stead of a diminution, of the circulation. The plier of national currency-he, Mr. B., could not only difference was that it had all left that part of the country, and that it would do for ever! If a hundred millions of United States Bank notes were carried to the upper parts of North Carolina, and put into circulation, it would be but a short time before the whole would have fallen into the current which sweeps the paper of that bank to the Northeast. Mr. B. said there were four other classes of proof which he could bring in, but it would be a consumption of time, and a work of supererogation. would not detail them, but state their heads: 1. One was the innumerable orders which the mother bank had forwarded to her branches to send on specie and bills of exchange to redeem their circulation-to pour in reinforcements to the points to which their circulation tends; 2. Another was in the examination of Mr. Biddle, president of the bank, by the investigating committee, in 1832, in which this absorbing tendency of the branch paper to flow to the Northeast was fully charged and admitted; 3. A third was in the monthly statement of the notes in transitu, which amount to an average of four millions and a half for the last twelve months, making fifty millions for the year; and which consist, by far the greater part, of branch notes and checks redeemed in the Northeast, purchased back by the branches, and on their way back to the place from which they issued; and, 4. The last class of proof was in the fact, that the branches north of the Potomac, being unable or unwilling to redeem these notes any longer, actually ceased to redeem them last fall, even when taken in revenue payment to the United States, until coerced by the Secretary of the Treasury; and that they will not be redeemed for individuals now, and are actually degenerating into a mere local currency. Upon these proofs and arguments, Mr. B. rested his case, and held it to be fully established, first, by argument, founded in the nature of bank circulation over an extended territory; and secondly, by proof, derived from the operation of the pre-counts, dollar for dollar, to the amount of pubsent bank of the United States, that neither the present bank, nor any one that the wisdom of man can devise, can ever succeed in diffusing a general paper circulation over the States of this Union.

consent to prolong the existence of the present bank. Certainly a profuse issue of paper at all points—an additional circulation of even a few millions poured out at the destitute pointswould make currency plenty for a little while, but for a little while only. Nothing permanent would result from such a measure. On the contrary, in one or two years, the destitution and distress would be greater than it now is. At the same time, it is completely in the power of He the bank, at this moment, to grant relief, full, adequate, instantaneous relief! In making this assertion, Mr B. meant to prove it; and to prove it, he meant to do it in a way that it should reach the understanding of every candid and impartial friend that the bank possessed; for he meant to discard and drop from the inquiry, all his own views upon the subject; to leave out of view every statement made, and every opinion entertained by himself, and his friends, and proceeed to the inquiry upon the evidence of the bank alone-upon that evidence which flowed from the bank directory itself, and from the most zealous, and best informed of its friends on this floor. Mr. B. assumed that a mere cessation to curtail discounts, at this time, would be a relief-that it would be the salvation of those who were pressed-and put an end to the cry of distress; he averred that this curtailment must now cease, or the bank must find a new reason for carrying it on; for the old reason is exhausted, and cannot apply. Mr. B. then took two distinct views to sustain his position; one founded in the actual conduct and present condition of the bank itself, and the other in a comparative view of the conduct and condition of the former Bank of the United States, at the approaching period of its dissolution. I. As to the conduct and condition of the present bank.

VI. Dropping every other objection to the bank-looking at it purely and simply as a sup

Mr. B. appealed to the knowledge of all present for the accuracy of his assertion, when he said that the bank had now reduced her dis

lic deposits withdrawn. The adversaries of the bank said the reduction was much larger than the abstraction; but he dropped that, and confined himself strictly to the admissions and declarations of the bank itself. Taking then the fact to be, as the bank alleged it to be, that she had merely brought down her business in pro

portion to the capital taken from her, it followed near enough for all practical views-to the proof course that there was no reason for reducing portion which the present loans of the Bank of her business any lower. Her relative position the United States bear to its capital of thirty—her actual strength-was the same now that five millions. Fifty per cent. upon the former, it was before the removal; and the old reason would give fifteen millions; fifty per cent. upon could not be available for the reduction of ano- the latter would give fifty-two millions and a ther dollar. Next, as to her condition. Mr. B. half. To make the relative condition of the undertook to affirm, and would quickly prove, two banks precisely equal, it will be sufficient that the general condition of the bank was bet- that the loans and discounts of the present bank ter now than it had been for years past; and shall be reduced to fifty-two millions by the that the bank was better able to make loans, or month of January, 1836; that is to say, it need to increase her circulation, than she was in any not make any further sensible reduction of its of those past periods in which she was so lav-loans for nearly two years to come. Thus, the ishly accommodating the public. For the proof of this, Mr. B. had recourse to her specie fund, always the true test of a bank's ability, and showed it to be greater now than it had been for two years past, when her loans and circulation were so much greater than they are now. He took the month of May, 1832, when the whole amount of specie on hand was $7,890, 347 59; when the net amount of notes in cir-will no longer answer. Mr. B. had no faith in culation was $21,044,415; and when the total discounts were $70,428,070 72: and then contrasted it with the condition of the bank at this time, that is to say, in the month of February last, when the last return was made; the items stands thus: specie, $10,523,385 69; net amount of notes in circulation, $19,260,472; total discounts, $54,842,973 64. From this

