and thereby plainly intimated to him that they regarded any interest which he might have had in the premises as at an end, he submitted to the notice, without protest, and acquiesced in his exclusion from the property. This conduct, coupled with his utter disregard thereafter of any liability, either in regard to the property or in regard to the indebtedness, is wholly inconsistent with the existence of any such trust arrangement as that which he claims to have been made between him and the defendants." 8 App. D. C. 237.

*This view being decisive of the case, it becomes unnecessary to consider the defense of laches, or that of the statute of frauds; and a discussion of the testimony in detail could be of no value as a precedent, and would serve no useful purpose. Harrell v. Beall, 17 Wall. 590; Tyler v. Campbell, 106 U. S. 322, 1 Sup. Ct. 293. Decree affirmed.

(169 U. S. 203)

UNITED STATES v. KLUMPP et al.
(February 21, 1898.)
No. 159.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-WOOLENS AND WORSTEDS-ACT

OF 1894.

By the tariff acts of 1890 and 1894 the distinction made in previous tariff laws between woolens and worsteds was no longer recognized; and, as worsteds are in fact made of wool, the provision in paragraph 297 of the act of 1894 declaring that the reduction of duties therein provided for on "manufactures of wool" should not take effect until January 1, 1895, included worsted goods. 19 C. C. A. 343, 72 Fed. 1008, and 68 Fed. 908, reversed.

On a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. *On the 30th day of August, A. D. 1894, John F. Klumpp and others, doing business as a partnership under the name of Alexander Murphy & Co., imported into New York certain merchandise, consisting of women's and children's dress goods composed of worsted. The collector classified this merchandise, and assessed it for duty under paragraph 395 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. 567, c. 1244), at 12 cents per square yard, and 50 per cent. ad valorem. The importers protested, claiming the goods to be dutiable under paragraph 283 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 509, c. 349), at 40 per cent., or 50 per cent. ad valorem, according to the value per pound.

The board of general appraisers overruled the protest (G. A. 2769), and the importers carried the matter to the circuit court, which reversed the decision of the board of general appraisers. 68 Fed. 908. On an appeal to the circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit, the decision of the circuit court was affirmed. 38 U. S. App. 467, 19 C. C. A. 343, and 72 Fed. 1008. The case was then brought here on certiorari.

It was admitted below "that the classification of the merchandise by the collector was worst

ed dress goods, at twelve cents per square yard, and fifty per cent. ad valorem, under Schedule K, par. 395, of the tariff act of October 1, 1890."

And "that the merchandise in controversy is worsted dress goods, made from the fleece of the sheep, which has been combed and spun into worsted yarn, and is not composed of the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animal than sheep."

Paragraph 395 of Schedule K of the act of October 1, 1890, entitled "Wool and Manufactures of Wool," reads: "On women's and children's dress goods, coat linings, Italian cloth, bunting, and goods of similar description or character composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals, and not specially provided for in this act, the duty shall be twelve cents per square yard, and in addition thereto fifty per centum ad valorem: provided, that on all such goods weighing over four ounces per square yard the duty per pound shall be four times the duty imposed by this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first class, and in addition thereto fifty per centum ad valorem."

Paragraph 283 of Schedule K of the act of August 27, 1894, entitled "Wool and Mannfactures of Wool," provided: "On women's and children's dress goods, coat linings, Italian cloth, bunting, or goods of similar description or character, and on all manufactures, composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals, including such as have India rubber as a component material, and not specially provided for in this act, valued at not over fifty cents per pound, forty per centum ad valorem; valued at more than fifty cents per pound, fifty per centum ad valorem."

Paragraphs 280 to 286, Inclusive, under this schedule, provided for duties on articles made or composed "wholly or in part of wool, worsted, or the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals," except that paragraph 282, which referred to blankets, etc., omitted the word "worsted."

