chance of reshaping international affairs to the reduction of the risk of war. Labor is no more inherently pacifistic than any other class, but it does not easily fall into the illusion that the chief interest of a people lies in securing commercial monopolies and concessions, or in interfering with the natural economic development of other peoples. Labor recognizes that nine-tenths of its interests lie in the domestic field, and that war, while it may force sporadic concessions to labor and create a fictitious prosperity for those not called upon for service in the field, is an exhausting drain upon the working class as a whole and a check upon orderly progress. Labor may be no more cosmopolitan in its instincts than any other class, but it is far less susceptible than capital to international jealousy. German labor was not jealous of the prosperity of American or British labor before the war; German capital was intensely jealous of the prosperity of American and British capital. British and American labor to-day are not demanding that German labor should languish in perpetual poverty. British and American capital would gladly prevent German capital from ever recovering its footing. The difference between a league of nations in which each member is controlled by captains of industry and their satellites and one in which each member is partly controlled by labor is the difference between a community of individuals naturally inclined toward peace and a community of turbulent feudists. In neither case can the peace be kept without organization, but in the latter case any organization is bound to break down at intervals.

If there is any hope for a tolerable international order it lies in the rise of a party dominated by the workers. But is this not tantamount to invoking the revolution? For some reason, explainable by the psychologists, popular political science dearly loves antitheses. If not Wilson, then Lenin, was a current phrase not long ago. There was a third possibility, Clemenceau, and that was what we got. If not capitalistic rule, then socialism. Why?

A labor party powerful enough to contest with other parties the actual control of administration would inevitably produce a marked effect upon our legislation. It might close up some avenues of profit, but not so many as are closed by the blockades and embargoes of war. It might levy taxes for the maintenance of social welfare institutions, but they would rest easily in comparison with war taxes. It might modify the distribution of wealth, but not so radically as does war. And assume, if you can be content with nothing but extremes, that labor rule would lead to universal confiscation. What will the next world war lead to, if we must have a next war? There is no reason, however, for insisting on any such assumption. The only party in the world that has made any contribution in recent years to the stock of moderate and sane political doctrines is the British Labor Party. A tremendous responsibility rests upon the leaders of the working class; to form a powerful political organization to defend the interests of the class and to establish a sound basis for international organization. It is a responsibility they owe not only to their own class but to the whole of society, which stands now, as it stood five years ago, in danger of conflagration that may sweep away everything men value.

S. Doc. 27, 66-1-2

MR. WILSON AND HIS PROMISES.

Since there. appears to be a scattering of people left who think that the treaty of Versailles executes the agreement in the armistice, it may be not altogether useless to examine the matter. There are not many such people, to be sure, and they grow scarcer every day. The New York World after one rather hesitating attempt to square Mr. Wilson's words and deeds gave it up, and has devoted itself to the Senate and the Germans. The New York Evening Post also took a shot at it, but after a little further consideration, has devoted itself ever since to proving that the covenant can repair whatever damage has been done, that the treaty is merely a preliminary treaty, and that the "peoples" (quotation marks the Post's) can rewrite it at leisure. Papers like the New York Tribune, which have always frankly disbelieved in Wilsonism, are honestly pleased at the triumph of their own ideas. They may well be. If betting on the winner is an achievement, those who have thought with the Tribune in America and the Morning Post in London may be well content. But if carrying out your pledged word is the first test, and the making of a stable peace is the real interest of America, then none of us has any ground for complacency.

At the risk of boring everyone, we must recall that the signing of the armistice was preceded by the transmission of a memorandum from the allied Governments stating that:

Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in the subsequent addresses.

The two qualifications concerned clause 2 of the 14 points, on the "freedom of the seas," and the matter of reparations:

By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilians of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

On the terms of peace laid down in the address of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in the subsequent addresses. Obviously it is not enough to check off the 14 points one by one and see how the score stands. Can anyone doubt that what that means is this: Wherever the 14 points give specific terms they are to be applied specifically; where they are not specific, terms are to be arranged on the basis of the principles laid down in the subsequent addresses.

I. If the treaty is published before it is signed, it may with charity be described as an open covenant of peace openly arrived at. The project of a triple alliance between France, Great Britain, and America is certainly a "private international understanding," and there were to be none of these. This is abundantly clear in the third principle of settlement laid down in the "subsequent address" of September 27, which says flatly "there can be no league or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the league of nations." If it is claimed that "no private international understandings" means no "secret " ones, then there is a loophole under clause 1 of the 14 points but not under principle No. 3 of the address of September 27. So far as secret

understandings go they have prevailed in the treaty, viz, Japan in Shantung, but Mr. Wilson might claim that the era of no secret treaties was to begin only after the treaty which ends this war.

II. The question of maritime law was excepted in the armistice. III. The removal of economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions is confined to nations "consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." Presumably Germany is to be regarded as a nation forced to consent to the peace but not associated for its maintenance. This may sound like a joke, but it isn't. Being excluded from the league, Germany is perhaps not associated for its maintenance, therefore the promise of equality of trade conditions does not apply to her. That is why Germany must without reciprocity keep down her tariffs and give the Allies special privileges over her railroads, waterways, and ports.

