court in several recent cases. Louisiana v. | kansas, 15 How. 304, 309, 14 L. ed. 705, 708, Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 27 L. ed. 448, 2 Sup. and in Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447, Ct. Rep. 128; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. 27 L. ed. 780, 784, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 878. The S. 52, 29 L. ed. 805, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 608; suit in the former case was prosecuted by Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 virtue of a state law which the legislature Sup. Ct. Rep. 164. Those were cases aris- passed in conformity to the Constitution of ing under the Constitution of the United that state. But this court decided, in Beers States, upon laws complained of as impairing the obligation of contracts, one of which was the constitutional amendment of Louisiana complained of in the present case. Relief was sought against state officers who professed to act in obedience to those laws. This court held that the suits were virtually against the states themselves, and were consequently violative of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, and could not be maintained. It was not denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution; but, notwithstanding that, they were held to be prohibited by the Amendment referred to." Referring to certain observations made by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall, in refutation of the doctrine that states were liable to suits, the court also said: "It seems to us that these views of those great advocates and defenders of the Constitution were most sensible and just; and they apply equally to the present case as to that then under discussion. The letter is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a state. The reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of. Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a state to sue their own state in the Federal courts, whilst [448]the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the states? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face." Again: "The suability of a state without its consent was a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted. v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529, 15 L. ed. 991, 992, that the state could repeal that law at any time; that it was not a contract within the terms of the Constitution prohibiting the passage of state laws impairing the obligation of a contract. ... It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign state from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on public law. It is enough for us to declare its existence." The present plaintiffs, as did the plaintiffs in Hans v. Louisiana, base the argument in support of their right to sue the state in the circuit court of the United States upon a mere letter of the Constitution. We deem it unnecessary to repeat *or enlarge upon the [449] reasons given in Hans v. Louisiana why a suit brought against a state by one of its citizens was excluded from the judicial power of the United States, even when it is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. They apply equally to a suit of that character brought against the state by a corporation created by Congress. Such a suit cannot, consistently with the Constitution, be brought within the cognizance of a circuit court of the United States without the consent of the state. It could never have been intended to exclude from Federal judicial power suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States when brought against a state by private individuals or state corporations, and at the same time extend such power to suits of like character brought by Federal corporations against a state without its consent. The Circuit Court entertained jurisdiction of the cause and dismissed the bill. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred in holding jurisdiction, but affirmed the order of dismissal upon the ground of want of jurisdiction in the latter court to take cognizance of such a case as is here presented. We approve the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and its judgment is affirmed. GEORGE H. EARLE, Jr., Receiver of the v. 'It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned,' said Mr. Justice Miller, in Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co. 109 U. S. 446, 451, 27 L. ed. 992, 994, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609, 'that neither a state nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent, except in the limited class of cases in which a state may be made a party in the Supreme Court of the United States by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred on this court by the Constitution.' Undoubtedly a state may be sued by its own consent, as was the case in Curran v. Ar- National banks-attachment of, as gar COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, at the Suggestion and to the Use of the COMMONWEALTH TITLE, INSURANCE, & TRUST COMPANY, Trustee for Mary Rodgers under the Will of Benjamin Milnes, Deceased. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 449-456.) IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John G. Johnson argued the cause in error. Mr. Alfred Day Wiler argued the cause and, with Messrs. Crawford, Laughlin, & Dallas, filed a brief for defendant in error. [450] *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin ion of the court: tories; and, on December 15, 1897, a rule was entered by plaintiff for judgment against the bank, as garnishee, on its an swers. A few days later, on the 23d day of De cember, 1897, the bank suspended payment of its obligations, and by order of the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States closed its doors to business; and, January[451] 29, 1898, the present plaintiff in error, Earle, was appointed by that officer as receiver of the bank and duly qualified as such. Subsequently, May 5, 1898, Earle, as receiver, entered his appearance in the above action, and filed a suggestion of record setting forth his appointinent and qualification, and on the following day filed an affidavit stating his appointment as receiver. On the succeeding day a motion was made and filed (entered as a rule) by the receiver to vacate and dismiss the attachment served upon the bank, garnishee, for want of jurisdiction in the court of common pleas under $ 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the receiver insisting that all the proceedings in attachment against the bank were null and void. The rule entered December 15, 1897, for judgment against the bank, and the rule to vacate and dismiss the attachment for want of jurisdiction in the court of common pleas, were heard, and that court, on May 21, 1898, made absolute the rule for judgment, and entered the following: "And now, to wit, May 21, 1898, upon the hearing of the attachment in the above case and the interrogatories of the plaintiff and the answer of the garnishee thereto, it is adjudged that the above-named garnishee has a deposit in money belonging to the above-named defendant of $2,900, with interest from October 28, 1897; and also that the said garnishee has 77 shares of 'National Gas Trust stock' and 33 