Tenth. - The House of Representatives, or its election committee, subject to the approval of the House in the exercise of its constitutional power, can count ballots found in the ballot box and marked "cancelled," when it appears from the marks upon the ballots that they have been through the official registering ballot box. But, if the question is intended to be whether such ballots can lawfully be counted without resort to the arbitrary powers of the House under the Constitution, it calls for further answer. I assume that the question refers only to ballots which would be entitled to be counted except for the mark" cancelled." There is no express prohibition in the act against counting a ballot marked "cancelled," but this mark indicates some irregularity about the ballot which should make it a subject of further inquiry. It is a settled rule of election law that mistake or fraud of the election officers shall not invalidate a vote lawfully and regularly cast; and this is a salutary rule, in the interest of the public no less than of the voter. As it is difficult to suppose that the mark "cancelled " would be put upon the ballot by the voter himself, and as the reasonable inference, therefore, is that, if the ballot was regularly cast, the mark was placed upon it by the mistake or fraud of some election officer, in which case it is entitled to be counted, the case calls for further investigation into the regularity of the ballot, and the circumstances under which the mark of cancellation was placed upon it. Pub. Sts., c. 222, § 20, authorizes the commutation of the sentence of a prisoner sentenced for different terms in different institutions on the basis of the aggregate of the sentences. Governor. 1891 In compliance with the request of Your Excellency and the To the Honorable Council for my opinion upon the questions submitted in the vote of April 15, I have the honor to say that in April 17. my opinion the sentence of a prisoner in a house of correction, who is, upon the expiration of the sentence he is then serving, to be committed to another institution to serve an additional sentence, can be commuted upon the basis of the aggregate of the sentences; and that the same is true of a sentence to a house of correction awarded by the court to take effect on and after the expiration of a previous sentence to another institution. The language of Pub. Sts., c. 222, § 20, is broad enough to include the case of sentences to different institutions; and the reason of the statute seems to apply with as much force to that case as to the case of several sentences to the same institution; and the history of the legislation on the subject indicates that the provision was intended to apply to both. To the HOURS OF LABOR IN STATE INSTITUTIONS, — Teachers. St. 1890, c. 375, does not prohibit the employment of labor in State institutions for more than nine hours a day, if such labor is contracted for and paid for by the hour. A teacher is neither a laborer, workman nor mechanic, within the meaning of the statute. The words "laborers, workmen and mechanics" are used in a technical and restricted sense in the statute, and do not apply to persons having powers and duties of an official character, distinct from ordinary employment or service. In compliance with the request of Your Excellency and the Honorable Council in the vote of April 22, I return my opinion upon the three questions therein submitted: First.St. 1890, c. 375, does not prohibit the employment of labor in State institutions for more than nine hours a day, if such labor is contracted for and paid for by the hour. An examination of all the legislation upon this and kindred topics leads to the conclusion that the purpose and effect of this statute are to make nine hours' labor in a day by the persons therein named a compliance with an ordinary contract for labor by the day or by longer periods. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the statute contains no express prohibition against employment or service for more than nine hours a day under any circumstances, such as is found in other recent statutes relating to the hours of labor; and that it can have comparatively little application to women or minors, to whom alone this prohibitory legislation has thus far been applied. Second.-Persons employed in instructing boys or girls, educationally or industrially, do not come under the act. They are teachers, and a teacher is neither a laborer, workman nor mechanic, in the sense in which these words are used in the statute. - Third. Upon such inferences as I can draw from the form of this question as to the actual employment and duties of the various officers or employees referred to therein, it seems clear that the statute does not apply to any of them, except possibly to the carpenter, engineer, watchman and assistant farmer. They are all styled "officers;" and if they are in fact officers of the institution, having powers or duties of an official character distinct from ordinary employment or service, the statute does not apply to any of them, as it clearly is intended to apply to labor rather than to official service. But, if the carpenter is employed merely as a working mechanic, the statute, in my opinion, applies to him. The engineer I take to be the man in charge of an engine, and not a professional civil engineer. If the latter, the statute clearly does not apply to him; nor, in