that the President has sent a message to Congress, recommending a renewal of the sufferings and horrors of the Jersey prison-ship. He says, too, that the bill snuffs of the alien and sedition law. But the bill is fragrant of no flower except the same which perfumes the message. Let him, then, say, if he thinks so, that General Jackson advises a revival of the principles of the alien and sedition laws.

"The honorable member from Virginia [Mr. Tyler], finds out a resemblance between this bill and the Boston port bill. Sir, if one of these be imitated from the other, the imitation is the President's. The bill makes the President, he says, sole judge of the constitution. Does he mean to say that the President has recommended a measure which is to make him sole judge of the constitution? The bill, he declares, sacrifices every thing to arbitrary power -he will lend no aid to its passage-he would rather be a dog, and bay the moon, than such a Roman.' He did not say 'the old Roman.' Yet the gentleman well knows, that if any thing is sacrificed to arbitrary power, the sacrifice has been demanded by the old Roman,' as he and others have called him; by the President whom he has supported, so often and so ably, for the chief magistracy of the country. He says, too, that one of the sections is an English Botany Bay law, except that it is much worse. This section, sir, whatever it may be, is just what the President's message recommended. Similar observations are applicable to the remarks of both the honorable gentlemen from North Carolina. It is not necessary to particularize those remarks. They were in the same strain.

"Therefore, sir, let it be understood, let it be known, that the war which these gentlemen choose to wage, is waged against the measures of the administration, against the President of their own choice. The controversy has arisen between him and them, and, in its progress, they will probably come to a distinct understanding.

"Mr. President, I am not to be understood as admitting that these charges against the bill are just, or that they would be just if made against the message. On the contrary, I think them wholly unjust. No one of them, in my opinion, can be made good. I think the bill, or some similar measure, had become indispensable, and that the President could not do otherwise than to recommend it to the consideration of Congress. He was not at liberty to look on and be silent, while dangers threatened the Union, which existing laws were not competent, in his judgment, to avert.

"Mr. President, I take this occasion to say, that I support this measure, as an independent member of the Senate, in the discharge of the dictates of my own conscience. I am no man's leader; and, on the other hand, I follow no lead, but that of public duty, and the star of the constitution. I believe the country is in consider

able danger; I believe an unlawful combination threatens the integrity of the Union. I believe the crisis calls for a mild, temperate, forbearing, but inflexibly firm execution of the laws. And, under this conviction, I give a hearty support to the administration, in all measures which I deem to be fair, just, and necessary. And in supporting these measures, I mean to take my fair share of responsibility, to support them frankly and fairly, without reflections on the past, and without mixing other topics in their discussion.

"Mr. President, I think I understand the sentiment of the country on this subject. I think public opinion sets with an irresistible force in favor of the Union, in favor of the measures recommended by the President, and against the new doctrines which threaten the dissolution of the Union. I think the people of the United States demand of us, who are intrusted with the government, to maintain that government; to be just, and fear not; to make all and suitable provisions for the execution of the laws, and to sustain the Union and the constitution against whatsoever may endanger them. For one, I obey this public voice; I comply with this demand of the people. I support the administration in measures which I believe to be necessary; and, while pursuing this course, I look unhesitatingly, and with the utmost confidence, for the approbation of the country.

The support which Mr. Webster gave to all the President's measures in relation to South Carolina, and his exposure of the doctrine of nullification, being the first to detect and denounce that heresy, made him extremely obnoxious to Mr. Calhoun, and his friends; and must have been the main cause of his exclusion from the confidence of Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun in the concoction of their bill, called a compromise. His motives as well as his actions were attacked, and he was accused of subserviency to the President for the sake of future favor. At the same time all the support which he gave to these measures was the regular result of the principles which he laid down in his first speeches against nullification in the debate with Mr. Hayne, and he could not have done less without being derelict to his own principles then avowed. It was a proud era in his life, supporting with transcendent ability the cause of the constitution and of the country, in the person of a chief magistrate to whom he was politically opposed bursting the bonds of party at the call of duty, and displaying a patriotism worthy of admiration and imitation. General Jackson felt the debt of gratitude and admiration which he

owed him; the country, without distinction of party, felt the same; and the universality of the feeling was one of the grateful instances of popular applause and justice when great talents are seen exerting themselves for the good of the country. He was the colossal figure on the political stage during that eventful time; and his labors, splendid in their day, survive for the benefit of distant posterity.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

