nearly equal as possible: in case of failure, each class to pay a penalty; and if this was not paid in a certain number of days, it was to be collected from the taxable inhabitants of the district, in proportion to property real and personal: the marshals and assessors were to act under the direction of the president of the United States. Any person aggrieved by excessive valuations may appeal in the manner as with respect to the direct taxes: the money accruing from the penalties to be employed by the secretary of war to recruit the armies. The last section provides that any five white male inhabitants, being liable to military duty, who shall furnish a soldier between 18 and 45 during the war, shall be exempt from military duty during the war.

Whatever objections may be made to this bill, as enacting regulations for raising men, which very strongly resembled the conscription of France, it must be acknowledged that the very proposing it was a proof that the president felt himself strong, and that his popularity, instead of having been diminished, had been increased by the events of the war. Still, if this war had been in accordance with the sincere and zealous opinion of the inhabitants of the United States, it seems reasonable to suppose that they would have stepped forward as volunteers in defence of their country: the whole number proposed to be raised by this bill was only 100,000, not more than one-fourth of the volunteers who in Great Britain offered their services during the revolutionary war with France.

But events were taking place at Ghent, which rendered it extremely probable that there would be no necessity for carrying into effect the regulations of this bill. On the 8th of August the British and American commissioners met at this city: the former were lord Gambier, Mr. Goulbourn, one of the under secretaries of state for the colonial department, and Dr. Adams. The American commissioners were John Quincy Adams, J. A. Baynard, H. Clay, John Russel, and Albert Gallatin. At their first meeting the British commissioners gave in a list of the subjects in which it appeared to them that difference of opinion would arise between the

American commissioners and themselves. these were,

1. The forcible seizure of mariners from on board merchant ships on the high seas, and in connection with it the right of the king of Great Britain to the allegiance of all his native subjects.

2. That the peace be extended to the Indian allies of Great Britain; and that the boundary of their territory be definitely marked out, as a permanent barrier between the dominions of Great Britain and the United States. An arrangement on this subject to be a sine qua non of a treaty of peace.

3. A revision of the boundary line between the British and American territories, with the view to prevent future uncertainty and dispute.

The British commissioners requested information whether the American commissioners were instructed to enter into negotiation on the above points? But before they desired any answer, they felt it right to communicate the intentions of their government as to the North American fisheries, viz. that the British government did not intend to grant to the United States gratuitously, the privileges formerly granted by treaty to them, of fishing within the limits of the British sovereignty, and of using the shores of the British territories for purposes connected with the fisheries.

At their next meeting, the American commissioners stated, that upon the 1st and 3d points they were provided with instructions: but not on the 2nd and 4th: that the American government had appointed separate commissioners to treat with the Indians for peace. They then presented further subjects considered by their government as suitable for discussion: these were,

1. A definition of blockade, and, as far as may be agreed, of other neutral and belligerent rights.

2. Certain claims of indemnity to individuals for captures and seizures preceding and subsequent to the war.

3. They further stated, that there were various other points to which their instructions extended, which might with propriety be objects of discussion, either in the nego tiation of the peace, or in that of a treaty of

commerce, which, in the case of a propitious termination of the present conferences, they were likewise authorised to conclude. That for the purpose of facilitating the first and most essential object of peace, they had discarded every subject which was not considered as peculiarly connected with that, and presented only those points which appeared to be immediately relevant to this negotiation.

At a subsequent meeting on the 10th of August, the British commissioners endeavoured to persuade the American commissioners, that it would be desirable that the American government should give up many places, of which they were still in possession, for the purpose of rendering the limits of Canada more precise and secure: but on this point the American commissioners were immoveable:-the British commissioners also expressed their surprise that no instructions had been given by the government of the United States, to treat at the congress of Ghent with respect to peace with the Indians.

The most important as well as the most difficult points in dispute between Great Britain and the United States were undoubtedly those relating to the impressment of seamen out of American ships, and the practice of blockade. With respect to the first, it was alleged on the part of Britain, that every state had a right to the allegiance and services of its own subjects; and that such services and allegiance could not be alienated. by the individual. It was a well known fact, that many British seamen entered on board American ships. To these the British government claimed a right; and if they were not given up by the American government, it claimed a right to search for them, and take them out of the American ships on board of which they were. The American government, on the other hand, did not directly deny that a state had a right to the allegiance and services of its subjects; but they virtually denied that such allegiance and services could not be alienated; since they considered as citizens of the United States, and of course as ceasing to be subjects of the country in which they were born, all who had lived a certain number of years in those

states. But they also complained that seamen, bona fide, and, according to the laws of all countries, American citizens, were taken out of American ships; and that they would not suffer their national flag to be insulted by searching their vessels on any pretext.In order to settle the difference with respect to impressment, the president expressed his willingness to exclude all British seamen from the vessels of the United States; and even to exclude all British subjects, except those already naturalized; and also to surrender all British seamen deserting from British vessels. This was certainly a fair proposition, if it could have been followed up with efficient practice; but it was well known that certificates of citizenship were easily obtained in the United States; and where these were shown, how was it to be determined whether they were genuine or not? The admission of the president, however, was important in another point of view; as it distinctly involved an acknowledgment that every state has a right to the service and allegiance of its subjects, and that such allegiance and services cannot be alienated.