mere imitation of the conduct of the old bank wil be a relief to the community. A mere cessation to curtail, will put an end to the distress, and let the country go on, quietly and regularly, in its moneyed operations. If the bank will not do this-if it will go on to curtail—it is bound to give some new reason to the country. The old reason, of the removal of the deposits,

that reason from the beginning, but he was now taking the bank upon her own evidence, and trying her upon her own reasons, and he held it to be impossible for her to go on without the production of a reason. The hostility of the government-rather an incomprehensible, and altogether a gratuitous reason, from the beginning-will no longer answer. The government view of figures, taken from the official bank re-in 1811 was as hostile to the old bank, as the turns, from which it appeared that the specie in government now is to this one; and rather more the bank was nearly three millions greater than so. it was in May, 1832, her net circulation nearly two millions less, and her loans and discounts upwards of fifteen millions less; Mr. B. would submit it to all candid men to say whether the bank is not more able to accommodate the community now than she was then? At all events, he would demand if she was not now able to cease pressing them?

II. As to the comparative condition and conduct of the first Bank of the United States at the period of its approaching dissolution.

Mr. B. took the condition of the bank from Mr. Gallatin's statement of its affairs to Congress, made in January, 1811, just three months before the charter expired; and which showed the discounts and loans of the bank to be $14, 578,294 25, her capital being $10,000,000; so that the amount of her loans, three months before her dissolution, was nearly in proportion

Both Houses of Congress were then hostile to it, and hostile unto death! For they let it die! die on the day appointed by law for its death, without pity, without remorse, without the reprieve of one day. The government can do no worse now. The Secretary of the Treasury has removed the deposits; and that account is settled by the reduction of an equal amount of loans and discounts. The rest depends upon the government; and the hostility of the government cannot go further than to kill the bank, and cannot kill it more dead than the old bank was killed in 1811. Mr. B. had a further comparison to draw between the conduct of the old bank, and the present one. The old bank permitted her discounts to remain at their maximum to the very end of her charter; she discounted sixty days' paper up to the last day of her existence; while this bank has commenced a furious curtailment two years and a half be

Instead of hunting out for remote and inconsiderable banks, and instituting a most disparaging scrutiny into their small affairs, and making this high Senate the conspicuous theatre for the exhibition of their insignificance, why not take the higher order of the State banks?— those whose names and characters are well known? whose stock upon the exchange of London and New-York, is superior to that of the United States Bank? whose individual deposits are greater than those of the rival branches of the Bank of the United States, seated in their neighborhood? whose bills of exchange are as eagerly sought for as those of the federal bank? which have reduced exchange below the rates of the federal bank? and which, in every particular that tries the credit, is superior to the one which is receiving so much homage and admiration? Mr. B. said there were plenty of such State banks as he had described; they were to be found in every principal city, from New Orleans to Boston. Some of them had been selected for deposit banks, others not; but there was no difficulty in making a selection of an ample number.

fore the expiration of her charter. Again: the old bank had not an hour, as a corporation, to wind up her business after the end of her charter; this bank has the use of all her corporate faculties, for that purpose, for two years after the end of her charter. Again: the present bank pretends that she will have to collect the whole of her debts within the period limited for winding up her affairs; the old bank took upwards of twelve years after the expiration of her charter, to collect hers! She created a trust; she appointed trustees; all the debts and credits were put into their hands, the trustees proceeded like any other collectors, giving time to all debtors who would secure the debt, pay interest punctually, and discharge the principal by instalments. This is what the old bank did; and she did not close her affairs until the 16th of June, in the year 1823. The whole operation was conducted so gently, that the public knew nothing about it. The cotemporaries of the dissolution of the bank, knew nothing about its dissolution. And this is what the present bank may do, if it pleases. That it has not done so that it is now grinding the community, and threatening to grind them still harder, is a proof of the dangerous nature of a great moneyed power; and should be a warning to the people who now behold its conduct-political rights of the States. When the first who feel its gripe, and hear its threat-never to suffer the existence of such another power in our free and happy land.

VII. Mr. B. deprecated the spirit which seemed to have broken out against State banks; it was a spirit which augured badly for the rights of the States. Those banks were created by the States; and the works of the States ought to be respected; the stock in those banks was held by American citizens, and ought not to be injuriously assailed to give value to stock held in the federal bank by foreigners and aliens. The very mode of carrying on the warfare against State banks, has itself been an injury, and a just cause of complaint. Some of the most inconsiderable have been picked outtheir affairs presented in the most unfavorable light; and then held forth as a fair sample of the whole. How much more easy would it have been to have acted a more grateful, and a more equitable part! a part more just to the State governments which created those banks, and the American citizens who held stock in them!