MR. CALHOUNS NULLIFICATION RESOLUTIONS.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the commencement of the discussions on the South Carolina proceedings, was the introduction in the Senate of a set of resolutions by Mr. Calhoun, entitled by him, "Resolutions on the powers of the government;' but all involving the doctrine of nullification; and the debate upon them deriving its point and character from the discussion of that doctrine. The following were the resolutions:

"Resolved, That the people of the several States composing these United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each State acceded as a separate sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification; and that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a union between the States ratifying the same.

"Resolved, That the people of the several States, thus united by the constitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating a general government to carry into effect the objects for which they were formed, delegated to that government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving at the same time, each State to itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own separate government; and that whenever the general government assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized, and are of no effect; and that the same government is not made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well as of the

infraction as of the mode and measure of redress. "Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United States, taken collectively as in

dividuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the principle of the social compact, and as such are now formed into one nation or people, or that they have ever been so united in any one stage of their political existence; that the people of the several States composing the Union have not, as members thereof, retained their sovereignty; that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred to the general government; that they have parted with the right of punishing treason through their respective State governments; and that they have not the right of judging in the last resort as to the extent of the powers reserved, and, of consequence, of those delegated; are not only without foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts, and the clearest deductions of reason; and that all exercise of power on the part of the general government, or any of its departments, claiming authority from so erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconstitutional, must tend directly and inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the States, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins a consolidated government, without constitutional check or limitation, and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself."

To which Mr. Grundy offered a counter set, as follows:

"1. Resolved, That by the constitution of the United States, certain powers are delegated to the general government, and those not delegated, or prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

"2. Resolved, That one of the powers expressly granted by the constitution to the general that of laying duties on imports. government, and prohibited to the States, is

"3. Resolved, That the power to lay imposts is by the constitution wholly transferred from the State authorities to the general government, without any reservation of power or right on the part of the State.

and 1832 are exercises of the constitutional "4. Resolved, That the tariff laws of 1828 power possessed by the Congress of the United States, whatever various opinions may exist as to their policy and justice.

"5. Resolved, That an attempt on the part of a State to annul an act of Congress passed upstitution to Congress, is an encroachment on the on any subject exclusively confided by the conrights of the general government.

6. Resolved, That attempts to obstruct or prevent the execution of the several acts of Conordinances of conventions or legislative enactgress imposing duties on imports, whether by ments, are not warranted by the constitution, and are dangerous to the political institutions of the country."

It was in the discussion of these resolutions,

and the kindred subjects of the "force bill" and the "revenue collection bill," that Mr. Calhoun first publicly revealed the source from which he obtained the seminal idea of nullification as a remedy in a government. The Virginia resolutions of '98-'99, were the assumed source of the power itself as applicable to our federal and State governments; but the essential idea of nullification as a peaceful and lawful mode of arresting a measure of the general government by the action of one of the States, was derived from the veto power of the tribunes of the people in the Roman government. I had often heard him talk of that tribunitian power, and celebrate it as the perfection of good government-as being for the benefit of the weaker part, and operating negatively to prevent oppression, and not positively to do injustice—but I never saw him carry that idea into a public speech but once, and that was on the discussion of his resolutions of this session; for though actually delivered while the "force bill" was before the Senate, yet all his doctrinal argument on that bill was the amplification of his nullification resolutions. On that occasion be traced the Roman tribunitian power, and considered it a cure for all the disorders to which the Roman state had been subject, and the cause to which all her subsequent greatness was to be attributed. This remarkable speech was delivered February 15th, 1833, and after depicting a government of the majority-a majority unchecked by a right in the minority of staying their measures-to be unmitigated despotism, he then proceeded to argue in favor of the excellence of the reto and the secession power; and thus delivered himself:

