ABANDONMENT.
See INSURANCE, 3.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
See LOCAL LAW, 2, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15;
1. The findings of fact in a cause in admiralty under the act of February
16, 1875, 18 Stat. 315, have the same effect as a special verdict in an
action at law. The Maggie J. Smith, 349.
2. Rule 24 in § 4233 Rev. Stat. applies only when there is some special
cause rendering a departure necessary to avoid immediate danger, such
as the nearness of shallow water, or a concealed rock, the approach of a
third vessel, or something of that kind. [See p. 353 for this rule.] Ib.
3. Where one ship has, by wrong manoeuvres, placed another ship in a posi-
tion of extreme danger, that other ship will not be held to blame, if
she has done something wrong, and has not been manoeuvred with per-
fect skill and presence of mind.
4. The allowance of interest and costs in a cause in admiralty rests in the
discretion of the court below, and its action will not be disturbed on
appeal. Ib.
ALLOWANCE.
See SALARY, 3.
AMENDMENT.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.
1. An appeal allowed in open court is of the date of its allowance, and to
be kept in force, should reach this court before the end of the term to
which it is made returnable. Radford v. Folsom, 725.
2. An appeal being allowed in open court, leaving the amount of the
appeal bond to be settled afterwards, the acceptance of a bond by the
District Judge after the expiration of the term at which the decree
was rendered, and without issue and service of citation, does not
operate as a new appeal as of the date of the acceptance of the bond. Ib.
3. The appearance of an appellee by counsel, without citation, at a term
after the term at which the appeal is returnable, and a motion to dis-
miss the appeal for want of filing the transcript of the record during
the return term, do not waive the citation. Ib.
APPRAISER.
See CUSTOMS DUTIES.
ARBITRATION.
See SALVAGE, 2, 4.
1. There being no assignment of errors in the transcript annexed to the
writ of error, no specification of errors in the brief, no statement pre-
senting the questions involved, no reference to pages in the argument,
and generally a non-compliance with the provisions of the statute and
the rules of this court in these respects, the case is dismissed for those
causes. Benites v. Hampton, 519.
2. An assignment of errors on appeal from the District Court to the
Supreme Court of a Territory cannot be accepted in this court as the
equivalent of the assignment required by the statute. Ib.
3. If the jury return a verdict for the plaintiff after the court in its charge
instructs them to "disregard altogether" evidence on the plaintiff's
part, which had been improperly introduced and had been excepted to,
the defendant cannot assign error here in this respect. New York,
Lake Erie, &c., Railroad v. Madison, 525.
1. A bank check for the payment of "five hundred dollars in current
funds" is payable in whatever is current by law as money, and is a
bill of exchange, within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875, c.
137, defining the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Bull
v. Bank of Kasson, 105.
2. A bank check, presented by a bona fide indorsee for payment six months
after its date, the funds against which it was drawn remaining in the
hands of the drawee, and the drawer having been in no way injured or
prejudiced by the delay in presentment, is not overdue so as to be sub-
ject to equities of the drawer against a previous holder. Ib.
BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE.
See BANK CHECK.
See CONTRACT, 7;
JURISDICTION, A, 16.
BOUNDARY.
See FLORIDA Boundary;
LAND GRANT, 2.
1. Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandall, 120 U. S. 524. Northern Pacific Railroad
v. Mares, 710.
2. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68. Spies v. Illinois, 131.
3. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430.
4. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543.
Spies v. Illinois, 131.
Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 288.
5. Jewell v. Knight, 426, followed in Smith v. Craft, 436.
6. Oelbermann v. Merritt, 356, affirmed in Mustin v. Cadwalader, 369.
7. Stryker v. Goodnow, 527, affirmed in Chapman v. Goodnow, 540.
applied as to the effect of Wolcott v. Des
Litchfield v. Goodnow, 549.
8. Stryker v. Goodnow, 527,
1. First National Bank of Cleveland v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74. Burlington,
&c., Railway Co. v. Simmons, 52.
2. Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112. Burlington, &c., Railway Co. v. Sim-
mons, 52.
3. United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389. Mathews v. United States,
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738. In re Ayers, 443.
United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52. United States v. Allen, 345.
CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION OF OPINION.
See DIVISION OF OPINION.
CLERKS, OFFICIAL BONDS OF.
See JURISDICTION, A, 16.
COAL LAND.
See PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2.
1. A railroad company is not responsible for the loss of a bag containing
money and jewelry, carried in the hand of a passenger and by him
accidentally dropped through an open window in the car, although,
upon notice of the loss, it refuses to stop the train, short of a usual
station, to enable him to recover it. Henderson v. Louisville & Nash-
ville Railroad, 61.
