Opinion of the Court.

essentially distinct constitute but one. In this case, it is not necessary for us to decide, and we express no opinion, as to the precise meaning and extent of the final clause of § 53, to which we have referred; as, whether it relates to all patents, or only to patents for machines. But as it relates to the matter of evidence alone, it cannot enlarge the power of the commissioner in reference to the invention for which a reissue may be granted. That power is restricted, by the general terms of the section, to the same invention which was originally patented."

If, by "new matter," in § 4916 of the Revised Statutes, is meant such new substantive matter as might be the subject of another application for a patent, there was new substantive matter introduced into the specification of the reissue in the present case; for the description set forth in that specification as the foundation for the first eight claims in it, and those eight claims themselves, might have been the subject of another application for a patent, at the time the original patent was applied for and taken out, leaving that patent valid and operative in respect to the claims it covered.

In the present case, the infringing clock was made by the defendant Lane more than six months before the reissue in suit was applied for. As stated by the Circuit Court in its opinion in this case, the Lane clock did not contain a single patented feature of the Hotchkiss clock, and it was immediately patented and put upon the market. This, therefore, is a case of the amendment of a patent so as to cover improvements not covered by the patent, and which came into use by others than the patentee and his licensee, free from the protection of the patent.

There is no evidence of any attempt to secure by the original patent the inventions covered by the first eight claims of the reissue, and those inventions must be regarded as having been abandoned or waived, so far as the reissue in question is concerned, subject, however, to the right to have made a new application for a patent to cover them; in other words, those eight claims are not for the same invention which was originally patented.

Opinion of the Court.

In Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S., 354, 359, at October Term, 1884, it was said by this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Bradley: "In this very matter of reissued patents, it has also been frequently decided that it is a good defence, in a suit on such a patent, to show that the commissioner exceeded his authority in granting it. Such a defence is established by showing that the reissued patent is for a different invention from that described in the original, inasmuch as the statute declares that it must be for the same invention."

The same view was taken in Coon v. Wilson, 113 U. S. 268, 277, at October Term, 1884, a case substantially like the present one, where it was said: "Although this reissue was applied for a little over three months after the original patent was granted, the case is one where it is sought merely to enlarge the claim of the original patent, by repeating that claim and adding others; where no mistake or inadvertence is shown, so far as the short or sectional bands are concerned; where the patentee waited until the defendants produced their continuous band collar, and then applied for such enlarged claims as to embrace the defendants' collar, which was not covered by the claim of the original patent; and where it is apparent, from a comparison of the two patents, that the reissue was made to enlarge the scope of the original. As the rule is expressed in the recent case of Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354, a patent cannot be lawfully reissued for the mere purpose of enlarging the claim, unless there has been a clear mistake, inadvertently committed, in the wording of the claim, and the application for a reissue is made within a reasonably short period after the original patent was granted.' But a clear mistake, inadvertently committed, in the wording of the claim, is necessary, without reference to the length of time. In the present case, there was no mistake in the wording of the claim of the original patent. The description warranted no other claim. It did not warrant any claim covering bands not short or sectional. The description had to be changed in the reissue, to warrant the new claims in the reissue. The description in the reissue is not a more clear and satisfactory statement of what is described in the original

Opinion of the Court.

patent, but is a description of a different thing, so ingeniously worded as to cover collars with continuous long bands and which have no short or sectional bands." See also Ives v. Sargent, 119 U. S. 652, 662, 663.

Reference was made on the argument to language used by Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion of this court in the case of The Cornplanter Patent, 23 Wall. 181, 217, where he said: "It may be remarked in passing, that, in our view, the several reissues are for things contained within the machines and apparatus described in the original patents." The reissues referred to were sustained by this court. There is nothing in the remark thus made to show that the court did not find the reissues to be for the same inventions as the original patents, consistently with the views contained in the other cases above referred to, or that the court did not follow those views in deciding that case.

