President Wilson indicated adhesion to Pan Americanism early in his administration by a circular note to United States diplomatic officers in Latin American countries:

One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents.

I earnestly desire the most cordial understanding and coöperation between the peoples and leaders of America and, therefore, deem it my duty to make this brief statement. Coöperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force.122

He has called it into political activity by twice enlisting the coöperation of certain American countries in settling the Mexican imbroglio.123 In response to the second of these efforts, the Pan American Union passed a resolution as follows:

The Pan American Union expresses its gratification and approval of the course adopted by the Governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, United States, and Uruguay in counseling together upon the situation in Mexico and in acting identically in recognizing the de facto Government of Mexico, in that it evidences the spirit of coöperation, which is the essential element of Pan American fraternity.124

Other phases of Pan Americanism were emphasized by President Wilson in his address to the Pan American Scientific Conference in 1916. He said that the Monroe Doctrine in its negative aspect had been maintained on the responsibility of the United States alone, but added:

If America is to come into her own . . . she must establish the foundations of amity. . . . It will be accomplished, in the first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity.a

122 March 12, 1913, Myers, op. cit., p. 7.

123 American Year Book, 1914, p. 72, 1915, p. 116. See also President Wilson's address to Congress, December 7, 1915 (Cong. Rec., 53: 95), and Secretary Lansing's address to the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, December 27, 1915 (Myers, op. cit., p. 98).

124 Bulletin of Pan American Union, 41: 609 (November 1915).

124 a American Year Book, 1916, p. 288. The relation of this solidarity of the

He then proceeded to outline a practical program for accomplishing this end, including an agreement for amicable settlement of all disputes, and:

The agreement necessary for the peace of the Americas, that no state of either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against another state to be fitted out on its territory, and that they will prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring governments.125

This principle had already received recognition in the Joint Resolution of Congress of March 14, 1912, giving the President authority to forbid the export of arms and munitions of war to "any American country" in which he finds "conditions of domestic violence"; 126 in the practice of Presidents Taft and Wilson under the resolution in connection with Mexico; and also in the Latin American schemes of confederation of 1848, 1858, and 1865.127 In the references to "neighboring governments" and "any American country" there is a manifestation of the doctrine of territorial propinquity.

During the War of 1914, several South American countries referred to "American" practice as the basis for certain neutrality regulations 128 and after the declaration of war by the United States in April, 1917, several of them mentioned the solidarity of the Americas as a reason for severing diplomatic relations with Germany, revoking

Americas to the Monroe Doctrine and to the problem of a general guarantee of 'the future peace of the world" was discussed by President Wilson in an address to a group of Mexican editors on June 7, 1918.

125 American Year Book, 1916, p. 288; Myers, op. cit., p. 108. The American Institute of International Law, at its second meeting at Havana, January 22-27, 1917, proposed the question for consideration: "Should the American Republics affirm, as a basis of international organization in their relations with the states of other continents, that the integrity and the sovereignty of the countries which constitute the American Continent or American World should be maintained; and, if so, should they declare themselves jointly and separately responsible for the maintenance of these principles?" This JOURNAL, Supp., 11: 50.

126 37 Stat. 630.

127 Supra, notes 112, 113.

128 Uruguay, decrees, December 14, 15, 1914, Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1916, pp. 115, 118. The special responsibilities of the "American states" are referred to in a Chilean decree, December 15, 1915, and a Venezuelan memorandum, October, 1914, ibid., 28, 129.

neutrality decrees, or declaring war.129 In a message to Congress of May 22, 1917, the President of Brazil stated:

Today, in consideration of the fact that the United States is an integral part of the American Union; in consideration, also, of the traditional policy of Brazil, which has always been governed by a complete unity of view with the United States; and, finally, in consideration of the sympathies of a great majority of the Brazilian nation, the administration invited Congress to revoke the decree of neutrality.130

Coöperation of the states of the Western Hemisphere to protect their independence and system of government seems to have proved a necessary development of the Monroe Doctrine. If this is true, general international coöperation "to make the world safe for democracy" is not a departure from past policies so much as an enlargement justified by new technical conditions of commerce and communication. Nor would such an enlargement necessarily imply an abandonment of the territorial propinquity phase of the doctrine. An individual under ordinary circumstances is more concerned with his family than with his nation, and with his nation than with humanity; so a state may be expected to take a more intense interest in the integrity of neighboring states than in those of a remote quarter of the globe. The United States will probably continue, under ordinary circumstances, to be more interested in Canada, Cuba and the Caribbean than in Chile, and in Pan America than beyond the seas; but without implying an absence of responsibility for the larger order.

