Opinion of the Court. the practice in error which has been adhered to for more than half a century. It is said that a generation familiar with the writ of certiorari abandoned it for the simpler review by proceedings in error, and that in the amendments there is no suggestion of an intention to return to it for the reviewing of cases involving constitutional questions or cases originating in the court of appeals, and that since all of these cases will continue to be brought here by the proceeding in error as formerly it should not be assumed that it was designed by the amendments to introduce the confusion of two modes of proceeding to invoke the exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction in error. The suggestion is of obvious force, and it should be regarded as conclusive if the language by which we are authorized to review cases of public interest were so vague as to admit of interpretation. Whatever may be thought of the character of the amendments submitted in September, 1912, or of the time and manner of their submission, or of the small minority vote by which they were ratified, those of them which were ratified are entitled to full recognition as parts of the organic law of the state. If we are asked how the character of a case decided by the court of appeals can be made more clear by a record sent here pursuant to our order than by the same record presented by the party who seeks to have it reviewed, we are permitted to answer that we do not know. If the inquiry is why we ignore the records voluntarily presented by the parties and insist that an order from this court to the court of appeals to certify its record to us is a pre Opinion of the Court. requisite to the review of cases of this character, it is a sufficient answer that it is so ordained. There can be no equivalent to a constitutional requirement. Authority to review causes of public interest is not embraced within the general grant of our jurisdiction. It is conferred as an authority to be exercised at our discretion, the authority to review to be preceded by our order to the court of appeals to certify its record to us. The authority to review cases of this character is conferred by the terms of the amendment, apparently leaving the court to determine the manner in which its exercise shall be invoked. The legislature is authorized to prescribe the limitation of time within which the order shall be made, which should be taken to mean the time within which it may be applied for. The authority so conferred upon the legislature not having been exercised, the entire subject seems to be within our authority to prescribe such rules as are consistent with law for the proper institution of cases here and their conduct before us. No limitation having yet been prescribed for invoking our authority with respect to cases of this character, a limitation of seventy days is now prescribed in analogy to the statute applicable to other cases in error but not to so operate as to prevent a review of judgments of the court of appeals in cases which were brought into that court after the first of January, if they are cases of public or great general interest. Opportunity should now be granted for a resort to this court in accordance with the mode required by the amendment for cases of this character and with the rule herewith Syllabus. prescribed. Although the petitions in error in cases of this character having been filed without authority as required by the amendment must be dismissed, that dismissal will be without prejudice to the rights of complaining parties to apply here for orders requiring the court of appeals to certify the records to us. Having thus stated our views of the provisions affecting the questions before us, we refer counsel and the bar of the state to the syllabus prefixed to this report for a definite statement of the rules prescribed. The motion in the case first entitled will be overruled and in the other case it will be sustained. NICHOLS, C. J., JOHNSON, DONAHUE, WANAMAKER, NEWMAN and WILKIN, JJ., concur. THE COLUMBUS CITIZENS TELEPHONE Co. v. THE CITY OF COLUMBUS. Municipal corporations—Compensation oy telephone company-For use of streets-Franchise stipulation for percentage of gross annual receipts-Not an assessment for general revenue, when. 1. A municipality has the power to demand and receive from a telephone company, for the privilege of digging ditches and laying and maintaining subsurface conduits for telephone wires under its streets, compensation beyond what is necessary to restore the pavement to its former state of usefulness. (City of Columbus v. The Columbus Gas Co., 76 Ohio St., 309, approved and followed.) 2. A stipulation in the ordinance granting the privilege, which requires the company to pay, among other considerations, a certain percentage of its gross annual receipts into the municipal treas Opinion of the Court. ury for the use of the general expense fund, to which the company assented, though under protest, is not an assessment for general revenue in the nature of a tax. (No. 13303-Decided October 14, 1913.) ERROR to the Circuit Court of Franklin county. Facts are stated in opinion. Messrs. Daugherty, Todd and Rarey, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Stuart R. Bolin and Mr. E. L. Weinland, city solicitors, and Mr. B. W. Gearheart, assistant city solicitor, for defendant in error. WILKIN, J. The city sued the telephone company for a percentage of the latter's receipts for the year 1904, upon a contract pursuant to the ordinance of the city, wherein the telephone company agreed to pay a percentage of its gross receipts annually in consideration of a grant to the latter company of the privilege to use the streets and other public ways for the period of twentyfive years, for the purpose of digging trenches and laying conduits therein necessary to successfully construct and operate a telephone exchange, toll lines and police and fire-alarm system. The telephone company installed its system, and thereafter paid to the city the stipulated percentage of the gross receipts according to contract for the years 1901, 1902 and 1903, but upon demand for the percentage for 1904, refused to pay. The company answered the petition, setting up two defenses. The major proposition of law upon Opinion of the Court. which the answer rests is that the city is without the power to demand or receive compensation for the use of its streets or other public ways beyond what may be necessary to restore the pavement to its former state. Section 9179, General Code. Another section provides that the mode of such use shall be such as is agreed upon between the city and the company; and if they can not agree, the probate court shall direct in what mode the telephone line shall be constructed along such streets or public ways, so as not to incommode the public. Section 9178, General Code. It has been decided by this court that "The statutes of Ohio do not confer power on the probate court to grant to a telephone company the right to put its wires and apparatus in conduits under the streets of a city in the absence of consent by the municipal authorities." Queen City Telephone Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St., 64. Therefore these sections do not apply to an agreement for the use of subsurface conduits. There is a statute which provides that gas, electric and water companies may lay conductors for supplying gas, electricity and water through the streets, lands and squares of a city, with the consent of the municipal authorities, under such regulations as they may prescribe. Section 9320, General Code. And this court has held that the council of the city may require a gas company, to which it grants the right to lay its pipes and other appliances in the streets and other public places, to pay annually to the city a reasonable sum to compensate for the city's necessary supervision after as well as during the construction of the |