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received, in the House, the approbation of more than twothirds of the meinbers; and, it is understood, that, had it been returned, in season, to the Senate, it would have repassed that body, the President's objections notwithstanding, by a vote of more than two-thirds; but by its detention, the bill was defeated.

378. The first reflection which presents itself, is, that, the President has again, by his veto, restrained and annulled the deliberate voice of the people, upon a question of mere expediency, involving no constitutional principle, by a process which has much the appearance of undignified artfulness. Under the Constitution, if the President retain a bill longer than ten days, Sundays excepted, it becomes a law, as if he had signed it, unless Congress, by adjournment, prevent its return. This section provides for a special case, the adjournment of Congress. But the present case has another aspect, the dissolution of the Congress, which expired on the 4th day of March. The President had, therefore, no right to retain the bill and, thereby, deprive Congress of the opportunity of its reconsideration, in case of his veto. He thus exercised a power against which the Constitution sought to provide,defeating legislation, by retaining bills for an indefinite period. The reason assigned for this course is, that, he had not sufficient time for the full consideration of the subject. But, the subject was not new. The bill had passed, at a previous session of the Senate, (1832-3) in the shape in which, with one modification, it was presented to him. Copies of the bill, prior to its passage, at both sessions, had been laid before him. He had treated the subject, and demonstrated his possession of a knowledge of the bill, in his message of December, 1832. When, therefore, it was presented for his approbation, on the 2d March, 1833, he must have been familiar with it. But we proceed to consider the reasons offered for the rejection of the bill. They are

I. That, the waste lands of the West were ceded on the express condition that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, according to their expenditure, and for no other purpose; and that the bill is in direct violation of this condition; that its operation is unequal, giving 12 per cent. of the net proceeds of the sales to certain States, in addition to their equal shares, in the distribution-and making that distribution, not upon the ratio of general charge and expenditure, but that of the federal representation.

II. That, the bill provides, expressly, that, a portion of the

public revenue, given to certain States, shall be applied “to objects of internal improvement or education within those States," and appropriates the balance to all the States, to be applied "to such purposes as the Legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper:" That, under these provisions the money of the United States may be applied to objects of local improvement, "which he had pronounced unconstitutional, and which judgment had been confirmed by the people."

III. That, the bill creates a surplus of funds for the purpose of distribution; subjects the General Government to the expense of the machinery of the land system; and thus, virtually, distributes, among the States, a portion of the general revenues; which portion may be increased, from time to time, until all the State expenses shall be thus borne and the States becoming dependent, consolidation will ensue.

IV. That, no advantage can accrue to the States from the proposed distribution, since the revenue from the public lands forms a part of the revenue for general purposes, and, if it be abstracted, the amount must be supplied from the imposts; it being necessary to levy whatever sum the public expenditure may require; and that, consequently, there is nothing more gained in appropriating these specific funds than, by a general appropriation of the same amount from the treasury.

V. That, the bill will tend to keep up the price of the public lands which should be reduced. "The just men" of the West would not sell, their bright prospect of increasing wealth and growing power, at such a price.

379. I. To the first objection, it may be replied, that it goes only to a part, and the smaller part, of the lands of the United States. All that have been obtained by the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, are free from any restriction as to their disposition: they form an unshackled portion of the wealth of the Union, and their proceeds may be dispensed, as any money, from the public treasury. And we may also add, that the power of the Government over the proceeds of all the public lands, however derived, has been, unqualifiedly, declared, by the President, in his message of the 4th of December, 1832; in which it is averred, that "It is in the discretion of Congress, to dispose of them in such way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony and general interest of the American people."

The allegation of inequality in the distribution comes with an ill grace from the President, who, in that message, and in

the very veto message itself, urges, that, the whole of the unsold lands should be relinquished to the new States. Surely if Congress may grant the whole of the lands to such States it may grant an eighth part of them, for a short and definite period. But, whatever may be the inequality of the distribution, it is strictly consonant with the policy hitherto observed towards the new States; to whom more than eight millions of acres have been granted for the purposes. of education; more than two millions and a quarter for internal improvements; and by the compact with them, respectively, five per cent. of the net proceeds of sales within their respective limits is reserved, for similar purposes.

But the extra allowance is not gratuitous. Increasing in population, by a greater ratio than the old States, if the same rule were applied to the new States, they would receive an unequal proportion, if the distribution were made solely on the principle of population, and by the census of 1830, as is proposed. The increase of population in Illinois, for example, is at the rate of 18 per centum per annum; and the population is, now, nearly double what it was at that period. It is obvious, therefore, that if the distribution should be continued to her, according to the census, that, she would receive, only, one-half of what she would be justly entitled to. Again, as the extra allowance to the new States is to be expended on education and internal improvements, the United States, as the greatest landholder in such States, is bound fairly to contribute to that improvement, which, necessarily, enhances the value of their property.

