flexible resolution, sustained by adequate capacity, to maintain them.

39. No policy could be more thoroughly anti-European, more American, than his. He would exclude all further European colonization from the American continent; all interference of European monarchs, especially those of the miscalled Holy Alliance, in American politics; he would render his own country, essentially, independent of European workshops, by fostering American arts, manufactures, and science, and would strengthen her, power, by rendering her force more available through the instrumentality of Internal Im provement.

40. To these objects, his efforts were directed. His prin cipal measures were-I. The Mission to Panama: II. A lib eral system of Internal Improvements: III. The fostering of American industry and genius, by protecting duties upon imports: IV. The extension of our foreign commerce, by the reciprocal abolition of discriminating duties upon trade and navigation in our own and in foreign ports: V The maintenance of our faith with the Indian tribes, and the advancement of their moral and political condition.

41. I. The object of the Panama Convention, to which Columbia, Central America and Mexico were originally parties, was to deliberate on the great and common interests of several new and neighbouring nations. In such deliberations the interests of the United States were deeply involved; and, were it, merely, that our Government might be, speedily and correctly, informed of the proceedings of the Congress, and the issue of their negotiations, it was advisable to have an accredited agency with them, in such confidential relation as would ensure the authenticity, and the safe and prompt transmission, of its reports.

42. The objects of the United States in this conference were: 1. The establishment of some principles of international law, whose unsettled state had been productive of much evil; as the perpetual abolition, among the American states, of private war upon the ocean, or at least such modification of the practice as would make the friendly flag protect the cargo: the curtailment of the contraband of war; and the proscription of fictitious paper blockades: 2. To consider of means for the abolition of the slave trade: 3. Of means to deter the European powers from further colonization on the American continent, and from interference in the contest between Spain and her former colonies: 4. To determine

in what light the political condition of Hayti should be regarded a case highly important to the southern portion of our own country: 5. To consider the views of Colombia and Mexico in their proposed invasion of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico; an event which might result, ultimately, in putting them in the hands of some European power, other than Spain-to prevent which, the United States were interested by preserving the existing tranquillity of the islands, and the peace and security of their inhabitants: 6. To obtain from the nations of the South, a recognition of the principles of religious toleration: 7. To establish general principles of intercourse, applicable to all the American powers, for the mutual regulation of their commerce and navigation, founded on the basis of perfect equality and reciprocity: 8. To consider the means of making a canal through the Isthmus of Panama; a measure of great importance to the commercial world, but more especially to the United States: 9. And lastly, to conciliate the affections of our sister republics, by aiding them, at their earnest request, with such wholesome counsel as our greater experience might suggest.

43. These views were not peculiar to the administration of Mr. Adams. The only proposition which, by possibility, might result in foreign alliance, the prevention of European interference in American affairs, had been profoundly considered by Mr. Monroe, and the commanding position taken by him upon the subject, was sustained by the nation. In his message to Congress, of the 2d December, 1823, we find this important passage: "The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favour of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on the European side of the Atlantic. In wars with the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part; nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent inju ries or make preparations for defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed un

exampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations subsisting between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of our hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purposes of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light, than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition; and to this we have adhered,` and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make neccessary a corresponding change on the part of the United States.'

44. This temperate and spirited declaration, it is well known, frustrated the crusade proposed by the Holy Alliance against political freedom in America. Its wisdom was recognized by the nation; and to give it efficiency the peo ple of the United States would, had it been necessary, poured forth their blood and treasure as freely as in their own peculiar cause. Few events in our history have done us more honour. It is a monument of our foresight, prudence and magnanimity; and of our disposition to take counsel from our duties, rather than our fears. To have taken any other position, or turn from the course which this had opened, would have been as unwise as dishonourable.