"He might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of which the Roman furnished the most familiar and striking. It was a wellknown fact, that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins, to the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into a state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, he might add, corruption. How did this happen? The explanation will throw important light on the subject under consideration. The community was divided into two parts, the patricians and the plebeians, with the powers of the state principally in the hands of the former, without adequate check to protect the rights of the latter. The result was as might be expected. The patricians converted the powers of the government into the means of making money, to enrich themselves and their dependants. They, in a word, had their American system, growing out of the peculiar character of the government

and condition of the country. This requires explanation. At that period, according to the laws of nations, when one nation conquered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors; and, according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into parts, one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the other assigned to the use of the treasury, of which the patricians had the distribution and administration. The patricians abused their power, by withholding from the people that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by converting to their own use that which ought to have gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the entire spoils of victory, and they had thus the most powerful motive to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverishment and oppression by all peaceable means, and the oppression beof the people. After resisting the abuse of power, coming intolerable, the people at last withdrew from the city; they, in a word, seceded; and, to induce them to reunite, the patricians coning their separate interests, the very power which ceded to the plebeians, as the means of protecthe contended is necessary to protect the rights of the States, but which is now represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted to the people the right of choosing three tribunes from among themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should have the right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even against their execution; a power which those who take a shallow insight into human nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the state, if not utterly impracticable. Yet, so far from that being the effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory followed her steps till she had established an almost universal dominion.

"How can a result so contrary to all anticipation be explained? The explanation appeared to him to be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring consent of both the patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependent on the other, and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, each was compelled to consult the good will of the other, and to elevate to office not simply those who might have the confidence of the order to which he belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that men possessing those qualities which would naturally command confidence, moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriotism, were elevated to office; and these, by the weight of their authority and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders, furnishes the real explanation of the power of the Roman state, and of that extraordinary wisdom, moderation, and firmness, which in so remarkable a

degree characterized her public men. He might illustrate the truth of the position which he had laid down, by a reference to the history of all free states, ancient and modern, distinguished for their power and patriotism; and conclusively show not only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under some form, by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the community was made necessary in the action of government, but also that the virtue, patriotism, and strength of the state were in direct proportion to the strength of the means of securing such assent. In estimating the operation of this principle in our system, which depends, as he had stated, on the right of interposition on the part of the State, we must not omit to take into consideration the amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement of the system be corrected, by the concurring assent of threefourths of the States; and thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any derangement occasioned by the executive action of a State. In fact, the power of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal against the usurpations of the general government, the joint agent of all the States, to the States themselves, to be decided, under the amending power, affirmatively, in favor of the government, by the voice of three-fourths of the States, as the highest power known under the system.

"Mr. C. said that he knew the difficulty, in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle for which he contended, though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience of free nations. He knew that the governments of the several States would be cited as an argument against the conclusion to which he had arrived, and which, for the most part, were constructed on the principle of the absolute majority; but, in his opinion, a satisfactory answer could be given; that the objects of expenditure which fell within the sphere of a State government were few and inconsiderable; so that, be their action ever so irregular, it could occasion but little derangement. If, instead of being members of this great confederacy, they formed distinct communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses necessary for their defence, the laws which he had laid down as necessarily controlling the action of a State, where the will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which he had referred were perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of the Union, whose governments had a powerful central action, and which already showed a strong tendency to that moneyed action which is the invariable forerunner of corruption and convulsions.