The question is whether Germany under the accepted program was to be admitted to the league. Clause 14 speaks of a "general association of nations," certainly not an allied and associate association of nations. So we turn to a subsequent address, and of course the last before the armistice, because this must represent the most subsequent of the subsequent principles:

And, as I see it, the constitution of that league of nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It can not be formed now. If formed now [that is while war was still being fought], it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy.

Now, either the war is still being fought, in which case the league should not be formed now, or the league is merely a new alliance. Yet just preceding this statement of Mr. Wilson's there is another which might be offered in extenuation:

For Germany will have to redeem her character not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

What does this mean? It was spoken before the German revolution, while the Kaiser was still on his throne and Ludendorff still in the saddle. Did Mr. Wilson mean that he might conclude peace with them, but that if he did he could not trust them? The German people must by this time be fully aware that we can not accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. [Sept. 27.]

But it is necessary that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination. [Jan. 8.]

The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany which once could secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world is discredited and destroyed. [Address of Nov. 11. Not technically a "subsequent address," but presumably consistent with the rest of the President's thought.]

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The nations of the world do not and can not trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the Government of the United States can not deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. [Oct. 24.] Without spinning the matter too finely it is surely fairly obvious that the President intended to form a league with a republican Germany, and in that league she was to be assured equality of trade conditions when she had consented to the peace and associated herself for its maintenance.

IV. In the matter of armaments "adequate guarantees" were to be given and taken. They have been taken and not given.

V. Colonial claims were to be freely, openly, and absolutely impartially adjusted. Granting that Germany's behavior in German Southwest Africa was wretched, and that Japan's, the Union of South Africa, Australia, France, and Britain's are by contrast good, the settlement may be taken as not flagrant.

VI. Russia. This clause is unreadable now.

VII. Belgium. Probably complied with, except that the cession of territory was never included. This cession has, however, the justification of dealing with Walloon territory and with a mixed population where there are to be plebiscites.

VIII. Alsace Lorraine is reannexed to France. The political control of the Saar Valley is expressly excluded from dispute by the naming of "the wrong done in 1871." It is a clear violation of a solemn contract. The "restoration of the invaded portion " of France is defined in one of the qualifications of the armistice. The seven categories of damages, with the exception of pensions and separation allowances, fall within the obligation. Germany's duty to make reparation is perfectly plain. Where the treaty breaks down is that, in addition to this, it gives the Allies a dictatorship over the industrial system out of which Germany is to pay. This was never stipulated and is the fundamentally vicious thing in the whole treaty. By signing away Germany's economic independence, the principle enunciated in the subsequent addresses is torn to shreds:

There can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the league of nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

The penalty is applied, and it is vested in Great Britain and France, not in the league. The difference is that the league would presumably formulate rules for its exercise, whereas France and Great Britain are free to act on their private interest and at their discretion.

What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind. [July 4.]

What we have got is a dictatorship of France and Great Britain in the commercial life of the Eastern Hemisphere. No rule of law under the league binds them.

* *

IX. The readjustment of the frontiers of Italy "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Completely abandoned in the Upper Adige for strategic reasons. No decision as to the rest. X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary * accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. This was amended, justly, before the armistice, to read as follows: Because of the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the aspirations of the Jugoslavs the President is "no longer at liberty to accept a mere autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations * * *" They, not he. On the basis of this, German Austria is forbidden to unite with Germany if she desires. The Germans of Bo

hemia are annexed without prebiscite to Czechoslovakia, and the Germans of the Upper Adige to Italy.

The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. [Sept. 27.]

XI. The Balkan States. No decision as yet published.

XII. Turkey. All that is now known is the giving to Greece of a mandate over Smyrna. Assuming that the boundaries are fairly delineated, this is in accordance with principle and is as desirable as any solution yet proposed.

XIII. A Polish State to "include territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations" and with free and secure access to the sea. Until we know the exact boundaries, no final judgment is possible.

XIV. "A general association of nations." This depends upon how you define the word "general." Its probable meaning is discussed under III.

So far as Germany is concerned, the major violations are:

1. Exclusion from the league.

2. The Saar.

3. One-sided disarmament, unaccompanied by "adequate guaranties given" as well as "taken."

4. The application of the principle of self-determination to nonGerman territory in Germany and its refusal to the Germans of Bohemia, Austria, and the Upper Adige.

5. But supremely the surrender of her economic independence and the setting up of a commercial dictatorship of two powers limited by no definite rule of law.

7. The fact that the sum of these violations illustrates the principle that we have discriminated between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. (First principle, Sept. 27," stated authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace.")

The retort that Germany as victor would have done worse is, of course, an insult to every honorable man in the allied world. Whoever employs it to justify the wrongs of this treaty "has adopted the standards of the enemies of his country, whom he affects to despise.” [July 27.]

This discussion has been carried far enough to make it abundantly plain that if this treaty is to be defended, every candid man_must preface his argument by saying: "It is not the peace which the President, speaking for the allied and associated Governments, promised to make. For reasons of state, for higher reasons, if you please, in the interests of a greater justice perhaps, we have scrapped whatever part of that promise might conceivably lessen the punishment of Germany." That is plain speaking at least, and having spoken plainly, our next business is to study this so-called strong peace to see, not whether it fulfills our pledges, but whether it has the strength which endures or merely the strength which blows up everything within reach. The Paris conference having made a clean get away from the business of idealism, the American people will, if they are awake, analyze the thing they are to guarantee in detail with the same unsen