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Four circuits have partial jurisdiction over the big railroad system. The original receivers were appointed by Judge Jenkins of the seventh circuit which includes Wisconsin. Charges of mismanagement were brought against these officers by the Ives party, they were compelled to defend themselves in three different districts, and finally found themselves in the impossible position of operating a railroad under the conflicting orders of about four different masters. This was too much for human ingenuity, the receivers resigned, and the trouble thickened. Judge Jenkins promptly filled their places; but Judge Hanford in the Washington district (ninth circuit) refused to recognize these receivers, and promptly appointed his own nominee. The judges of the eighth circuit stood by Judge Jenkins, while Judge Lacombe of the second (New York) circuit, compelled the original receivers to retain their places until the Western judges on the scene of action could agree. Unfortunately this was exactly what these judges refused to do. Finally after some months of this state of total blockade the various fighting factions decided to take the matter into their own hands, and by an original move brought the whole trouble for advice before the four justices of the Supreme Court who are assigned to the different circuits. These judges have promptly solved the difficulty. On January 28th they issued an advisory order that Judge Jenkins' circuit (the seventh) shall have original jurisdiction over the whole system. By this simple move it is now possible to have a single set of receivers for the whole property, and the dissenting judges are thus compelled to yield by the warning of their superiors. As we have said this action has never been taken before, but it will doubtless prove a precedent for other cases of the same sort. In the present case it will mean the salvation of this much abused property.

The question of citizenship in the United States is receiving repeated attention in the Federal Courts. A recent case, In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 Fed. 382, illustrates the incompatibility between the common law rule as to citizenship and the doctrine affirmed by the law of nations.

In this case, a person born of Chinese parents domiciled in the United States, but subjects of the Emperor of China, departed upon a temporary visit to China and subsequently returned; and thereafter, in 1894, he again departed for China, and returning in the following year was refused by the collector of customs permission to land. In rendering his decision upon habeas

corpus, Judge Morrow interpreted the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," occurring in the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to mean "subject to the laws of the United States," comprehending in this expression "the allegiance that aliens owe to a foreign country to obey its laws." In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. 905, was followed as establishing the common law rule. Mr. Justice Field there held: "They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the subsequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment.” Similar opinions were expressed in Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583; Gee Fook Sing v. U. S. 49 Fed. 46; 7 U. S. App. 27. In re Chin King, 35 Fed. 354; and In re Young Sing Hee, 36 Fed.

437.

In favor of the rule of the law of nations, however, are textwriters of high authority, relying upon certain dicta of the United States Supreme Court, although this precise question has never received final adjudication by that tribunal. Judge Cooley (Const. Law, 254) says: "But a citizen by birth must not only be born within the United States, but he must also be subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and by this is meant that full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens generally are subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdiction such as may consist with allegiance to some other government." A dictum of Mr. Justice Miller, in the so-called Slaughterhouse cases, 16 Wall. 36, would seem to support this view. He says: "The phrase, 'subject to the jurisdiction,' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the United States." Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, seems also to sustain the same view.

A decision by the United States Supreme Court is needed to determine conclusively the true American doctrine upon this interesting point; for Judge Morrow, in rendering the decision in this present case, used the significant words: "The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable and satisfactory; but this consideration will not justify this Court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority."

RECENT CASES.

INJUNCTIONS.

Injunction.-Belknap et al. v. Schield, 16 Supreme Court Rep. 443. An injunction cannot issue to restrain United States officers from using an article made by them in infringement of patent, when such article is in the possession of and used for the benefit of the United States.

Injunction-Action

on Bond-Damages-Interest.—Belmont Mining & Milling Co. et al. v. Costigan et al., 42 Pac. Rep. 650 (Col.). When the sale of land under a trust deed is delayed by a temporary injunction, and upon subsequent sale it fails to bring enough to pay the secured debt, an element of damage is the difference between the amount actually received and what would have been probably realized if the injunction had not been granted, but interest upon the amount of the debt during the time of the delay should not be awarded.

Injunction-Damages-Attorney Fees.-Creek v. McManus et al., 43 Pac. Rep. 497 (Mont.) This was a suit for damages on an injunction bond, in which the plaintiff sought to recover, as one item of damages, fees paid to an attorney who resisted the injunction and tried the case on its merits. But the court held that, since the attorney was employed generally, fees could not be recovered as damages.

