afford protection within reach of their guns. They may protect a city, but not a state.

On the other hand, ships of war are very expensive luxuries. They cost immense sums and soon wear out, while wellconstructed forts last a long time, though not for ever. The former require to be repaired and refitted at the end of every cruise; the latter are kept in repair at little expense. Armed ships, whether in service or not, are in a perpetual process of deterioration, and to them a state of inaction is more injurious than war. In a few years the entire capital expended in their construction is irretrievably lost, since they become totally unseaworthy, and to rebuild them is equivalent to a new con

struction.

These are important considerations, and should be maturely weighed in adopting a general system of national defense. The pecuniary resources of the country being equally indispensable to both species of armament, should be carefully estimated, in order to ascertain what portion can be appropriated to either, or both, without withdrawing too much from other branches of expenditure equally conducive to the public welfare. It is always bad policy to starve one portion of the body politic in order to pamper another. We however, feel perfectly assured that the United States are now in a condition to create and maintain a naval force with which no foreign power would wantonly provoke a conflict, and this without incurring a debt or imposing additional burdens on the people. This might require a rigid system of economy in all other public expenditures, and so much the better, as that is one of the indispensable requisites of all good government, and there is nothing more directly contributes to the happiness of the great masses who have seldom any thing to spare from their every-day necessities. As a general rule, therefore, we should say, that is the best government which deprives the people of the least possible portion of their earnings. Everywhere nations are governed too much, and "pay too much for their whistle."

In reference to the establishment of a greater naval force, we have frequently heard it objected that in view of the delays and difficulties which so frequently occur in manning our comparatively small navy, any great increase would be absurd, since it would only lead to additional delay in fitting out additional ships. But a scarcity of seamen, whenever it occurs, is easily accounted for. Naval seamen are always more or less scarce when commerce is in a flourishing state, because almost all sailors prefer high wages and short trips to low wages and

long cruises. But it should be recollected that in time of war with a great maritime power, commerce would be at once crippled, and seamen thus thrown out of employment in the merchant service, seek it in that of their country. There was no scarcity of seamen during the late war with Great Britain; and the same will doubtless be the case in any future one, unless Jack should be driven into foreign service by the efforts of sentimental twaddlers, and wholesale reformers in Congress to convert him into a saint or a teetotaller.

It would, however, we think, be good policy in that honorable body to pass an act compelling every merchant-vessel to employ a certain number of apprentices, or boys, in proportion to its tonnage, which Congress can do under the power to regulate commerce. Without doubt, the merchants would grumble, as they always do when a feather is laid on their shoulders. But it would in the end be agreeably beneficial to them and their country, and should, therefore, gratify both their self-interest and their patriotism. The system of naval apprenticeship revived by the present Secretary, if it can be successfully carried into effect to any considerable extent, will probably furnish an important addition of seamen. But we regret to say, we doubt the ultimate success of the experiment. The late Secretary Paulding, we understand, devoted much of his attention to this subject. He had collected several hundred apprentices, and established schools for their instruction in the receiving ships at the principal naval stations, under the direction of naval professors; and as a stimulant to study and good conduct, annually bestowed an acting midshipman's warrant on the boy who was recommended by his teacher, or at the head of each school in actual acquirements and moral conduct. But the result of the experiment did not, it is understood, answer his expectations.

These apprentices were, as well from policy as necessity, taken from the class of boys who had hitherto led a vagabond life, and enjoyed the freedom of the streets without any restraint but the fear of the police officer and the penitentiary. It is very difficult to make such weeds bear wholesome fruit; and as a general rule, we believe experience will show, that the being in whom vice and depravity have been engrafted in early life, who has never received any precepts but those of immorality, or seen any examples but those of corruption, will seldom, if ever, make an honest man or a useful citizen. Vice, when sucked in, as it were, with the mother's milk, becomes chronic, and can never be thoroughly eradicated. Neither the

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discipline of the navy, nor that of the State prison or penitentiary, can work a thorough reformation in these impracticable materials. Few were redeemed from their vicious habits; a considerable portion deserted on receiving leave of absence when returning from a first cruise, and were never retaken; and scarcely any of the remainder continued attached to the service after the expiration of their term of apprenticeship. Thus after being educated at the public expense, receiving pay sufficient for their clothing at the same time, very little benefit was derived from their services. Such, we are assured, was the result of Secretary Paulding's experience, when from these, and other causes, he relinquished all hope of the success of the experiment. We earnestly hope, however, the present capable, active, and energetic head of the Navy Department may be more fortunate. But to resume our appropriate subject.