But does the rule of distribution adopted by the bill, violate the deeds of cession? A distribution among the States, "according to their respective and usual proportions in the general charge," is wholly impracticable. That clause in the deeds had reference, solely, to the articles of confederation. Revenue is not collected from the States, now, in their sovereign character, but from the mass of the community; and it is, consequently, impracticable, to ascertain how much is paid by the citizens of any one State: Nor does the disbursement of the proceeds of the lands, from the common treasury, more nearly fulfil the rule; for, it can never be known, how each State is, in its disbursement, benefited, according to its due proportion in the general charge and expenditure.

But all obscurity upon this subject is cleared away by the provision of the Constitution, in which all anterior conditions have merged. That declares, "The Congress shall have

power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claim of the United States, or of any particular State." The last words of this clause relate to certain reservations made to the States, and to such claims of a territorial, jurisdictional or pecuniary nature, as may have subsisted under the confederacy. Consequently, the objection, on the score of inconsistency with the original grants, is totally without support.

II. To the second objection, it might be answered, that it is founded altogether upon an assumption of what the President considers a possible abuse,-upon the prophecy that the funds will be applied to some local objects of improvement. But this objection has never prevented the application of the lands themselves to local purposes within the States, nor their proceeds to any and every purpose, including pensions, donations to foreign States, &c. &c., when such proceeds have come into the general treasury. If Congress may apply the proceeds of lands to such purposes, it may give them, surely, in a scale of proximate equality, to all the people of the United States.

III. But this bill tends to the creation of surplus revenue. Is that a fitting objection in the mouth of one who maintains the expediency of the distribution of the general funds of the Government? Of a system which rushes, with irresistible force, to taxation and plunder? The great, the excelling merit of this appropriation of the proceeds of the land sales is, that it is specific and, necessarily limited, by the verv nature of the subject: That whilst it meets the crying wants of the country, for funds for internal improvement, it gets rid of most of the objections raised against ordinary appropriations for such purpose; and it fixes a point, namely, the net proceeds of sales, beyond which no ingenuity can increase the amount. It, therefore, does not lead to the creation of a surplus for distribution; but, on the contrary, limits the amount which shall be applicable to internal improvement. It is, in truth, nothing more nor less, than a donation, of an ascertainable and determinate character, of funds, in a certain equitable ratio, among the people; of the propriety of which, the people, by their representatives, the only proper and constitutional organ, not by party representations and newspaper misrepresentations, as the President assumes, are entitled to judge. And nothing but the most shocking ar

rogance and overwhelming presumption could induce an individual to oppose their decision.

On this occasion the President again resorts to that power which he makes paramount, because it makes him paramount, to the representatives of the people. He assumes, that, this bill is contrary to the principle established by him in the Maysville road message; and then proceeds to say; "That principle, I cannot be mistaken in supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American people." Whence arises this confidence? Is it from his re-election? But since the Maysville road message, a new Congress had been elected, and of that Congress more than an hundred members had voted for the bill. If, then, it be permissable, which we deny, to draw an inference in favor of a particular trait of policy, from the election of an officer, who may have, nay, must have, been recommended to the people by many and various considerations, it is still more allowable to draw a contrary inference from the election of one hundred officers, all opposed to that policy. But we repudiate every idea of the kind. There is but one mode of ascertaining the sense of the people upon subjects within the scope of legislation, and that is, by the voice of the legislators, duly and constitutionally expressed. Any other mode mines the, Constitution, introduces anarchy, mobocracy, irresponsible power and despotism. A result which Jacksonism, has, as energetically as perseveringly, pursued,

But, the bill tends to the consolidation of the Government -over the States. Yes, if to strengthen the States individually, if to fix invariably the principles of the donation, if to increase the means of independent existence be to consolidate the States, then, does the bill tend to consolidation-not otherwise. But, the bill does furnish a principle of union, which should recommend it to every patriot. It demonstrates an interest in the common domain, available to each State for the most valuable purposes-available, however, only during union and which must be lost, by any event which dissolves the confederation. It supplies, in truth, that common bond of pecuniary interest, which was erroneously supposed to be created by a national debt.

V. But the bill maintains the present price of the public lands. True. And that which recommended it to Congress and the nation, has rendered it odious to those usurping spirits which have hatched the design of plundering the Union for the enrichment of individuals and the western States.-A rapine which

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