my opinion, does it apply to him in the former capacity; nor, for the same reasons, to the watchman. If the assistant farmer is, as I presume, the deputy of the head farmer, having in his absence or by delegation from him or otherwise, duties of supervision, oversight or control, and is not merely a farm hand, the statute does not apply to him. The words “laborers, workmen and mechanics" have acquired to a certain extent in recent legislation a technical meaning; and while all persons engaged in any kind of labor may broadly be called laborers, and all persons engaged in mechanical labor mechanics, and while any mechanic is in this broad sense a workman and a workman a laborer, it is clear that the words were used in the statute in a more restricted sense, to distinguish these particular classes from each other and from other classes of labor; and that the statute should not be construed to apply to persons rendering service which does not naturally fall within the description of the words so used. It may be added, also, that any other construction would be likely to lead to practical difficulties in the application of the statute, which the Legislature probably did not intend. To the CONTRACT, CLAIM AGAINST COMMONWEALTH, CHAMPERTY, LOBBYING. APPROPRIATION, On the facts disclosed, the claim of Theodore E. Davis against the Commonwealth for a compensation of two per centum of the amount received by the Commonwealth from the United States as repayment of the direct tax imposed upon Massachusetts by the United States under the act of Congress of August 5, 1861, is valid, and may be paid from the amount received without any further appropriation or action by the Legislature. Claims which are not and are not to be the subject of litigation, or of suit in court, are not within the rule against champerty, and contracts for the prosecution of such claims for a percentage of the amount collected are not void for champerty. The legislative lobbying which is contrary to public policy is the bringing to bear upon members of the Legislature of personal, secret, sinister or corrupt influences or inducements, to control or affect their official conduct. In compliance with the request of Your Excellency and the Honorable Council, I return my opinion upon the various questions submitted to me, arising out of the claim of Theodore E. Davis upon the Commonwealth for a compensation of two per centum of the amount received by the Commonwealth from the United States as repayment of the direct tax imposed upon Massachusetts by the United States under the act of Congress of August 5, 1861. The first question submitted is whether, under Res. 1888, c. 39, and the contract in pursuance thereof made between the Governor and Council and the claimant February 5, 1890, the auditor has a right to allow and the Governor and Council to approve the payment of the claim except out of the amount received by the Commonwealth from the United States. The resolve provided that the "Governor and Council are hereby authorized to employ the agent of the Commonwealth for the prosecution of war claims against the United States, to prosecute also the claim of the Commonwealth for a refund of the direct tax paid under act of Congress, approved August 5, in the year 1861," and of certain other claims, "also to fix his compensation, which shall be paid out of any amount received therefrom." Under the authority of this resolve the Governor and Council, under date of February 5, 1890, passed the following order : "Ordered, That Theodore E. Davis of Washington, D. C., agent of the Commonwealth for the prosecution of war claims against the United States, be and he is hereby authorized to prosecute also the claim of the Commonwealth for a refund of the direct tax, paid under act of Congress approved August 5, in the year 1861; and that his compensation be two per centum of any amount he may collect, which shall be paid out of the proceeds received therefrom and paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth, the same to be in full for compensation and expenses on account of said claim. This order is adopted under the authority of chapter 39 of the Resolves of 1888." As the resolve contemplates, and the contract provides, that the compensation of the claimant shall be paid out of the proceeds of the claim of the Commonwealth against the United States, and as the Legislature has made no other provision for payment of his compensation, I am of opinion that, in the present state of the case, the auditor has no right to allow or the Governor and Council to approve the payment except out of the amount received by the Commonwealth from the United States. The next inquiry is, "whether such payment is not expressly forbidden by the trusts imposed by the act of Congress, and accepted by the Commonwealth in its resolve of 1891; and whether, therefore, if the claim of Davis is to be paid, it does not require an appropriation or further action by the Legislature." The act of Congress referred to is the act of March 2, 1891, refunding to the States the amount of the direct tax; which provides in § 3 that "where the sums or any part thereof credited to any State, Territory or the District of Columbia have been collected by the United States from the citizens or inhabitants thereof, or any other person, either directly or by sale of property, such sums shall be held in trust by said State, |