Paragraphs 287 to 296, inclusive, related to carpets, mats, etc., and the concluding paragraph of the schedule read: "(297) The reduction of the rates of duty herein provided for manufactures of wool shall take effect January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five."

Paragraph 685, one of the paragraphs of the free list, was as follows: "(685) All wool of the sheep, hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other like animals, and all wool and hair on the skin, noils, yarn waste, card waste, bur waste, slubbing waste, roving waste, ring waste, and all waste, or rags composed wholly or in part of wool, all the foregoing not otherwise herein provided for."

Sol. Gen. Richards, for the United States. W. Wickham Smith, for appellees.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER (after stating the facts). Women's and children's dress

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goods, "composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals," were dutiable under paragraph 395 of the act of October 1, 1890, at 12 cents per square yard, and 50 per cent. ad valorem; under paragraph 283 of the act of August 27, 1894, at 40 or 50 per cent. ad valorem, according to value. But by paragraph 297, the reduction of the rates of duty on "manufactures of wool" was not to take effect until January 1, 1895. And, if that paragraph applied to worsted dress goods for women and children, then the collector was right, and the judgment must be reversed.

Was it intended that the words "manufactures of wool," as used in this paragraph, should include or exclude worsted goods?

Worsted goods are made out of wool, and are necessarily a manufacture of wool. The Century Dictionary defines "worsted" as a noun: "A variety of woolen yarn or thread, spun from long-staple wool which has been combed, and in the spinning is twisted harder than is usual;" and as an adjective: "Consisting of worsted; made of worsted yarn; as worsted stockings."

"Worsted is but wool spun and twisted in a particular manner," said Mr. Justice Story in Whiting v. Bancroft, 1 Story, 560, Fed. Cas. No. 17,575. And in Cohn v. Seeberger, 30 Fed. 425, it was found by Judge Blodgett that "worsted is made by combing long-fibered wools so that the fibers usually lie or are arranged alongside each other, while wool is treated by carding it so as to interlock the fibers with each other."

As between worsted yarns and woolen yarns, the Encyclopædia Britannica says that the fundamental distinction "rests in the crossing and interlacing of the fibers in preparing woolen yarn, an operation confined to this alone, among all textiles,-while for worsted yarn the fibers are treated, as in the case of all other textile materials, by processes designed to bring them into a smooth, parallel relationship with each other." Volume 24, p. 658.

Although, through the introduction of improved processes of manufacture, it gradually became possible to comb shorter and finer varieties of wool, and thus to manufacture worsted goods of higher grade and better quality, approximating worsted to woolen goods, and removing the reason for any distinction between them in the matter of duties, the tariff laws, prior to May 9, 1890, made a distinction in that respect between woolen and worsted goods, resting on the difference in the process of manufacture; but the raw material was, of course, always the same, namely, wool. By the tariff acts of April 27, 1816 (3 Stat. 310, c. 107), of May 22, 1824 (4 Stat. 25, c. 123), May 19. 1828 (4 Stat. 270, c. 55), July 14, 1832 (4 Stat. 583, c. 227), August 30, 1842 (5 Stat. 548. c. 270), worsted stuff goods were recognized as manufactures of wool.

By the acts of July 30, 1846 (9 Stat. 92, c. 74), March 2. 1861 (12 Stat. 252, Res. 15), July 14, 1862 (12 Stat. 543, c. 163), June 30,

1864 (13 Stat. 202, c. 171), March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 559, c. 197), March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. 488, c. 121), "manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for" were separated from "manufactures of worsteds not otherwise provided for," and distinct duties levied on each, while from 1861 distinct duties were levied on articles specifically described, whether manufactured of wool or worsted.