2. The undertaking of a common carrier to transport live-stock, though
differing in some respects from the responsibility assumed in the car-
VOL. CXXIII-49
riage of ordinary goods, includes the delivery of the live-stock. North
Penn. Railroad Co. v. Commercial Bank, 727.
3. When a railroad company receives live-stock for transportation by means
of connecting lines to a named consignee or to his order at a destina-
tion beyond its terminus, and gives a receipt or bill of lading in accord-
ance therewith, and delivers the property safely to the next connect-
ing line, from which it finally passes into the possession of the con-
necting company on whose line the point of destination is, the latter
company is bound to deliver the property there to the consignee or to
his order, if they are made known to it on receiving the freight; and
it is not released from that liability by reason of a practice or custom
to deliver all such freight to a drove-yard company without requiring
the production of the bill of lading or receipt, or other authority of
the shipper, knowledge of the practice or custom not being brought
home to the holder of such receipt, bill of lading, or other authority.
Ib.
4. A railroad company received live-stock to be transported over its line and
over connecting lines to a distant point beyond its terminus. It gave
the shipper a receipt stating that they were "consigned to order P. M.,"
who was also shipper and owner, “notify J. B." at the point of desti-
nation. The goods were safely transported to that point. The agents
of the last transporting line received with the property a way-bill con-
taining the same statement as to the consignee, and as to the party to
be notified. Held, that knowledge of the destination and the con-
signee of the goods being thus brought to the notice of the company
which carried the goods to their destination, it became its duty to
deliver, or to instruct its agents to deliver, the property only to the
consignee or his order; and that a delivery of the property to J. B.
after such knowledge would not avail as a defence when sued for its
value by a bank at the place of shipment, which had discounted a bill
drawn by the shipper, and secured by an indorsement of the receipt as
collateral. Ib.
1. It is well settled that the first ten articles of amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States were not intended to limit the powers of
the States, in respect of their own people, but to operate on the na-
tional government only. Spies v. Illinois, 131.
2. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, affirmed to the point that when a challenge
by a defendant in a criminal action to a juror for bias, actual or im-
plied, is disallowed, and the juror is thereupon peremptorily chal-
lenged by the defendant and excused, and an impartial and competent
juror is obtained in his place, no injury is done the defendant if, until
the jury is completed, he has other peremptory challenges which he
can use. Ib.
3. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, affirmed to the point that the right to
challenge is the right to reject, not the right to select a juror; and if
from those who remain an impartial jury is obtained, the constitu-
tional right of the accused is maintained. Ib.
4. A statute of Illinois passed March 12, 1874, Hurd's Stats. Ill. 1885, 752,
c. 78, § 14, enacted that "in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact
that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression,
based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of
which he has expressed no opinion), shall not disqualify him to serve
as a juror in such case, if he shall upon oath state that he believes he
can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with
the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth
of such statement." At a trial, had in that State, of a person accused
of an offence punishable, on conviction, with death, the court ruled
that, under this statute, "It is not a test question whether the juror
will have the opinion, which he has formed from the newspapers,
changed by the evidence, but whether his verdict will be based only
upon the account which may here be given by witnesses under oath."
Held, that, as thus interpreted, the statute did not deprive the persons
accused of a right to trial by an impartial jury; that it was not repug-
nant to the constitution of Illinois, nor to the Constitution of the
United States; and that, if the sentence of the court, after conviction,
should be carried into execution, they would not be deprived of their
lives without due process of law. Ib.
5. When the ground relied on for the reversal by this court of a judgment
of the highest court of a State is that the error complained of is so
gross as to amount in law to a denial by the State of a trial by an im-
partial jury to one who is accused of crime, it must be made clearly to
appear, in order to obtain a reversal, that such is the fact, and that the
case is not one which leaves something to the conscience or discretion
of the court. Ib.
6. The exaction of tolls, under a state statute, for the use of an improved
natural waterway, is not within the prohibition of the Constitution of
the United States that no State shall deprive a person of his property
without due process of law. Sands v. Manistee River Improvement
Co., 288.
7. The internal commerce of a State, that is, the commerce which is wholly
confined within its limits, is as much under its control as foreign or
interstate commerce is under the control of the national government;
and to encourage the growth of this commerce and render it safe,
States may provide for the removal of obstructions from their rivers
and harbors, and deepen their channels, and improve them in other
ways, and levy a general tax or toll upon those who use the improve-
ment to meet their cost; provided the free navigation of the waters, as
permitted under the laws of the United States, is not impaired, and
|