shares of the capital stock of the Eighth National Bank of Philadelphia belonging to the said defendant and pledged by him with the said garnishee for payment by On the 29th day of September, 1897, the him to it of the sum of $17,831, with intercommonwealth of Pennsylvania, at the sugest thereon from April 22, 1897, and that the gestion and to the use of the Commonwealth Title, Insurance, & Trust Company, trustee for Mary Rodgers, obtained judgment upon a bond in the court of common pleas for the county of Philadelphia against one James Long for the sum of $31,499. A writ of attachment issued upon that judgment, and on the 5th day of October, 1897, an alias writ was issued against the Chestnut Street National Bank of Philadelphia, as garnishce. The writ was served on October 28, 1897, and commanded the bank to show cause in that court on a day named why the judgment against Long, with costs of writ, should not be levied of the effects of the defendant in the hands of the bank. Afterwards, on November 6, 1897, special interrogatories were filed by the plaintiff, and a rule was entered requiring the bank, as garnishee, to answer the same within a named time. Subsequently the bank filed its answer in the attachment proceedings, and November 24, 1897, it filed an answer to the special interroga plaintiff have execution of any dividends on The rule to vacate and dismiss the pro ceedings in attachment for want of juris- | another, except in payment of its circulat- "§ 5234. On becoming satisfied, as speci- "§ 5235. The Comptroller shall, upon appointing a receiver, cause notice to be given, by advertisement in such newspapers as he may direct for three consecutive months, calling on all persons who may have claims against such association to present the same and make legal proof thereof. Sections 5234, 5235, and 5236, above quoted, have reference to the affairs and property of national banks in the hands of receivers, and the administration of its assets by the Comptroller; and the words in § 5242, “no be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding in any state, county, or municipal court,' are to be construed in connection with the previous parts of the same section declaring null and void certain transfers, assignments, deposits, and payments made after the commission by the bank "of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof." with the intent to prevent the application of the bank's assets in the manner prescribed by Congress, or with a view to the preference by the bank of one[454] creditor to another. Whatever may be the scope of § 5242, an attachment sued out against the bank as garnishee is not an attachment against the bank or its property, nor a suit against it, within the meaning of that section. It is an attachment to reach the property or interests held by the bank for others. After the Chestnut Street National Bank had been served as garnishee with the attachment sued out in the Long suit, but before it went into the hands of a receiver, it admitted in its answers to special interrogations in the suit against Long that it was indebted to Long on a clearinghouse due bill, and also that it held as collateral security for his debt to it certain shares of the stock of the National Gas Trust, as well as certain shares of the stock of the Eighth National Bank of Philadelphia. By the service of the attachment upon the bank, the plaintiff in the attachment acquired a right to have the money and property belonging to Long in the hands of the bank applied in satisfaction of its judgment against him, subject, of course, to the bank's lien for any debt due to it at that time from him. The bank therefore became bound to account to the plaintiff in the at "§ 5236. From time to time, after full provision has been first made for refunding [458]to the United States any deficiency in *redeeming the notes of such association, the Comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money so paid over to him by such receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the assets of such association are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on all claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of the proceeds, if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such association, or their le-tachment for whatever property or money it gal representatives, in proportion to the stock by them respectively held." "§ 5242. All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt owing to any national banking association, or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of mortgages, sureties on real estate or of judgments or decrees in its favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use, or for the use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to either, made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner prescribed by this chapter, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to held for the benefit or to the use of Long at the time the attachment was served upon it. And the right thus acquired by the service of the attachment was not lost by the suspension of the bank and the appointment of the receiver. The assets of the bank passed to the receiver burdened, as to the interest that Long had in them, with a lien in favor of the plaintiff in the attachment which could not be disregarded or displaced by the Comptroller of the Currency. We must not, however, be understood as holding that the distribution of the bank's assets in the hands of the receiver could have been in any wise directly controlled by the state court or seized under an attachment or execution in the hands of any state officer. V. On the contrary, the direction in the statute | GEORGE H. EARLE, Jr., Receiver of the that the receiver pay over all moneys real- Chestnut Street National Bank, Plff. in ized by him from the assets of the bank to Err., the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller, furnished a rule of conduct for him which neither an order of nor any proceedings in the state court could affect, modify, or [455]change. The scheme of the statute relat ing to suspended national banks is that from the time of a bank's suspension all its as. sets, of whatever kind, as they are at the time of suspension, pass, in the first instance, to the receiver, the proceeds thereof to be distributed by the Comptroller among those whose claims are proved to his satisfaction or are adjudicated by some court of competent jurisdiction. So, when the Chestnut Street National Bank suspended and went into the hands of a receiver the entire control and administration of its assets were committed to the receiver and the WILLIAM CONWAY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 456-458.) National banks-garnishment of receiver. An attachment of a national bank and its receiver as garnishees can be maintained in a state court, although it cannot create any lien upon specific assets of the bank in the receiver's hands, or disturb his custody of those assets, or prevent him from paying to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency, all moneys coming to his hands or realized by him as receiver from the sale of the property and assets of the bank. [No. 219.] 