INSURANCE.

Action on Life Insurance Policy-Evidence-Appeal-Harmless Error-Estoppel.-Mullen v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 32 S. W. Rep. 911 (Tex.). Where, as required by law, a notice is sent to plaintiff and his wife on whose lives a life policy has been issued, stating the premiums due and that the policy would be forfeited for non-payment, the plaintiff cannot avail himself of his failure to deliver the notice to his wife and claim that the policy was not forfeited because she had not received notice.

Construction of Policy-Conflict of Policy and Application—Revival of Policy-"Renewable Term" Policies.-Goodwin v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York, 66 N. W. Rep. 157. Equivocal terms of a life insurance policy will be construed in support of the claim for indemnity. When the provisions of the policy conflict with the stipulations of the application, those of the latter yield to those of the former. When a New York "renewable term" policy is forfeited through nonpayment of premiums, a reinstatement has not the effect of making a new contract but of canceling the forfeiture.

Insurance-Assignment of Life Policy-Assignee may Enforce.Steinbach v. Diepenbrock et al., 37 N. Y. Sup. 279. An insurance policy taken by a person upon his own life can be assigned like any chose in action, and upon the death of the assured the assignee is entitled to the full amount payable, even though he has no insurable interest in the life of the assured.

Insurance-Conditions-Waiver.-Gross v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, 65 N. W. Rep. 1036 (Wis.). The action was brought to recover on a policy containing a provision that if the building insured be on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple, the policy should be void, unless a written waiver to such condition be attached thereto. At the time the policy was issued the defendant's agent knew that the plaintiff had only an estate for years and waived the condition avoiding the policy on this ground, but neglected to attach the waiver to the policy. Held: This waiver was effective.

Insurance-Conditions of Policy-Breach-Estoppel to Claim Forfeiture-Knowledge of Agent-Powers of Agents.—Dick et al. v. Equitable Fire and Marine Insurance Co. et al., 65 N. W. Rep. 742 (Wis.). An insurance company waives the forfeiture resulting from a breach of a condition of the policy when it requires the assured at some expense and trouble to give a carpenter's estimate of the damage.

Insurance-Policy-Provisions as to Health.-Robinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. Sup. 146. A provision in the policy that the insurer assumes no obligation unless the insured is in "sound health" refers to the physical condition, and the fact that the insured is a cripple and an idiot, but in other respects enjoys good physical health, does not avoid the policy.

Insurance-Stock in Illegal Business-Invalidity of Contract Policy.-Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. Searles et al., 18 Southern Rep. 544 (Miss.). The Searles Co., merchants, had paid their proper privilege tax, but subsequently permitted their stock to exceed their license limit. The court held that their business became eo instanti illegal, and that in consequence a contract of insurance thereafter issued upon said stock is invalid.

Life Insurance Policy-Construction-Stipulation against Suicide-Validity.-Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Payne, 32 S. W. Rep. 1063 (Tex.). The lawful stipulation by a life insurance company against liability for death of insured by his own hand, whether sane or insane, may be overcome by a clause in the certificate, providing that after being in force five years, the certificate should be incontestable for any cause except the non-payment of dues."

Life Policy-Who entitled to Proceeds.-Geoffrey v. Gilbert et al., 36 N. Y. Sup. 884. In this case a father took out a life insurance policy payable to his four-year-old daughter or "her legal representatives." Twenty-two years later she married and soon after died. Subsequently her father died; and it was held that her surviving husband could not receive the benefit of the policy jure mariti, for his wife's interest had terminated; nor as legal representative, for they take by substitution, and the substituted beneficiaries are the next of kin.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Bank Officer-Liability for Deposit-Bill of ParticularsWhen Ordered.-Townsend v. Williams, 23 S. E. Rep. (Jan.) 461. The plaintiff having placed money in a bank of which the defendant was vice-president, heard rumors questioning the solvency of the concern, and attempted to withdraw his deposits. The defendant assured him that the bank was safe, saying “We have got all the money you want. You never need have any fear of this bank as long as I am in it," knowing at the time that his statement was false. The plaintiff, relying on said representations, lost his money on the failure of the bank. Court held that defendant was personally liable.

Chinamen-Right of Naturalization-Effect of Passport-In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274. Gee Hop was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in Camden, New Jersey, and thereafter he

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