In Seeberger v. Cahn, 137 U. S. 95, 11 Sup. Ct. 28, it was held that cloths popularly known as "diagonals," and in trade as "worsteds," were subject to duty under the act of March 3, 1883, as manufactures of worsted, and not as manufactures of wool; the ground of decision being thus stated by Mr. Justice Gray delivering the opinion of the court:

"In the interpretation of the customs acts, nothing is better settled than that words are to receive their commercial meaning, and that when goods of a particular kind, which would otherwise be comprehended in a class, are sub jected to a distinct rate of duty from that imposed upon the class generally, they are taken out of that class, for the purpose of the assessment of duties.

"Of the two successive paragraphs in the customs act of 1883, upon which the parties respectively rely, the first imposes a certain scale of duties on 'all manufactures of wool of every description, made wholly or in part of wool, not*specially enumerated or provided for in this act'; and the second imposes a lower scale of duties on 'all manufactures of every description, composed wholly or in part of worsted.'

"Though worsted is doubtless a product of wool, and might in some aspects be considered a manufacture of wool, yet, manufactures of worsted being subjected by the second paragraph to different duties from those imposed by the first paragraph on manufactures of wool, it necessarily follows that a manufac ture of worsted cannot be considered as a manufacture of wool, within the meaning of this statute."

This decision was announced November 17, 1890, but the controversy had been pending for a long time in the courts, and on May 9. 1890, an act was passed, "providing for the classification of worsted cloths as woolens," by enacting "that the secretary of the treasury be, and he hereby is, authorized and directed to classify as woolen cloths all imports of worsted cloth, whether known under the name of worsted cloth or under the name of worsteds or diagonals or otherwise." 26 Stat. 105, c. 200.

And since that date no distinction for customs purposes between woolens and worsteds has been recognized by congress.

By the act of October 1, 1890, the same dutles were levied upon worsted and woolen goods. Paragraphs 375 to 387 divided all wools, hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other like animals, into three classes, and levied certain duties on each class. Paragraphs 391 to 398 provided for certain duties on describ

By the act of August 27, 1894, wool was put on the free list (paragraph 685); and the paragraphs of the act of October 1, 1890, classifying wools, and levying duties on the different classes, were omitted. Paragraphs 280 to 286, inclusive, of Schedule K of this act, prescribed duties on certain enumerated articles, whether composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animal.

There was no distinction made by either of these acts between manufactures of wool and manufactures of worsted, for the purposes of duty; and the word "worsted" seems to have been used out of abundant caution, and as conducive to greater certainty.

The act of July 24, 1897, commonly known as the "Dingley Act," omits the repetition of the words "wool, worsted, hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, and other animals," and uses the single word "wool." Paragraph 383 provides: "Whenever, in any schedule of this act, the word 'wool' is used in connection with a manufactured article of which it is a component material, it shall be held to include wool or hair of the sheep, camel, goat, alpaca or other animal, whether manufactured by the woolen, worsted, felt, or any other process." 30 Stat. 151, c. 11.

Manifestly the distinction on which the decision in Seeberger v. Cahn turned was done away with by the acts of October 1, 1890, and August 27, 1894, as well as by that of May 9, 1890, and there certainly is no imperative ground for its reinstatement by technical construction.

The reason for the postponing of the taking effect of the reduction of duties obviously had nothing to do with the process of manufacture, but related to the material of which the goods were composed, which material had been relieved from duty by paragraph 685 of the act.

Congress undoubtedly concluded that the manufacturers of goods from wool had laid in a large stock of material, which equitably they should be allowed a reasonable time to work off, and that there was probably on hand a large stock of goods, to dispose of which reasonable time should be allowed, rather than that the large dealers should be induced to bring in foreign goods at a cost which involved ruinous competition, while at the same time the wool growers ought to have their original market until they could adjust themselves to the new condition of things.

The specific rate was compensatory, and, when stricken out, and the duty on raw material abolished, a postponement was provided for in order to avoid injustice.

But the reason for postponing the reduction on manufactures of wool, which, on the face of the act, we think properly imputable to congress, is as applicable to worsted

wool.

