married woman, made in the prescribed form, and recorded with the
deed executed by her, cannot be controlled or avoided, except for
fraud, by extrinsic evidence of the manner in which the magistrate
performed his duty. Ib.
4. In Florida a sheriff's deed given in evidence without production of the
judgment or execution, and read without objection, is sufficient evi-
dence of sale by sheriff. United States v. Morant, 335.
See EQUITY, 6 (5).
MALT LIQUORS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16-24.
MARRIED WOMAN.
See LOCAL LAW, 2, 3.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Accruing rents, collected and paid into court by a receiver appointed on a
bill in equity against the mortgagor and a second mortgagee to enforce
a first mortgage, which appears to have been satisfied and discharged,
belong to the second mortgagee, so far as the land is sufficient to pay
his debt. Hitz v. Jenks, 297.
See EQUITY, 8, 9;
As it appears on the face of the bonds sued on in this action that they
were issued under the special act of February 18, 1857, which was
held void in Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667, and not under the gen-
eral law of March 6, 1867, the judgment dismissing the action is
affirmed. Gilson v. Dayton, 59.
1. A statute of Missouri authorized county collectors to collect county
taxes, and required them to receive in payment thereof warrants issued
by the county when presented by the legal holder. A, a holder of two
county warrants, presented them to the treasurer for payment, and
payment was refused, because there was no money in the treasury. A
brought suit against the collector and his official bondsmen, to collect
the amount due on these warrants, alleging that the collector was
authorized by law to receive warrants in payment of taxes only from
the holder in payment of his own taxes; that this provision had been
disregarded by the collector in receiving warrants from persons who
were not legal holders, entitled to use them; that all the tax-payers
had thus made payments of taxes and received acquittances without
the actual payment of money from 1879 to 1881; and that the collec-
tor had once in each month during that period settled with the County
Court, and his course in this respect had been ratified and approved.
The defendants demurred. The demurrer is sustained by this court,
(1) because it appeared that there was no contract relation between
A and the collector on which he had a right to bring the suit; and (2)
because it appeared that the proper county officials had settled with
the collector, and ratified his acts, and discharged him from any lia-
bility which might have existed by reason of them. Harshman v.
Winterbottom, 215.
A receiver of a national bank, appointed by the comptroller of the currency,
is not accountable in equity to the owner of real estate for rents
thereof received by him as such receiver, and paid by him into the
treasury of the United States, subject to the disposition of the comp-
troller of the currency, under § 5234 of the Revised Statutes. Hitz v.
Jenks, 297.
See JURISDICTION, A, 8;
TAX, 2.
See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION;
SALARY.
ORDINANCE OF 1787.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.
A decree dismissing a bill for a partnership accounting affirmed, on the
ground that the plaintiff had regarded the partnership agreement as
never having gone into effect or as having been cancelled; and that
part of the matters in dispute had been settled by a subsequent agree-
ment between the parties. Davis v. Key, 79.
1. The first eight claims of reissued letters-patent No. 10,062, granted
March 14, 1882, to Arthur E. Hotchkiss, for improvements in clock
movements, on an application for a reissue filed July 19, 1881, (the
original patent, No. 221,310, having been granted to Hotchkiss, Novem-
ber 4, 1879, on an application filed July 29, 1879, and a prior reissue,
No. 9656, having been granted April 12, 1881,) are invalid, because
not for the same invention as that of the original patent. Parker &
Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 87.
2. The statutes, and the decisions of this court, on the question of the
necessity that a reissued patent should be granted only for the same
invention as the original patent, reviewed. Ib.
3. What was suggested or indicated in the original specifications, draw-
ings, or patent-office model is not to be considered as a part of the
invention intended to have been covered by the original patent, unless
it can be seen, from a comparison of the two patents, that the inven-
tion which the original patent was intended to cover embraced the
things thus suggested or indicated in the original specification, draw-
ings, or patent-office model, and unless the original specification indi-
cated that those things were embraced in the invention intended to
have been secured by the original patent. Ib.
4. In this case, the original patent was amended so as to cover improve-
ments not covered by it, and which came into use by others than the
patentee free from the protection of the patent; and there is no evi-
dence of any attempt to secure by the original patent the inventions
covered by the first eight claims of the reissue; and those inventions
must be regarded as having been abandoned or waived, so far as the
reissue is concerned. Ib.
5. The use of his own invention by an inventor, for the purpose of testing
the machine, in order by experiment to devise additional means for
perfecting the success of its operation, is not a public use under Rev.
Stat. § 4886, and if a profit is derived from the sale of the product of
its operation, merely as incident to such use, the character of the use
is not thereby changed; but if the use is mainly for the purpose of
trade and profit, the experimenting being incidental only, and it is
public, and is continued for a period of more than two years prior to
the application for a patent for the invention, it comes within the
prohibition of that statute. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 249.
6. When it is clearly established that there was a public use of an inven-
tion by the inventor for more than two years prior to his application
for a patent for it, the burden is on him to show by convincing proof
that the use was not a public use, in the sense of the statute, because
it was for the purpose of perfecting an incomplete invention by tests
and experiments. Ib.
7. Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 in letters-patent No. 228,136, dated May 25,
1880, and claims 2, 3, and 5 in letters-patent No. 231,199, dated
August 17, 1880, both granted to Leonard A. Sprague for improve-
ments in machines for making buckle-levers, are void by reason of a
public use of the invention by the patentee for a period of more than
two years prior to his application for patent No. 231,199; as to claim
5 in letters-patent No. 228,136, and claims 1 and 4 in letters-patent
No. 231,199, this court agrees with the Circuit Court, for the reasons
stated in the opinion of the latter. Ib.
8. Reissued letters-patent No. 4372, granted to Nelson W. Green, May 9th,
1871, for an "improvement in the method of constructing artesian
wells," the original patent, No. 73,425, having been granted to said
Green, as inventor, January 14th, 1868, on an application filed March
17th, 1866, are invalid, because the invention was in public use by
others than Green more than two years prior to his application for the
patent. Andrews v. Hovey, 267.
9. The proper construction of § 7 of the act of March 3, 1839, (5 Stat.
354,) is, that if, more than two years before the application for a pa-
tent, the invention covered by it was in public use, whether with or
without the consent of the subsequent patentee, the patent was ren-
dered invalid. Ib.
10. The English letters-patent dated January 22, 1861, and sealed July 19,
1861, issued to Charles William Siemens and Frederick Siemens for
"improvements in furnaces," and the American letters-patent No.
41,788, dated March 1, 1864, issued to C. W. and F. Siemens for "im-
proved regenerator furnaces" describe the same furnace, in all essen-
tial particulars, and are substantially for the same invention. Siemens
v. Sellers, 276.
11. When American letters-patent are issued covering the same invention
described in foreign letters-patent of an earlier date, the life of the
American patent is not prolonged by the fact that it also covers im-
provements upon the invention as patented in the foreign country. Ib.
12. The condition imposed by the act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 117, that the
term of a patent for an invention which has been patented in a foreign
country shall commence to run from the time of publication of the
foreign patent, was not repealed or abrogated by the act of March 2,
1861, 12 Stat. 246. Ib.
13. Under the patent laws a disclaimer cannot be used to materially alter
the character of the patented invention, or to effect such a change in
it as calls for further description or specification in order to make it
intelligible but its proper office is in the surrender either of a sepa-
rate claim, or of some distinct and separable matter, which can be ex-
scinded without mutilating or changing what is left. Hailes v. Albany
Stove Co., 582.
14. The drawings cannot be used on a disclaimer to show that the patent,
as changed by the disclaimer, embraces a different invention from that
described in the specification. Ib.
15. Sections 4917 and 4922 of the Revised Statutes are parts of one law,
having one general purpose, and both relate to the case in which a
patentee, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any
fraudulent or deceptive intention, has included in his claims and in
his patent inventions to which he is not entitled, and which are clearly
distinguishable from those to which he is entitled; the purpose of
§ 4917 being to authorize him in such case to file a disclaimer of the
part to which he is not entitled, and the purpose of § 4922 being to
legalize the suits on the patent mentioned in that section, and to the
extent to which the patentee can rightfully claim the patented inven
tion. Ib.
16. Assuming that claims 1 and 2 of re-issued letters-patent No. 9803,
granted July 12, 1881, to George W. Heyl, assignee of Henry R. Heyl,
the inventor, for an "improvement in devices for inserting metallic
staples," are valid, they are not infringed by the "Victor tool,”, made
under and in accordance with letters-patent No. 218,227, granted to
William J. Brown, Jr., August 5, 1879, and a second patent, No.
260,365, granted to the same person, July 4, 1882. Crawford v. Hei-
singer, 589.
17. As to claims 1 and 2 of that reissue, namely, "1. The combination of
the stationary staple-support or anvil A', and the sliding staple-guide
B, with the reciprocating slotted or recessed hammer, operating to in-
sert a staple through layers of stock to be united, and simultaneously
bend over its projecting ends, substantially as and for the purpose set
forth. 2. In a device for inserting metallic staples, the combination
of the staple-guide B, anvil A', spring D, and reciprocating driver,
provided with the knob G, the whole arranged to operate substantially
as and for the purpose set forth," it must, in view of the language of
the claims, and of the state of the art, and of the limitations imposed
by the Patent Office, in allowing those claims, be held, that the staple-
support or anvil is required to be stationary, and the slotted or re-
cessed hammer or driver to be reciprocating. Ib.
18. In the "Victor tool" the anvil is movable and the hammer or driver is
stationary. Ib.
The respondents, holding a quantity of securities hypothecated as collat-
eral for an indebtedness due them from an insolvent bank, sold them
by public auction, in the manner stated in the opinion of the court,
for less than the debt and proved the balance of the debt. When the
judgment declaring a dividend was entered, it was stated in it, both
parties consenting, that all the rights of both touching damages re-
sulting from the sale of the bonds were expressly reserved. On these
and other facts stated at length in the opinion of the court: Held, (1)
that this could not be construed into an admission of the liability of
the respondents, or that a just cause of action existed against them:
(2) that the complainants, in endorsing the bonds which are the sub-
ject of controversy as payable to bearer after the sale which is ob
jected to, and in delivering them in that condition to the respondents,
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