The question respecting blockade was equally difficult: it appears to us that we have stretched this right beyond what justice and common sense, as well as the usages of nations will warrant, and even beyond our own acknowledged principle: we admit that no blockade is legal, except where it is supported by a sufficient force :-but were even all the ships of the British navy adequate to the efficient blockade of the immense extent of the sea coast of the United States? Certainly not; and to call that a blockade, where the ports are only occasionally and partially blocked up, seems to us a gross misapplication of words! In fact, instead of issuing a proclamation, intimating to neutrals that we had blockaded all the coast of America, we ought to have expressly declared, what was our intention and our practice, that we did not mean to permit neutrals to trade with the United States.

It would probably, therefore, have been impossible to have brought together the opinions of the British and American commissioners on these subjects, had not the peace which had taken place in Europe fortunately

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The other subjects, of any importance, were the admission of the Indians to the treaty, and the fixing a new frontier to Canada. We certainly asked a very improper thing, when we asked, that the United States should not transgress on the Indian territory: in the course of events, the Indians must give place to the inhabitants of the United States; and it is desirable on every account that it should be so.

We may also say, that in the course of events Canada must fall into the possession of the United States; and we even doubt whether this would be any serious evil. To those who consider colonies as very beneficial to the parent state, and their loss as weakening and injuring it to a great degree, we o a great degree, we would cite what was the result of the loss of our American colonies are not both we and they better for it? Have we not less expense and more trade?—and is it not probable that the same would be the case if we lost Canada? Colonies always flourish best when independent; and as the real benefit which the parent state derives from them is derived from commerce with them, it is evident that this benefit will be increased in proportion as they flourish, while the expense of maintaining them will be done away. But to return to the immediate point in dispute between Great Britain and the United States, with regard to Canada: it was not to be expected that the latter would cede any part of its own territory, at least without an equivalent, especially if they had any design against Canada, and if this cession would make Canada more secure.

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and the apprehension that, if the war were not speedily terminated, some of the EuroUnited States, especially on the subject of maritime rights. On the side of the United States, their government were disposed to peace, principally on account of the unpopularity of the president, the embarrassment of their commerce and finances, and the devastation to which their coasts were exposed. The terms of the treaty of peace (which was signed at Ghent on the 24th of December, ratified immediately by the prince regent, and transmitted without delay to Washington, for the ratification of the president) were as follows:

1. All discussion of our maritime rights is waved on both sides.

2. Mr. Madison does not insist on our giving up the prizes captured in retaliation of the Berlin and Milan decrees.

3. We leave our Indian allies as we found them in 1812.

4. We give up all our conquests, and particularly the province of Maine, of which our commanders took permanent possession by solemn proclamation; requiring from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance to his majes ty. We are graciously permitted, however, to retain the islands which were actually ours by the treaty of 1783.

5. Commissioners are to be appointed on both sides, to determine whether there shall be any, and what safe and practicable communication between Quebec and Upper Canada, together with all other disputed questions of territory.

6. We are to be allowed the exclusive enjoyment of the right of fishing on our own coasts at Newfoundland! and of trading to our own settlements in the East Indies.

Having thus brought to a close our account of the naval and military operations against the Americans, it is impossible not to compare the results of our hostility with the means which we possessed, and the expectations we had formed. Our disasters were rendered more disgraceful by the tone of triumphant anticipation with which we announced our designs, and the indiscretion with which we avowed our confidence of success. The glory which we had lately ob

tained against a much more celebrated foe, presented a striking contrast to the imbecility and mismanagement displayed in the American campaign. These humiliating circumstances infused into the minds of a large portion of the British people a vindictive wish that our government would not make peace with the United States till they had been

decisively beaten and conquered, and till we had thus redeemed our naval and military character. Fortunately for the honour of England, the happiness of America, and the interests of humanity at large, the British government was animated by more meritorious feelings, and more enlightened policy.