1900. Comptroller, subject, however, to any rights Argued April 11, 1900. Decided May 14, It results that the state court did not err In overruling the motion of the receiver to vacate and dismiss the attachment issued in the suit brought against Long and served upon the bank as garnishee prior to its suspension. The proceedings in the state court prior to the appointment of a receiver were all in due course of law. We do not understand that to be controverted. But we are of opinion that the order of judgment of May 21, 1898, was erroneous in some particulars. As the bank did not cease to exist as a corporation upon its suspension and the appointment of a receiver, it was competent for the state court to determine, as between the plaintiff in the attachment and the bank, what rights were acquired by the former as against the latter by the service of the attachment; and its judgment, thus restricted, could have been brought to the attention of the Comptroller for his guidance in distributing the assets of the bank. To this extent the judgment below is affirmed. But, for the reasons already stated, we hold that the state court had no authority to order execution in favor of the plaintiff of any dividends upon the money on deposit in the bank to Long's credit at the time the bank was served with the attachment, and direct the sale of the shares of stock originally held by the bank as collateral security, but which passed upon the suspension of the bank to the custody of the receiver. This part of the judgment should be set aside. It is proper to say that the rights acquired by the defendant in error under the garnishee proceedings can be made effective upon applica[456]tion to the Comptroller, to whom Congress has intrusted the power to distribute the assets of a suspended bank among those enti tled thereto The decree is reversed to the extent indited, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opin san. eversed. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the view a decision affirming an order sustaining the jurisdiction of a state court in garnishment of a national bank and its receiver. Affirmed. See same case below, 189 Pa. 610, 42 Atl. 303. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Asa W. Waters argued the cause and, with Mr. W. H. Addicks, filed a brief for plaintiff in error. Mr. John G. Johnson argued the cause and filed a supplemental brief for plaintiff in error. Mr. James C. Stillwell argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error. *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin-[456] ion of the court: This case differs somewhat in its facts from those in Earle v. Pennsylvania, just decided, 178 U. S. 449, ante, 1146, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep.. 915. It appears that on February 24, 1898. the appellee Conway, in an action of assumpsit in the court of common pleas of the county of Philadelphia, obtained a judgment[457] against one John G. Schall for $1,012.43. Upon that judgment a writ of attachment was issued and served May 24 and 25, 1898, upon the Chestnut Street National Bank of Philadelphia and upon Earle, receiver, as garnishees,-the receiver having been appointed January 29, 1898,-commanding them to show cause on a day named why the judgment against Schall, with costs of writ, should not be levied of his effects in their hands. The bank and the receiver entered their appearance as defendants and garnishees "for the purpose only of moving said court to set aside the writ of summons in attach NOTE. AS to conflict of jurisdiction between Federal and state courts-see Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, 22 C. C. A. 334, and note. As to garnishment of receivers-see note to J. I. Case Plow Works v. Finks, 26 C. C. A. 49. ment sur judgment against him and them, and to dismiss and vacate all proceedings in attachment therein against him or them." That motion was made upon the ground that the court of common pleas was without jurisdiction under § 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The motion was denied, and the order of the court of common pleas was affirmed by the supreme court of Pennsylvania. 2. 3. of the state in which the offense is com- A criminal case may be taken directly from We are of opinion that it was not error to deny the motion to set aside the service of the writ of attachment on the bank and the receiver. No sound reason can be given why the receiver of a national bank may not be notified by service upon him of an attachment issued from a state court of the nature and extent of the interest asserted or sought to be acquired by the plaintiff in the attachment in the assets in his custody. But for the reasons stated in Earle v. Pennsylvania, such an attachment cannot create any lien upon specific assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver, nor disturb his custody of those assets, nor prevent him from paying to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency, all moneys coming to his hands or realized by him as receiver from the sale of the property and assets of the bank. After the service of the attachment upon the receiver it became his duty to report the facts to the Comptroller, and it then became the Submitted April 23, 1900. duty of the latter to hold any funds coming to his hands through the Treasurer of the United States as the proceeds of the sale of the bank's assets subject to any interest which the plaintiff may have legally ac[458]quired therein as against his debtor under the attachment issued on the judgment in The right of an accused under U. S. Const. 6th Amend., to be confronted with witnesses against him, is violated by permitting a deposition or statement of an absent witness, taken at an examining trial, to be read at the final trial, when it does not appear that the witness was absent by the suggestion, connivance, or procurement of the accused, but it does appear that his absence was due to the negligence of the prosecution. his favor in the state court. As the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania goes no further than to sustain the right of the plaintiff to have the attachment served upon the receiver as garnishee, it is affirmed. Mr. Justice White dissents. COLUMBUS WINCHESTER MOTES, alias v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 458-476.) 4. Error in the admission of evidence for the prosecution will not require a reversal of a conviction against one who has in fact said under oath that he is guilty of the charge preferred against him. [No. 257.] 1900. Decided May 21, United States for the Northern District of Alabama to review a conviction for conspiracy accompanied by murder. Affirmed as to one defendant and reversed as to others. The facts are stated in the opinion. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Mr. Lee Cowart submitted the cause for plaintiff in error. Assistant Attorney General Boyd submitted the cause for defendant in error. Contentions of counsel sufficiently appear in the opinion. *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin-[459] ion of the court: Columbus Winchester Motes, alias Chess Criminal law-conspiracy accompanied by 1. A sentence to imprisonment for life for the Constitution or laws of the United of any right or privilege secured to him by States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, |