Comment is made by the appellants upon the fact that the original specification states that the "mainspring occupies the whole back of the space occupied by the works, so as to give the greatest running power with the least possible expense of room, one of the leading objects of my invention being to render it possible to make a cheap, neat, and satisfactory timepiece of unusually small size;" and upon the further fact that the specification of the reissue states that the invention has for its object "to make a clock movement which shall be simple and durable in its construction, of small initial cost in manufacture, and the several parts of which shall be relatively arranged in such manner that the movement may be enclosed in a small and compact case." It is urged that every one of the claims of the reissue responds to the object of making a cheap and small but satisfac.ory timepiece. But this statement, in the original specification, of the object of the invention, in such general terms, cannot have the effect of making the reissue one for the same invention as that of the original, when it otherwise would not be. Such a general statement contained no intimation that the invention consisted in the matters covered by the first eight claims of the reissue.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

BULL v. BANK OF KASSON.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.

Submitted May 3, 1887. - Decided October 31, 1887.

A bank check for the payment of

"6 five hundred dollars in current funds"

is payable in whatever is current by law as money, and is a bill of exchange, within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, defining the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

A bank check, presented by a bona fide indorsee for payment six months after its date, the funds against which it was drawn remaining in the hands of the drawee, and the drawer having been in no way injured or prejudiced by the delay in presentment, is not overdue so as to be subject to equities of the drawer against a previous holder.

THIS case came before this court on a certificate of division of opinion between the circuit and district judges holding the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The action was upon two drafts, or bills of exchange, (as they are térmed in the record,) each for $500, drawn by the First National Bank of Kasson in Minnesota upon the Ninth National Bank in New York City, and payable to the order of A. La Due, of which the following were copies :

"$500.

"The First National Bank,

Kasson, Minn., Oct. 15, 1881.

"Pay to the order of Mr. A. La Due five hundred dollars in current funds.

"No. 18956.

E. E. FAIRCHILD, Cashier.

"To Ninth National Bank, New York City.

"Indorsed: Pay to the order of M. Edison, Esq. A. La Due. M. Edison."

"$500.

66

"First National Bank,

Kasson, Minn., Oct. 15, 1881.

'Pay to the order of Mr. A. La Due five hundred dollars

in current funds.

"No. 18754.

E. E. FAIRCHILD, Cashier.

"To Ninth National Bank, New York City.

"Indorsed: Pay to the order of M. Edison, Esq. A. La Due.

M. Edison."

Statement of the Case.

The drafts or bills of exchange were immediately after their execution transferred by indorsement of the payee to one M. Edison, at Kasson, Minnesota. Edison was at the time largely indebted, and on the following day he absconded from Kasson, carrying the drafts with him. These drafts he retained in his possession until March 24, 1882, when, at Quincy, in Illinois, he sold and indorsed them for a valuable consideration to the plaintiffs, who had no notice of any setoff to them. The plaintiffs then forwarded them to New York City, where, on the 27th of March, they were presented for payment to the drawee, the Ninth National Bank of New York; and payment was refused by it. The drafts were then protested for non-payment, and notice thereof given to the drawer and indorsers.

In the meantime the First National Bank of Kasson, the drawer of the drafts, had become the owner of certain demands against Edison, which, under the statute of Minnesota, could be legally set-off against its liability on the drafts in the hands of Edison, and also in the hands of the plaintiffs, unless they were protected against such set-off as innocent purchasers of the paper before maturity, and without notice of the set-off. At the time the drafts were drawn, and at the time. of their presentation for payment, the Ninth National Bank of New York had in its hands money of the drawer sufficient to pay them.

The action was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury by stipulation of parties, and the facts stated above are embodied in its findings. Upon these facts the following question of law arose, viz.: Whether the said drafts, or bills of exchange, were to be regarded as overdue and dishonored paper at the time they were presented by the plaintiffs to the drawee for payment and payment refused, so as to admit the set-off.

Upon this question the judges were divided in opinion, and, upon motion of plaintiffs, it was certified to this court for decision. The circuit judge who presided at the circuit, being of opinion that the question should be answered in the affirm ative, ordered judgment for the defendant. To review this