Syllabus.

their depth. For outlays caused by such works the State may exact reasonable tolls." 119 U. S. 548. And again: "By the terms tax, impost, and duty, mentioned in the ordinance, is meant a charge for the use of the government, not compensation for improvements." Ibid. 549.

We perceive no error in the record, and

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.

RUGGLES V. MANISTEE RIVER IMPROVEMENT Co.

Error to the

Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. MR. JUSTICE FIELD: The same questions are presented as in Sands v. The Manistee River Improvement Co.; and, in conformity with the decision there rendered, the judgment herein is

Real estate in the District of Columbia, belonging to a married woman before the act of April 10, 1869, c. 23, may be conveyed, by deed voluntarily executed and duly acknowledged by her husband and herself, to secure the payment of a debt of his.

Under §§ 450-452 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, a certificate of the separate examination and acknowledgment of a married woman, made in the prescribed form, and recorded with the deed executed by her, cannot be controlled or avoided, except for fraud, by extrinsic evidence of the manner in which the magistrate performed his duty.

A receiver of a national bank, appointed by the comptroller of the currency, is not accountable in equity to the owner of real estate for rents

Opinion of the Court.

thereof received by him as such receiver, and paid by him into the treasury of the United States, subject to the disposition of the comptroller of the currency, under § 5234 of the Revised Statutes.

Accruing rents, collected and paid into court by a receiver appointed on a bill in equity against the mortgagor and a second mortgagee to enforce a first mortgage, which appears to have been satisfied and discharged, belong to the second mortgagee, so far as the land is insufficient to pay his debt.

IN equity. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Enoch Totten for appellant.

Mr. Walter D. Davidge and Mr. R. D. Mussey for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

The original suit was a bill in equity, filed January 10, 1879, by Keyser, as the receiver of the German American National Bank, against Hitz and wife, Donaldson, Prentiss, Chipley, Halstead, Crane, Tyler and Jenks, to enforce a deed, in the nature of a mortgage, dated January 26, 1876, by which Hitz and wife conveyed land in Washington to Donaldson and Prentiss, in trust to secure the payment of promissory notes for $20,000, made by Chipley, indorsed by Halstead and held by the bank; as well as to set aside, as made in fraud of the bank, the following conveyances of the same land: 1st. A release, dated June 16, 1877, from Donaldson and Prentiss to Mrs. Hitz. 2d. A deed, of the same date, from Hitz and wife to Crane. 3d. A deed, dated June 18, 1877, from Crane to Tyler, in trust to secure the payment of Crane's promissory notes for $20,000, payable to Hitz and by him indorsed to Jenks.

Mrs. Hitz filed a cross-bill against Keyser and her codefendants, alleging that she was induced to execute the conveyance to Crane by fraud and in ignorance of its contents; and praying for a cancellation both of that conveyance and of the deed of trust from Crane to Tyler, and for an account of rents and

Opinion of the Court.

profits. By leave of court, she afterwards amended her bill so as to allege that the deed to Crane was fraudulently altered after she executed it.

After a hearing upon pleadings and proofs, it was adjudged at the special term, by a decree made November 28, 1881, and amended December 15, 1881, that these two deeds were valid against Hitz, but void as against his wife; that the former deed of trust had been discharged by payment and release; and that Keyser account for the rents and profits previously received by him, and collect and pay into court all rents subsequently accruing. From that decree Mrs. Hitz, Jenks and Keyser each appealed to the general term, which on December 11, 1883, reversed the decree of the special term, and dismissed both bills, save that the cause was retained to take an account of the rents and profits received or which should have been received by Keyser, and to determine the right to those rents and profits, which were claimed by Mrs. Hitz as her separate property, by Jenks as part of the security afforded by the deed of trust to Tyler, and by Keyser under judgments recovered against Hitz. 2 Mackey, 513. On July 13, 1885, a further decree was entered in general term, denying the right of Mrs. Hitz to any part of those rents and profits. 4 Mackey, 179. From each decree of the general term she alone appealed to this court.

