Argument for Appellee. UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. Submitted October 11, 1887.- Decided October 24, 1887. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction of an action by a State against the United States for a demand arising upon an act of Congress. The action of a State in the Court of Claims to recover moneys received by the United States from sales of swamp lands granted to the State by the act of September 28, 1850, is not barred by the statute of limitations until six years after the amount is ascertained from proofs of the sales before the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The direct tax laid by the act of August 5, 1861, did not create any liability on the part of the States, in which the lands taxed were situated, to pay the tax. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Heber J. May for appellant, cited: United States v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 298; Spear Fed. Judiciary, 252; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449; Ex parte Russell, 13 Wall. 664; United States v. McDougall's. Administrator, 121 U. S. 89; State of Texas Case, 7 C. Cl. 301; State of Illinois Case, 20 C. Cl. 342; State of New Hamp shire Case, 20 C. Cl. 394; Rice v. United States, 122 U. S. 611; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488; Five Per Cent Cases, 110 U. S. 471; Marshall's Case, 21 C. Cl. 308; Ramsay's Case, 14 C. Cl. 367; Woolner's Case, 13 C. Cl. 355; Portland Company's Case, 5 C. Cl. 441; Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122; Davidson's Case, 21 C. Cl. 298, and cases therein cited. Mr. William E. Earle for appellee, cited: Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall. 553; Beauregard v. Case, 91 U. S. 134; Baldwin v. Stark, 107 U. S. 463; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377; Emigrant Co. v. County of Wright, 97 U. S. 339; Emigrant Co. v. County of Adams, 100 U. S. 67; Mills County v. Railroad Companies, 107 U. S. 557; Ames v. Kansas, 111 Opinion of the Court. U. S. 449; Börs v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252; Five Per Cent Cases, 110 U. S. 471; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257; State of Texas Case, 7 C. Cl. 301; State of Illinois Case, 20 C. Cl. 342; State of New Hampshire Case, 20 C. Cl. 394. MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. This action was brought in the Court of Claims by the State of Louisiana against the United States, to recover two demands, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $71,385.83. The first of these demands arises upon the act of Congress of February 20, 1811, 2 Stat. 641, c. 21, "to enable the people of Orleans to form a constitution and state government," the fifth section of which declared that five per cent of the net proceeds of the sales of lands of the United States, within her limits, after the first day of January next ensuing, should be applied to laying out and constructing public roads and levees in the State, as its legislature might direct. Pursuant to the authority thus conferred, the people of the Territory of Orleans, represented in a convention called for that purpose, formed themselves into a State, by the name of Louisiana, and adopted a constitution under which the State was admitted into the Union. The five per cent of the net proceeds of sales of lands of the United States, made between July 1, 1882, and June 30, 1886, and due to the State by the United States, as found by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, amounted to $47,530.79. The second of these demands arises upon the act of Congress of September 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 519, c. 84, "to enable the State of Arkansas and other States to reclaim the swamp lands within their limits," and the act of March 2, 1855, 10 Stat. 634, c. 147,"for the relief of purchasers and locators of swamp and overflowed lands." The act of September 28, 1850, granted to the States then in the Union all the swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation, within their limits, which at the time remained unsold. The second section made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, as soon as practicable after the passage of the act, to prepare a list of the lands VOL. CXXIII-3 Opinion of the Court. described and transmit the same to the Governor of the State, and at his request to cause a patent to be issued therefor. It would seem that this duty was not discharged; and, notwithstanding the grant was one in præsenti, many of the lands ¡falling within the designation of swamp and overflowed lands were sold to other parties by the United States. The act of March 2, 1855, was designed to correct, among other things, the wrong thus done to the State; it provided that, upon due proof of such sales, by the authorized agent of the State, before the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the purchase money of the lands should be paid over to the State. Such proof was not made, but equivalent proof was submitted to the Commissioner as to the character of the lands from the field notes of the Surveyor General of the State. This mode of proof was accepted by the Commissioner in other cases as early as 1850. The amount found in this way by the Commissioner on the 30th of June, 1885, to be due to the State from the United States, on account of sales of swamp lands to individuals, made prior to March 3, 1857, was $23,855.04. It does not appear that there was any serious contest in the Court of Claims, either as to the validity or the amount of these demands; but it was objected that the demand arising upon the acts of September 28, 1850, and of March 2, 1855, was barred by the statute of limitations, and that both demands were set off by the unpaid balance of the direct tax levied under the act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. 292, which was apportioned to the State of Louisiana. The First Comptroller of the Treasury had, at different times previous to the commencement of this action, admitted and certified that the sums claimed were due to the State on account of the five per cent net proceeds of sales of the public lands, and on account of sales of swamp lands within the State purchased by individuals; but had directed the amounts to be credited to the State on account upon the claim of the United States against her for the unpaid portion of the direct tax mentioned. It was, also, objected in the Court of Claims, and the objection is renewed here, that that court had no jurisdiction, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hear Opinion of the Court. and determine a cause in which the State is a party in a suit against the United States. This objection, therefore, must first be examined; for, if well taken, it will be unnecessary to consider the other questions presented. The Constitution declares that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and "that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." This clause was modified by the Eleventh Amendment, declaring that "the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." As thus modified, the clause prescribes the limits of the judicial power of the courts of the United States. The action before us, being one in which the United States have consented to be sued, falls within those designated, to which the judicial power extends; for, as already stated, both of the demands in controversy arise under laws of the United States. Congress has brought it within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by the express terms of the statute defining the powers of that tribunal, unless the fact that a State is the petitioner draws it within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The same article of the Constitution which defines the extent of the judicial power of the courts of the United States, declares, that "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other Opinion of the Court. cases," "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Although the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, where a State is a party, as thus appears, is not in terms made exclusive, there were some differences of opinion among the earlier judges of this court whether this exclusive character did not follow from a proper construction of the article. In a recent case, Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, this question was very fully examined, and the conclusion reached that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases where a State is a party, is not made exclusive by the Constitution, and that it is competent for Congress to authorize suits by a State to be brought in the inferior courts of the United States. In that case, it is true, the action was commenced by the State in one of her own courts, and, on motion of the defendant, was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, and the question was as to the validity of this removal. The case having arisen under the laws of the United States, it was one of the class which could be thus removed, if the Circuit Court could take jurisdiction of an action in which the State was a party. It was held that the Circuit Court could take jurisdiction of an action of that character, and the removal was sustained. The judiciary act of 1789, it is true, declares that "the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature where a State is a party, except between a State and its citizens, or between a State and citizens of other States, or aliens, in which latter cases it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction." This clause, however, cannot have any application to suits against the United States, for such suits were not then authorized by any law of Congress. There could, then, be no controversies of a civil nature against the United States cognizable by any court where a State was a party. The act of March 2, 1875, in extending the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not exclude any parties from being plaintiffs. Whether the State could thereafter prosecute the United States upon any demand in the Circuit Court, or the Court |