In placing our principal reliance for the general defense of the coast and commerce of the United States on a navy, we by no means desire to exclude fortifications as indispensable auxiliaries, although it must occur to all that the latter are exclusively defensive, while the former is both offensive and defensive. It is believed that the next war, come when it will, and be it with whom it may, will not be exclusively defensive either on the ocean or the land. But whether so or not, the command of the seas would not be sufficient. Fortifications would still be required for the protection of our principal ports and naval stations. A navy is not intended to be stationary, and can not be always at hand for every exigency of war. Great Britain, which has long depended on her "wooden walls" for protection, was, during the absence of almost the whole of her disposable force in the Black Sea and the Baltic, so destitute of all other defenses, that she could not have prevented the landing of twenty or thirty thousand men, or indeed, half that number, nor defended her capital and naval station from a fleet of ten or a dozen steamers and ships of war. It is, therefore, imprudent to intrust the national defense to a navy alone.

In the present state of the world, the only powers by which the United States can be seriously assailed, are Great Britain and France, which are three thousand miles distant, with a wide ocean intervening. It should not, however, be forgotten that their fleets may rendezvous, and find shelter and supplies at Halifax, Jamaica, Bermuda, Martinique, and Gaudaloupe, though a great portion of their supplies must originally come from Europe. The most dangerous of our enemies is Great

Britain, not so much on the score of any superiority in naval prowess or power, as from our being environed almost on every side by her colonies, and naval and military stations, affording at the same time a refuge to her fleets, a depot for her armies, and supplies for subsistence and repair. By these means she has brought her power to our very doors, and is always in striking distance. France, in virtue of the entente cordiale, now partakes in all these advantages.

From these premises we draw the conclusion that by far the most efficient arm of the national defense is a navy, and that no triumphs on the land should ever tempt us to neglect the sea. It is most unquestionably our best defense as well as our keenest weapon of annoyance against Great Britain and France, which alone can at this time, or are likely in future, to bring their hostility to our shores. That hostility will, in all probability, be concentrated on our maritime frontier. We do not apprehend they will attempt to establish their equilibrium of power in the New World by attempting to subjugate and hold possession of any portion of the interior; though it is, we think, not at all improbable they may indulge a longing for New-Orleans, the most important position in the United States, and at this moment the least protected of any one of our great commercial emporiums. Once in possession of that, it might be extremely difficult to dislodge them without another "Öld Hickory;" and thus almost the entire valley of the Mississippi would be corked up in a bottle like the Russian possessions in the Black Sea. Here, if anywhere, it seems to us, that strong fortifications are indispensable, until we have a navy.sufficient at least to hold in check any armament either or both these powers can bring directly to bear on the United States.

We do not mean by this, that we should be prepared to oppose ship to ship, man to man, and gun to gun, for this will not be necessary. We have at this moment before us an example of the mighty efforts necessary to fit out expeditions to the Baltic and the Black Sea, the enormous expenses and unavoidable obstacles and delays by which they are embarrassed, though the distance is in one case less than one half, in the other not more than two thirds that across the Atlantic. Should they contemplate any thing beyond mere predatory incursions, or in the phrase of the belligerent London Times, "scouring our coasts," they would materially damage our henroosts and pig-sties, and perhaps lay some of our cities in ashes, or under contribution, and this would probably be the extent of their triumphs. Should they attempt to block

ade the ports of the United States, they will find it very different from blockading Russia. We can not be corked up in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Our coast has more mouths than Cerberus, and to shut them all would require a different strain from that of Orpheus, and a stronger arm than that of Hercules. All the navies afloat on the seas could not keep up a regular and efficient blockade of the coasts of the United States for a single campaign.

Neither Great Britain nor France can man one half their navy at a time, and this not without a resort to impressment or conscription. The boasted sixty thousand men, said to be on the roll of the French navy, are by far the greater portion not even ordinary seamen, and but special few of them volunteers, as all our sailors are. They are principally river boatmen, and what are called among us "Longshore-men," a sort of amphibious vagabonds who are neither fish, flesh, nor fowl, and it requires years to make any thing more of them than freshwater sailors. No doubt they will fight as well as they know how, for that is the instinct of a Frenchman. As to the formidable array of British ships of war in the Baltic and the Black Sea, if we may judge from some broad hints of Admiral Napier since he returned from dancing the air of "Over the water to Charley," it is badly equipped, badly manned, and rather indifferently officered.

Commerce is proverbially the mother as well as the nurse of a navy, and that of the United States is now at least equal to any nation of the globe. In proportion to commerce is the number of seamen, and the number of seamen decides the capacity of a nation to maintain a naval force. In this respect the United States are superior to France, and at least on a par with Great Britain, and it is only their combination that makes them especially formidable. Whether this will continue for any length of time, is a question that can only be settled by time. We pretend to no extraordinary insight into the future, but from certain indications occasionally peeping forth, we should be inclined to predict this hot love will soon be cold, and scarcely outlive the honey-moon. To use a somewhat hackneyed, though beautiful illustration, Great Britain and France are like the iron and clay in Nebuchadnezzar's image-they may cleave together for a while, but will never incorporate. Two such brilliant rival suns can not long shine together in the same sphere. The furious cannonade of compliments daily interchanged between them, if it does not imply a consciousness of mutual insincerity, at least seems to indicate a