CONCLUSION

A review of the foregoing pronouncements shows that territorial propinquity has furnished a legal justification for the acquisition of territory, but only in regions unoccupied or occupied only by savages. Geographical position has been given some recognition as a justification for special economic privileges, which, however, have been fre

129 Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1917, pp. 60, 65, 77, 197, 198, 249; American Year Book, 1917, p. 50 et seq.

130 Message, President of Brazil, May 22, 1917. This recommendation was acted upon, May 29, 1917, and followed by a declaration of war, October 27, 1917; American Year Book, 1917, p. 53.

quently a prelude to political incorporation. Propinquity to the enemy has been referred to by belligerents as a justification for subjecting neutrals to special economic restrictions; and the proximity of disorder to their frontiers has been often cited by states as a justification for the exercise of jurisdiction in foreign territory, but this justification has usually been accepted only where the case is covered by a special convention, where there is an instant and overwhelming necessity of defense, or where there is a marked difference in the civilization of the two states. As a doctrine applicable between states of equal standing, territorial propinquity would seem to be recognized only as a justification for special interests of mutual protection and coöperation.

The scope of the most recent illustration of the doctrine of territorial propinquity must await for the verdict of history. Does the Lansing-Ishii agreement give Japan a free hand to expand territorially in China? Her delay in fulfilling the promise to return Kiau Chau seems to raise that presumption.131 Does it permit her to gain a privileged economic situation in that country? Her position in Manchuria suggests that interpretation.132 Does it concede her the right to enjoy certain jurisdictional rights in China? Such might be inferred from some of the demands presented to that country in 1915 and 1916.133

Yet the notes themselves 134 specifically provide against any impairment of the “territorial sovereignty of China" and the principle of the "open door," or "the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of

131 American Year Book, 1914, p. 99. See also Chinese supplementary proposal to Group I, of the demands of January 18, 1915, ibid., 110.

132 Groups II and III of demands of January 18, 1915, American Year Book, 1915, p. 111.

133 Group V of demands of January 18, 1915, American Year Book, 1915, p. 112. Resulting agreement, May 25, 1915, this JOURNAL, Supp. 10: 5. See, also, eight demands made after the Cheng Chia Tun incident, September 2, 1916, this JOURNAL, Supp., 11: 113; American Year Book, 1916, p. 100.

134 This JOURNAL, Supp. 12: 1; World Court Magazine, S: 594 (Dec. 1917); American Year Book, 1917, p. 61.

any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China."

Secretary Lansing interprets the agreement as 135 'openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relations to China created by geographical position." And shortly prior to the conclusion of the agreement, Viscount Ishii spoke of the Japanese policy as follows:

There is this fundamental difference between the Monroe Doctrine of the United States as to Central and South America and the enunciation of Japan's attitude toward China. In the first there is on the part of the United States no engagement or promise, while in the other Japan voluntarily announces that Japan will herself engage not to violate the political or territorial integrity of her neighbor, and to observe the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, asking at the same time other nations to respect these principles.136

From the words of the notes and the expressions used in connection with them, it may be inferred that protection of China from interference by foreign states is the only special interest Japan has in China. The doctrine would then be not unlike the Monroe Doctrine in its simplest form. If this is its true intent, it is to be hoped that, as in recent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, coöperation will be recognized as an essential feature of the doctrine and that in the determination of action to be taken under it, China will have an equal

voice.

QUINCY WRIGHT.

135 This JOURNAL, 12: 154; World Court Magazine, 3: 595.

136 The Imperial Japanese Mission, 1917, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication No. 15, Washington, 1918, pp. 103-104. World Court Magazine, 3: 520 (November, 1917). The Chinese attitude toward the agreement is indicated by the declaration of the Chinese Legation in the United States, November 12, 1917, immediately after publication of the exchange of notes: "The Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations." This JOURNAL, Supp., 12: 3; World Court Magazine, 3: 599 (December, 1917).