It will be perceived that the acts of 1890 and 1894 did not levy a duty on "worsted dress goods," eo nomine, nor on worsted dress goods by commercial designation, nor on worsted dress goods as distinguished from woolen dress goods; but a duty on dress goods, whether made of "wool. worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals." The description is addressed to the quality and material of the goods, namely, women's and children's dress goods, made of wool, worsted, etc.

The principle, then, that the special designation of an article by its commercial meaning should prevail over general terms used in the same or a later act, has no application.

In Barber v. Schell, 107 U. S. 617, 2 Sup. Ct. 301, the words "cotton laces, cotton insertings," etc., used in the act of 1846, were held to be designations of articles by special description of quality and material; and the general provision of 1857, transferring to Schedule C "all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed, or dyed," whereby a different duty was imposed on such goods, was held to apply. Mr. Justice Blatchford said, "The designations qualified by the word 'cotton' in the act of 1846 are designations of articles by special description, as contradistinguished from descriptions by a commercial name, or a name of trade. They are designations of quality and material." Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U. S. 171, 178, 14 Sup. Ct. 288.

It is argued that the same reasoning which brings worsted goods within the words "manufactures of wool" would also compel the inclusion of goods composed of the hair of the camel and other animals, confessedly not covered by the phrase.

Doubtless, wool, considered as the sheep's coat, might be said to be the sheep's hair; and fleeces of the hair of the Angora goat, the llama, the alpaca, and other like animals, might be called their wool. In the Encyclopædia Britannica (9th Ed.; volume 24, p. 653), under the title of "Wool and Woolen Manufactures," it is said: "Wool is a modi-* fied form of hair, distinguished by its slender, soft, and wavy or curly structure, and by the highly imbricated or serrated surface of its filaments. The numerous varieties of the sheep are the most characteristic, as they are also by far the most important, producers of wool; but the sheep is by no means the only animal which yields wool employed for industrial purposes. The al paca and other allied fibers obtained from the alpaca and its congeners in South America, the mohair yielded by the Angora goat, and the soft, woolly hair of the camel, are all wools of much industrial importance. while the most costly wool in the world is that yielded by the Cashmere goat, of the Himalayan Mountains. At what point, in

deed, it can be said that an animal fiber reases to be hair, and becomes wool, it is impossible to determine, because in every characteristic the one class, by imperceptible gradations, merges into the other, so that a continuous chain can be formed from the finest and softest merino to the rigid bristles of the wild boar." G. A. 2834; Lyon v. U. S., 8 U. S. App. 409, 413, 5 C. C. A. 359, and 55 Fed. 964.

But the acts of 1890 and 1894, as well as prior tariff acts, distinguished the wool of the sheep from the hair of the camel, goat, and other like animals, as raw materials. And there is nothing in this record from which to conclude that congress felt obliged to make concessions by way of alleviating the effect of the act of 1894 on the production of the hair of the camel, the goat, the alpaca, and so on, in this country, or on manufactures thereof.

We think that the words "manufactures of wool," in paragraph 297, had relation to the raw material out of which the articles were made, and that, as the material of worsted dress goods was wool, such goods fell within the paragraph.

Judgment of the circuit court of appeals reversed. Judgment of the circuit court also reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with a direction to affirm the decision of the board of general appraisers.

(169 U. S. 165)

CESSNA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. (February 21, 1898.) No. 78.

MEXICAN LAND GRANTS COLONIZATION LAWSPOWER OF AYUNTAMIENTO-TREATY OF CESSION-CONDITIONS OF GRANT.

1. Under the colonization laws of January 4, 1823, the ayuntamiento or general council of a town had no authority to make grants of lands outside of the four square leagues to which the town may have been entitled, and especially not when the grant was disapproved by the provincial deputation to which it was referred.