The principal matter to be determined is the validity, as against Mrs. Hitz, of the conveyance from her husband and herself to Crane, and of the deed of trust from Crane to Tyler. The evidence establishes the following facts:

Mr. and Mrs. Hitz were married in 1856, children were born to them, and she inherited the land in question from her father, before the passage of the act of Congress, providing that "in the District of Columbia the right of any married woman to any property, personal or real, belonging to her at the time of marriage, or acquired during marriage in any other way than by gift or conveyance from her husband, shall be as absolute as if she were feme sole, and shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts; but such married woman may convey, devise and bequeath

Opinion of the Court.

the same, or any interest therein, in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried." Act of April 10, 1869, c. 23, § 1, 16 Stat. 45; Rev. Stat. D. C. §§ 727, 728.

Chipley and Halstead were men of no means, and the real object of the deed of trust from Hitz and wife to Donaldson and Prentiss was to secure certain liabilities of Hitz to the bank, of which he was then president. The object of making the deeds from Hitz and wife to Crane and from Crane to Tyler was to secure the payment of money actually advanced by Jenks to Hitz, and by Hitz applied to the payment of the notes secured by the former deed of trust.

The evidence satisfactorily proves that no fraud was practised upon Mrs. Hitz, and that the deed from herself and her husband to Crane was put in its present form before it was signed by either of them. As these are pure matters of fact, and the evidence relating to them is well summed up in the opinion of the court below, they need not be enlarged upon. 2 Mackey, 521–526.

There can be no doubt that by a deed, voluntarily executed and duly acknowledged by the husband and the wife, the entire title of both might be conveyed to secure the payment of his debt, notwithstanding that the act of 1869, as construed by this court, exempted the land, or any interest therein, from being taken on execution against him. Hitz v. National Metropolitan Bank, 111 U. S. 722; Mattoon v. McGrew, 112 U.S. 713.

The more important question is, whether the appellant has shown by competent and sufficient proof that her acknowledgment of the deed to Crane did not fulfil the requirements of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia upon the subject, which are as follows:

By § 441, acknowledgments of deeds may be made before any judge of a court of record and of law, or any chancellor of a State, or a judge of a court of the United States, or a justice of the peace, or a notary public, or a commissioner of the circuit court of the district.

By § 450, "when any married woman shall be a party executing a deed for the conveyance of real estate or interest

Opinion of the Court.

therein, and shall only be relinquishing her right of dower, or when she shall be a party with her husband to any deed, it shall be the duty of the officer authorized to take acknowledgments, before whom she may appear, to examine her privily and apart from her husband, and to explain to her the deed fully."

By § 451, "if, upon such privy examination and explanation, she shall acknowledge the deed to be her act and deed, and shall declare that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same, and that she wished not to retract it, the officer shall certify such examination, acknowledgment and declaration by a certificate annexed to the deed, and under his hand and seal, to the following effect," that is to say, beginning in the usual form of a certificate of acknowledgment, and adding that "being by me examined privily and apart from her husband, and having the deed aforesaid fully explained to her, she acknowledged the same to be her act and deed, and declared that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same, and that she wished not to retract it."

By § 452, "when the privy examination, acknowledgment and declaration of a married woman is taken and certified and delivered to the recorder of deeds for record, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the deed shall be as effectual in law as if she had been an unmarried woman," except as to any covenants therein.

These provisions substantially reënact statutes which have been in force ever since 1715 in the District of Columbia, and in the State of Maryland out of which the District was formed. Maryland Stats. 1715, c. 47, § 11; 1752, c. 8; 1766, c. 14, § 6; 1797, c. 103, § 3-all in Kilty's Laws; Dist. Col. Laws 1868, pp. 21, 28, 38; acts of May 31, 1832, c. 112, 4 Stat. 520; April 20, 1838, c. 57, § 4, 5 Stat. 227.

The conveyance of the estates of married women by deed, with separate examination and acknowledgment, has taken the place of the alienation of such estates by fine in a court of record under the law of England, though differing in some of its effects, owing to the diversity in the nature of the two modes of proceeding.