This spirit of hostility to the State banks, Mr. B. said, was of recent origin, and seemed to keep pace with the spirit of attack upon the

federal bank was created, in the year 1791, it
was not even made, by its charter, a place of
deposit for the public moneys. Mr. Jefferson
preferred the State banks at that time; and so
declared himself in his cabinet opinion to Pre-
sident Washington. Mr. Gallatin deposited a
part of the public moneys in the State banks
during the whole of the long period that he was
at the head of the treasury. At the dissolution
of the first Bank of the United States, he turned
over all the public moneys which he held in de-
posit to these banks, taking their obligation to
pay out all the treasury warrants drawn upon
them in gold and silver, if desired by the hold-
er. When the present bank was chartered, the
State banks stood upon an equal footing with
the federal bank, and were placed upon an equal-
ity with it as banks of deposit, in the
very char-
ter which created the federal bank. Mr. B. was
alluding to the 14th fundamental article of the
constitution of the bank-the article which pro
vided for the establishment of branches-and
which presented an argument in justification of

to answer.

the removal of the deposits which the adversa-out, and the first to suffer. If counterfeiting ries of that measure most pertinaciously decline is perpetrated, it is chiefly the small notes The government wanted banks of which are selected for imitation, because they deposit, not of circulation; and by that article, are most current among those who know the the State banks are made just as much banks least about notes, and who are most easily made of deposit for the United States as the Bank of the dupes of imposition, and the victims of the United States is. They are put upon exact fraud. As the expeller of hard money, small equality, so far as the federal government is con- notes were the bane and curse of a country. A cerned; for she stipulates but for one single nation is scarce, or abundant, in hard money, branch of the United States Bank, and that to precisely in the degree in which it tolerates the be placed at Washington city. As for all other lower denominations of bank notes. France branches, their establishment was made to de- tolerates no note less than $100; and has a gold pend-not on the will, or power, of the federal and silver circulation of 350 millions of dollars. government—not on any supposed or real ne- England tolerates no note of less than $25; and cessity on her part to have the use of such has a gold and silver circulation of 130 millions branches-but upon contingencies over which of dollars: in the United States, where $5 is she had no control; contingencies depending, the minimum size of the federal bank notes, the one upon the mere calculation of profit and loss whole specie circulation, including what is in by the bank itself, the other upon the subscrip- the banks, does not amount to thirty millions tions of stock within a State, and the applica- of dollars. To increase the quantity of hard tion of its legislature. In these contingencies, money in the United States, and to supply the namely, if the Bank of the United States thought body of the people with an adequate specie curit to her interest to establish branches in rency to serve for their daily wants, and ordithe States, she might do it; or, if 2,000 shares nary transactions, the bank note circulation beof stock was subscribed for in a State, and there- low twenty dollars, ought to be suppressed. If upon an application was made by the State le- Congress could pass a law to that effect, it ought gislature for the institution of a branch, then its to bed one; but it cannot pass such a law: it has establishment within the State became obliga- no constitutional power to pass it. Congress tory upon the bank. In neither contingency can, however, do something else, which will, in had the will, the power, or the necessities of time, effectually put down such a currency. It the federal government, the least weight, con- can discard it, and disparage it. It can reject cern, or consideration, in the establishment of it from all federal payments. It can reject the the branch. If not established, and so far as whole circulation of any bank that will continue the government is concerned, it might not be, to issue small notes. Their rejection from all then the State banks, selected by the United federal payments, would check their currency, States Bank, and approved by the Secretary of and confine the orbit of their circulation to the the Treasury, were to be the banks of deposit immediate neighborhood of the issuing bank. for the federal moneys. This was an argument, The bank itself would find but little profit from Mr. B. said, in justification of the removal of the issuing them-public sentiment would come to deposits, and in favor of the use of the State the aid of federal policy. The people of the banks which gentlemen on the opposite side of States, when countenanced and sustained by the the question-gentlemen who take so much federal government, would indulge their natural pains to decry State banks-have been careful antipathy and honest detestation of a small not to answer. paper currency. They would make war upon all small notes. The State legislatures would be under the control of the people; and the States that should first have the wisdom to limit their paper circulation to a minimum of twenty dollar bills, would immediately fill up with gold and silver. The common currency would be entirely metallic; and there would be a broad and solid basis for a superstructure of large notes; while

The evils of a small paper circulation, he considered among the greatest grievances that could afflict a community. The evils were innumerable, and fell almost exclusively upon those who were least able to bear them, or to guard against them. If a bank stops payment, the holders of the small notes, who are usually the working part of the community, are the last to find it