45. The Congress at Panama might not accomplish any of the transcendant benefits anticipated. It was, in its nature, a measure speculative and experimental. Unforeseen accidents and mischances might baffle its high purposes, and disappoint its fairest speculations. But its design, the amelioration of the condition of man, was great and benevolent. "It was congenial with that spirit which prompted the Declaration of Independence; inspired the preamble of our first treaty with France; dictated our first treaty with Prussia, and the instructions under which it was negotiated, and filled the hearts and fired the souls of the immortal founders of our Revolution.

46. The measure, as the situation of the parties, was of a new character. Mr. Adams approached it with due prudence and that respect for the co-ordinate powers of the Government which has remarkably distinguished him from his successor. Although the convention at Panama would be diplomatic, not legislative, and indeed consultative merely, and acting under the declaration, that the United States would engage in no discussion inconsistent with entire neutrality, he proposed to instruct the representatives of the United States to receive and refer to the consideration of their Government, the propositions of the other parties to the meeting, but to conclude nothing without the definite sanction of their Government. Nay, although the measure was deemed by him within the constitutional competency of the Executive, he took no step in it before ascertaining that his opinion of its expediency would concur with that of both branches of the legislature; first by the decision of the Senate upon the nomination of ministers; and secondly, by the sanction of both Houses to the appropriations for giving it effect.

47. When, at the earnest request of the southern republic, the President accepted their invitation to the Congress, he annexed the condition that the Senate should advise and consent to the measure. Of course, the question came before the legislature free from all difficulty of the Executive right to act in such a case independently of that body, and was to be resolved, solely, on its sense of expediency. Upon this point, there was much diversity of opinion in both Houses of Congress. But the mission was approved by the Senate, and sustained by the necessary appropriation of funds.

48. But the opponents of the administration feeling, or feigning, many fears, violently, opposed this mission-a mission founded on the interests, the proper feelings, and the duties of the United States; naturally following previous acts of the Government, which had received the warmest approba tion of the people; undertaken at a time when the principles of maritime law, of commerce and navigation were to be fixed upon a basis of justice, long sought by the United States, or upon the old crude and unilateral system from which they had already sustained great detriment; undertaken, too, at a time when Cuba and Porto Rico, in whose fate the United States have so deep a stake, were threatened; and contemplating the establishment of a wise and liberal international policy. A mission founded on such principles, springing from such motives, undertaken at such a juncture, and aiming at such

ends, was characterized as an Amphictyonic Council, pregnant with entangling alliances, and dangers to our neutrality, as a religious crusade, and as a temporary scheme for unworthy purposes.

49. The character of the opposition, however, was properly defined, by the declaration of a zealous opponent, that had the administration rejected the mission, "we should have had them;" that is, that they would have thereby rendered themselves most obnoxious to the nation: And by the pertinacity with which the opposition refused to publish, at a proper period, the instructions given by the President to our ministers, and when the Executive, acting on the responsibility which it had been invited to exercise, published them in an open message to Congress, violently suppressed the publication, and seized what belonged to the House of Representatives as well as to the Senate.

50. II. The constitutional power of the General Government to impose duties for the protection of domestic industry, and to appropriate money for internal improvements, has, since the year 1816, been strenuously denied by distinguished politicians in every section of the Union, particularly in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Although the adverse construction originated in local and sectional interests, it found advocates among the speculative politicians of every State, and among the leaders of every party, by whatever name distinguished. No party, therefore, influencing the presidential election, could be formed upon this question. As at the siege of Jerusalem, the Jews, when the enemy assailed the walls, united to resist him, but when he was expelled, turned their arms against each other; so, the parties of the United States gathered under their respective banners to contend for power and office, but broke into hostile fragments whenever there was a cessation of the contest for those selfish ends. The friends of domestic industry and internal improvements, united with their enemies to pull down the administration devoted to these interests, but they struggled zealously to support such interests in the legislative halls.

51. The workings of party on these questions form an under-plot, in the great political drama, pregnant with danger to the permanence of our institutions. And though we are not alarmists, nor believe that every wind of doctrine may prostrate the Union, we are satisfied that there are sentiments abroad, in the nation, which would make a southern