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