Counsel for Parties.

some other person than the grantee; that no formal words are necessary to create such an estate; and that, whenever a manifest intention is exhibited that another person shall have the benefit of the property, the grantee shall be declared a trustee. Section 2632 provides that every voluntary deed shall be void as against subsequent bona fide purchasers for value without notice of such voluntary conveyance. It follows, from these provisions, that as the deed in this case was recorded in due time, it was valid as against the defendant, who had notice of it before the mortgage to him of May, 1870, was executed, and before the sheriff's sale in 1876: This result is in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Gordon v. Green, 10 Geo. 534, 543; Horn v. Ross, 20 Geo. 210, 223; Cummins v. Boston, 25 Geo. 277, 283; Brown v. Spivey, 53 Geo. 155; Adair v. Davis, 71 Geo. 769. The decree of the Circuit Court is

Affirmed.

ZECKENDORF v. JOHNSON.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARI

ΖΟΝΑ.

Submitted November 21, 1887.- Decided December 12, 1887.

The value of the matter in dispute is to be determined by the amount due at the time of the judgment of the court below, which is brought here for review, including interest up to the time of the judgment of the Appellate Court, if the appeal is from an Appellate Court, and the judgment which is taken to the Appellate Court bears interest.

Findings of fact in the court below are conclusive, and cannot be reëxamined here.

THIS was a motion to dismiss, with which was united a motion to affirm. The case is stated in the opinion of the

court.

Mr. Van H. Manning and Mr. J. B. Edmonds for the motions.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. E. M. Marble, opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

A judgment was rendered September 28, 1885, by the District Court of Arizona, in and for the county of Pima, against L. Zeckendorf & Co., the appellants, and in favor of Johnson, the appellee, for $4304.93, "with interest on $2800 of said sum, at the rate of two per cent per month from the date hereof until paid, and interest on $1504.33, at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the date hereof until paid." This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, on appeal, November 8, 1886. From that judgment of affirmance this appeal was taken, which the appellee moves to dismiss, on the ground that the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed $5000, as now required by law. Act of March 3, 1885, c. 355, 23 Stat. 443.

The value of the matter in dispute is to be determined by the amount due at the time of the judgment brought here for review, to wit, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory, and not at the time of the judgment of the District Court. Adding the interest to the judgment of the District Court until the date of that of the Supreme Court, as we must for the purpose of determining our jurisdiction, The Patapsco, 12 Wall. 451; N. Y. Elevated Railroad v. Fifth National Bank, 118 U. S. 608, we find that the amount due at the time of the judgment of the Supreme Court was considerably more than $5000. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.

But, on looking into the record, we discover that the errors assigned relate only to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. These we cannot consider. The findings of fact by the court below are conclusive, and cannot be reexamined here. The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440, and cases there cited. Upon the facts as found there can be no doubt of the correctness of the judgment. It is apparent if the case is kept here longer it will be for delay only. For that reason the motion to affirm is granted.

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

BOND v. DAVENPORT.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.

Submitted December 8, 1887.- Decided December 12, 1887.

On the stipulation of such of the parties as are before this court, the decree of the court below is reversed without costs, and the cause is remanded with instructions to proceed in accordance with the stipulation, but without prejudice to the rights of other parties to the suit who were not before this court on the appeal.

MOTION by complainant below and appellant here, for an order reversing the decree of the court below, and to remand the cause. The motion was supported by a stipulation authorizing it. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Henry Jayne for the motion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal by the complainant below from the following part of the decree in the cause:

"It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said respondent, Sarah G. Davenport, pay to the complainant the sum of five hundred and sixteen and dollars, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 10th day of May, 1883, the same being the amount, with interest, which the undivided half of the south half of block fifty-nine (59) which descended to, and has become vested in, the said Sarah G. Davenport as the mother, and an heir-at-law of the said George A. Davenport, deceased, is chargeable for and on account of taxes on said block fifty-nine (59), which were paid and discharged out of the money advanced by the said Equitable Trust Company on the 28th of June, 1875; and that on failure to pay the said sum within the time herein limited the said master sell, at public sale, so much of the said Sarah G.

Opinion of the Court.

Davenport's undivided half of the south half of said block fifty-nine (59) as shall be necessary to pay the same.

"Such sale to be made at the same place and in the same manner, and in all respects as is herein prescribed for the sale of the property of the said George A. Davenport, and with like effect. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that upon payment by the said Sarah G. Davenport of the said sum of five hundred and sixteen and 7 dollars to the said complainant, complainant's bill be dismissed as to the undivided one-half of the south half of said block fifty-nine (59), which vested in, and to which the said Sarah G. has become entitled, as the mother and heir-at-law of the said George A. Davenport, deceased. And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as between the complainant and the said Sarah G. Davenport, the said Sarah G. Davenport recover of complainant the costs of this suit, so far as made, in trying the issue of the sanity of said George A. Davenport at the time of the making and delivery of said mortgage set up in complainant's original bill."

The only parties to the suit who are before this court are Henry R. Bond, trustee, complainant below and appellant, and Sarah G. Davenport. These parties have filed in this court the following stipulation:

"In the Supreme Court of the United States.

"Henry R. Bond, Trustee, Appellant,

66

v.

Sarah G. Davenport, Appellee.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa..

"In the before mentioned suit it is stipulated by and between Henry R. Bond, trustee, complainant and appellant, The Equitable Trust Company of New London, Connecticut, the holder of the bonds secured by the mortgage sought to be enforced, and Sarah G. Davenport, appellee, being the sole parties in interest, as follows, to wit:

"1. Said Sarah G. Davenport hereby withdraws the answer and cross-petition filed by her in said suit, and all evidence

Opinion of the Court.

offered and introduced by her in said Circuit Court, and consents and agrees that the same shall not be considered as part of the record.

"2. It is agreed that a decree shall be entered by the Supreme Court in said suit, reversing the decision and decree of the said Circuit Court, in so far as said court found in favor of said Sarah G. Davenport, and in so far as said court by its decree denied to complainant the relief by him prayed, as against the undivided half of the south half of block fifty-nine (59), in the city of Davenport, Iowa, claimed by Sarah G. Davenport, as mother and heir-at-law of George A. Davenport, deceased, and in so far as said court, by its said decree, undertook to dismiss complainant's bill as against said property, and tax certain costs to complainant, and that this cause be remanded to said Circuit Court, with instructions to enter a decree in complainant's favor, declaring the sums owing upon said bonds, secured by said mortgage, to be a lien upon the premises in said mortgage, described as of the date of said mortgage, and directing sale of sufficient of said premises to pay the same, and further directing that the receiver heretofore appointed in said cause shall turn over to the complainant all the funds in his hands arising from the rentals of said premises, the same to be credited upon the amount found to be owing upon said bonds secured by said mortgage before sale of said premises, and further directing that the complainant be permitted to further plead and bring in new parties if so advised.

"3. The complainant and appellant is excused from printing the record in this suit, save and except such portions thereof as to him shall seem material to enable the court to dispose of said suit under this stipulation.

"4. The attorney or solicitor who has entered his appearance in this suit is authorized to consent to such demand or requirement of the complainant, or the said court, as shall enable the complainant to have the said decree of the Circuit Court reversed, said cause remanded, and a final decree entered in the Circuit Court in complainant's favor, and for that purpose is hereby authorized to appear in said Circuit Court to any pleading filed by the complainant.