2. Even if the ayuntamiento of a town had authority to grant lands outside of its jurisdiction under the colonization laws of 1823, the courts will not confirm a grant so made in that year, which was immediately afterwards repudiated by the higher Mexican officials, who prevented the grantee from settling thereon and drove him from the country; it appearing that he never thereafter made any claim against the Mexican government or took any proceedings to prosecute his claim of title until 1893.

3. By rejecting the tenth article of the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, as agreed upon between the commissioners of the two governments, and which, in effect, bound the United States to recognize the validity of grants as to which the grantees had been prevented from fulfilling the conditions on which they were made, this government, in effect, declared that it would not recognize any grants which were not, at the time of the treaty, recognized by the Mexican government as valid, or any grants the conditions of which, either precedent or subsequent, Lad not been fully performed.

4. It is the duty of a nation receiving a cession

of territory to respect all rights of property rec ognized by the nation making the cession, but not to right wrongs which the grantor nation may have theretofore committed against individuals, except, perhaps, in cases where the wrong was so recently committed that the individual may not have had time to appeal to the courts or other authorities of the grantor nation for redress.

5. The thirteenth section of the act establishing the court of private land claims, having forbidden the confirmation by it of any grant made on condition, either antecedent or subsequent, unless it appears that such condition has been performed in the time and manner stated, that court has no authority to confirm a claim when the conditions of the grant were not complied with, even if the grantee was prevented from performing them by the wrongful act of the Mexican government itself.

Appeal from the Court of Private Land Claims.

On January 9, 1893, the appellants, as plaintiffs, filed their petition in the court of private. land claims, praying that their title to a tract of land in the territory of New Mexico, and near to the city of El Paso, Tex., be confirmed. The plaintiffs named as defendants, besides the United States, the unknown owners of the Dona Ana Bend colony, Mesilla colony, and Bracito grants. The United States, as well as certain individuals, representing themselves to be the owners of these grants, appeared and answered. Thereafter a trial was had, and on June 26, 1895, the court entered a decree, find. ing that the plaintiffs' claim of a land grant had not been sustained by satisfactory proof, and dismissing the petition. From such decree the plaintiffs have brought this appeal.

The facts disclosed by the record, and about which there is little dispute, are substantially as follows: In April, 1823, one Doctor John Heath, or Juan Gid, as his name is written in the Spanish, petitioned the ayuntamiento or general council of El Paso for a grant of a tract of land, which petition was acted upon by the ayuntamiento, and a tract five leagues square was granted to him. This petition was in these words:

"Dr. Don Juan Gid, citizen of the United States of North America, in the best legal form allowed by law, appears before your honorable body, and states: That, not having received up to date any answer to the communication of December last of last year, which I presented to the former* ayuntamiento, the predecessor of your honorable body, which (communication), approved in all its parts, was forwarded to his imperial majesty by the same, for which reason and because of the increase (ampleacion) of the power which is given to your honorable body by the law of colonization which was issued by the national instituent assembly (junta) of the empire on the 3d of January of the present year. For these reasons I again have recourse through this, repeating my request to your honorable body, adding that I offer to bring for the settlement of the land of El Bracito, which I ask may be given to me, thirty families of Christian Catholics, and among them blacksmiths, gunsmiths, silversmiths, carpenters, tailors, shoemakers,

*167

saddlers, architects, mathematicians, chemists, mineralogists, surgeons, doctors of medicine, and to establish a hospital, with its corresponding drug store and proper stock therein, with the necessary instruments for all operations; also to build a warehouse supplied with all kinds of merchandise for wholesale; the necessary machines for the manufacture of cotton and cloth goods; another for the manufacture of gunpowder, offering, until payment of the expense of transportation, to furnish the amount of this article all this jurisdiction may need at the very low price of one dollar per pound, it being first class for the use of arms; with the understanding that in all the said trades there shall be admitted for instruction the youths whose parents may see fit to dedicate them thereto, the children of this country (suelo) having the preference thereto.