"But to return to the general government; we have now sufficient experience to ascertain

that the tendency to conflict in this action is between Southern and other sections. The latter, having a decided majority, must habitually be possessed of the powers of the government, both in this and in the other House; and, being governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to the human breast, they must become the advocates of the power of government, and in the same degree opposed to the limitations; while the other and weaker section is as necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. In one word, the one section is the natural guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved; and the struggle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that on the opposite side will be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such he considered the present; a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor, productions, and situation, has at stake all that can be dear to freemen. Should they be able to maintain in their full vigor their reserved rights, liberty and prosperity will be their portion; but if they yield, and permit the stronger interest to consolidate within itself all the powers of the government, then will its fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom they have expelled, or of their slaves. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers, so far from repining that his lot and that of those whom he represented is cast on the side of the latter, he rejoiced that such is the fact; for though we participate in but few of the advantages of the government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor did he repine that the duty, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence of the reserved powers against, apparently, such fearful odds, had been assigned to them. To discharge successfully this high duty requires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual; and, should you perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny, if we yield to the steady encroachment of power, the severest and most debasing calamity and corrup tion will overspread the land. Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be for ever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this government, which will be reserved for those only who have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen Asylum."

In this extract from that remarkable speech, the first one in which Mr. Calhoun defended nullification and secession in the Senate, and in which every word bears the impress of intense thought, there is distinctly to be seen his opin

ion of the defects of our duplicate form of government (State and federal), and of the remedy for those defects. I say, in our form of government; for his speech had a practical application to ourselves, and was a defence, or justification of the actual measures of the State he represented. And this defect was, the unchecked authority of a majority; and the remedy was, an authority in the minority to check that majority, and to secede. This clearly was an absolute condemnation of the fundamenta, principle upon which the administration of the federal constitution, and of the State constitutions rested. But he did not limit himself to the benefits of the veto and of secession, as shown in Roman history; he had recourse to the Jewish for the same purpose-and found it—not in a veto in each of the twelve tribes, but in the right of secession; and found it, not in the minority, but the majority, in the reign of Jeroboam, when ten tribes seceded. That example is thus introduced:

"Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, was the most striking. Their government, at first, was a mere confederation, without any central power, till a military chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without, however, merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes. This was the commencement of that central action among that peculiar people, which, in three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is impossible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event without being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separation, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the establishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of taxation, which, under king Solomon, was greatly increased, to defray the expense of rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent reign. Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences discontent and complaint, which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succession of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a reduction of the taxes; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties-a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under consideration, and, after consulting the old men (the counsellors of '98), who advised a reduction, he then took the VOL. I.-22

opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers. He hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make the reduction; and the secession of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house of David."

This example also had a practical application, and a squint at the Virginia resolutions of '98'99, and at the military chieftain then at the head of our government, with a broad intimation of what was to happen if the taxes were not reduced; and that happened to be secession. And all this, and the elaborate speech from which it is taken, and many others of the same character at the same time, was delivered at a time when the elections had decided for a reduction of the taxes-when a bill in the House was under consideration for that purpose-and when his own "compromise" bill was in a state of concoction, and advanced to a stage to assure its final passing. Strong must have been Mr. Calhoun's desire for his favorite remedy, when he could contend for it under such circumstances-under circumstances which showed that it could not be wanted for the purpose which he then avowed. Satisfied of the excellence, and even necessity in our system, of this remedy, the next question was to create it, or to find it; create it, by an amendment to the constitution; or find it already existing there; and this latter was done by a new reading of the famous Virginia resolutions of '98-'99. The right in any State to arrest an act of Congress, and to stay it until three fourths of the States ordered it to proceed, and with a right forcibly to resist if any attempt was made in the mean time to enforce it, with the correlative right of secession and permanent separation, were all found by him in these resolutions—the third especially, which was read, and commented upon for the purpose. Mr. Rives, of Virginia, repulsed that interpretation of the act of his State, and showed that an appeal to public opinion was all that was intended; and quoted the message of Governor Monroe to show that the judgment of the federal court, under one of the acts declared to be unconstitutional, was carried into effect in the capital of Virginia with the order and tranquillity of any other judgment. He said:

"But, sir, the proceedings of my State, on another occasion of far higher importance, have