THE situation of France at the recall of Louis is thus described by the treacherous and unfortunate Labedoyere. "In 1814 neither the nation nor the army could longer support the yoke of Buonaparte. It was tired with war without motive, and exhausted by sacrifices without utility. All felt the necessity of a repairing government. Where could we flatter ourselves that we should find it but in the recall of the Bourbons, whose names reminded France of a series of good kings, and ages of prosperity." Such was the general language of the marshals and officers of France, on the first return of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne; and the flatteries which were heaped upon them in return by every member of the royal family were so gross and profuse, as at once to gratify their pride and awaken their suspicion. The line of conduct at first adopted by the court was singularly unfortunate, as it was afterwards compelled to confer its principal favours on the troops of La Vendée and of Coblentz, who formed the military strength of the royalist party, and who claimed the reward of their former sufferings. Discontent and suspicion were excited in the minds of the Buonapartean military; the remem brance of their former chief, with whom they had no rivals, was recalled, and the foundation was laid for their speedy disaffection.

The army had not submitted until the cause of their former master was desperate. They had then slowly and reluctantly tendered their allegiance. That a monarch had been forced upon them was a fruitful source of discontent. The sovereign was now surrounded by those against whom they had long and desperately fought, whom they considered as the enemies of their country, and whom they regarded with mingled contempt and aversion. The emigrant noblesse and the soldiers of the revolution, entertained the most hostile sentiments towards each other, and the professions of gratitude and confidence which the court expressed were too evidently insincere to deceive or to conciliate.

The return of the prisoners from Russia and England increased the general discontent. One hundred and fifty thousand men, destitute of subsistence or empolyment, were restored to France, with all the habits of idleness and depravity to which a long detention in prison so powerfully conduces. In war alone they possessed the means of indulging their vicious and licentious propensities, or of supporting their existence. They united therefore with the regular troops in eager and importunate demands to be conducted once more in the paths of glory.

The officers who returned from Russia had

suffered considerable losses, and demanded an indemnity. The arrears of their pay were enormous, and the claimants were innumerable. It was necessary to create a commission to examine and liquidate their claims. The delay inevitably attending such transactions excited the most general but unreasonable discontent. Many of them assumed courage to penetrate to the foot of the throne, and in the most insolent language demanded of the king the recompence of those services which they had rendered to the exiled emperor.

Another event converted their complaints and remonstrances into actual rebellion. The extravagance of the former government had left the finances in a state of utter confusion and exhaustion. That part of France which had been the theatre of the last campaign was unable to contribute its quota to supply the exigencies of the state. Retrenchments were absolutely necessary, and while the household establishment of the king was conducted on the most rigorous principle of economy, and every part of the administration cheerfully submitted to its share of privations, the army could not expect to be exempt. Seve ral of the regiments were disbanded, and all the supernumerary officers placed on half pay. The French arny, however unreasonably, deeply resented this necessary measure. Louis had promised that all the officers should retain their respective ranks. They falsely alleged that this promise was broken when they were deprived of part of the emoluments formerly attached to their respective situations. When one half of their pay was at once deducted, they were no longer able to support that luxury, or that respectability, which they had enjoyed under the warlike auspices of Napoleon, or even to maintain that situation in society to which their rank entitled them. Stimulated by these considerations, and regarding the conduct of the sovereign as a breach of promise, they anxiously waited for some pretext by which they might justify their rebellion, and were prepared to follow any leader who might flatter them with the hope of plunder and of victory.

The court of Louis was divided into two parties. The first comprised the majority of

his ostensible ministers, who were attached to the constitution, and saw in a strict adherence to its principles the true honour and only security of the monarchy. To this party the king inclined. He had sworn to be faithful to the charter, and his ambition would have been amply gratified, had he possessed the affections, and contributed to the prosperity, of a free and happy people.

A number of the Bourbon princes, and the old and confidential advisers of the king, formed a second party in the state. They beheld with jealousy every concession in favour of liberty, and ardently wished for the return of the ancient regime. The re-establishment of the ancient and arbitrary government of the Bourbons was the object of their daily wishes and their nightly dreams. They constantly surrounded the king and they possessed a thousand opportunities of influencing his mind and guiding his decisions. To this perpetual struggle between the honest intentions of the monarch, the advice of his most enlightened counsellors, and the arbitrary principles of his family and favourites, the inconsistencies and errors of his unfortunate but honest performance of his regal duties, must be ascribed. He acted under circumstances of the most arduous nature. He owed his crown exclusively to the efforts of the allies, and no sooner was he seated on the throne than they withdrew to their respective countries, and left him at the mercy of that very army which fought with so much perseverance against his cause. The few friends whom he had brought with him could lend but little assistance or protection, and were regarded with an eye of vigilant suspicion.

Though the monarch had been imprudent in rejecting the crown as the gift of the people, though he could not evince a marked partiality to the murderers of his brother, and the persecutors of himself, and though he could not contemplate, without feelings of gratitude and of justice, the individuals who had shared his sufferings, yet he had given sufficient pledges that he was determined to assume the character and merit the praise of a patriot king. His bitterest enemies cannot deny that, under his first administration, France enjoyed more real liberty than at any