"In view of what has been said, and because, for establishing the said machinery, utilizing the farms, grazing stock, and for the other field interests, it is indispensable that it have the extension which is necessary therefor, it behooves me to demonstrate to your honorable body that the land which may be assigned to me, limiting me to the smallest amount, be at least enough for (sea lo menos para) an hacienda, and that said designation be made for me on both sides, that is to say, that it be on both sides of El Bracito, because, the said land being broken, it is necessary to leave out various portions of it. I also propose to your honorable body that, until time permits whatever else may be desirable, this settlement be attached to the parish of this jurisdiction; likewise that the pasture and woodlands be common, with the same privilege as other people of this locality; recommending that it be without prejudice to those farms (sementeras), and that the petitioner be the person to whom is intrusted the distribution of said lands, he being considered the legitimate justice of said families.

"Candor of mind being what I most appreciate, and to join myself with my brethern, the faithful inhabitants of this empire, living always in the simple peace, in order to dispel all rumors of hatred, I ask your honors that, you being pleased, and in order that the said law of colonization be executed in all its parts, notice of this, my petition, be given to the individuals of this jurisdiction, in order that all these gentlemen who like may better or equal it with a view to the right of preference, in which act your honorable body, to whom is intrusted the power of father of this country (patria), will weigh, at their true value, the incalculable benefits that result from my petition, whereupon, far from seeking means to deprive it thereof, it would be encouraged in every way to procure their increase.

"Wherefore I ask and petition your honorable body to be pleased to accede to what I petition, being pleased to pardon the fault that this my petition is not upon paper of the proper seal, for there is none in this place, I being ready to pay the fees that belong to the

national treasury. I protest that I do not act in bad faith, and the necessary," etc. "Paso, April 7th, 1823. Juan Gid." Certain proceedings were had upon this petition, which it is unnecessary to mention in detail.

On April 22d this order was made by the ayuntamiento:

"This ayuntamiento having on this day received that which by its order was to be executed by the commission appointed from its midst to do the surveying that was to be done in the land of El Bracito, this being five leagues in each direction, the whole of it composing an ‘hacienda,' according to article 5 of the colonization plan, which land was granted by this ayuntamiento to Don Juan Gid for the purpose of settlement, as stated afterwards, and he being satisfied with what was done in all its parts by the said commission, it was entered as a minute, in due witness thereof the president and other members of which that is composed signing it before me, the secretary, to which I certify. José Ygnacio Rascon, José Morales, José Maria Belarde, José Francisco Carbajal, Juan Maria Barela, Antonio Prudencio, José Maria García, Saturnino Agular, José Manuel García, Lorenzo Provencio, José Albares. "Juan Maria Ponce de Leon, Secretary." And on the 25th the following:

"The present expendiente in which there has been granted to Don Juan Gid, AngloAmerican of the United States, the lands of El Bracito for settlement, being considered by this ayuntamiento as closed, proceed to what is to be done under the tariff in force in this ayuntamiento and by its secretary that Juan Gid may know what fees he is to pay for what has been done therein, placing the original in the archive as a perpetual testimony, but nevertheless to this shall be sent, together with a certified copy, by the first mail or safe conduct, to the governor of this province for his superior information; another of the same kind being given to the party in interest for his protection. And by the present order the president and members of this corporation so determined and signed it before me, the secretary, to which I certify. José Ygnacio Rascon, José Morales, José Maria Belarde, José Francisco Carbajal, Saturnino Aguiar, José Manuel García, Lorenzo Provencio.

"Juan Maria Ponce De Leon, Secretary." "It is a copy of the original expediente which on petition of Don Juan Gid was made in order to grant to him for settlement the land of El Bracito, in accordance with the colonization plan, together with what is afterwards stated; which original remains accordingly in the archive, to which I certify. "Juan Maria Ponce De Leon, "Secretary. [Rubric.]" A copy of these proceedings was sent to the governor of the province, and the following action was taken by the provincial deputation: