of such an opinion. Certain it is that he has advocated the extension of its branches; has solicited and obtained the establishment of one, at Nashville, and sought, unsuccessfully, the location of another in Florida. We are assured, that it was proposed by himself, or what seems more to the purpose, by the inferior council which guides him, to include, in the congressional message of December, 1829, a recommendation of the recharter of the Bank. But this committal was averted by the influence of Mr. Van Buren, who believed it could never be retracted, and that the safer policy would be, to intimate to the institution impending danger, which submission might avert. The attempt had been made to convert the Bank into a political engine, and though it had been repelled, the design was not abandoned.

392. Soon after the election of General Jackson, a meeting was held, in Washington, of the principal chiefs of the party, to consider of the means to perpetuate their authority, of which, possession of the Bank was among the most prominent. The first manifestation of their purpose was, in June, 1829, by an attempt (supported by Mr. Woodbury, then a Senator and since Secretary of the Navy, and now Secretary of the Treasury, and by Mr. Isaac Hill, late editor of a violent Jackson journal of New Hampshire, then unconfirmed Comptroller of the Treasury, and now a Senator of the United States) to coerce the Bank, to remove the President of the Branch Bank, at Portsmouth, upon party grounds. This attempt was countenanced, if not, fully participated in, by Mr. Ingham, Secretary of the Treasury, who undertook to give the Bank, "the views of the administration in relation" to the appointment.

Upon these extraordinary instances, the Bank deemed it necessary to extinguish, if possible, at once, the hope of converting it into a party agent. The President of the institution, therefore, distinctly announced to the Secretary of the Treasury, that, the Bank rightly apprehended his views, and that it became his duty to state in a manner so clear as to leave no possibility of misconception, that the Boards of Directors, of the Bank and of its respective branches, acknowledged not, the slightest responsibility, to the Secretary of the Treasury, touching the political conduct of their officers; that, being a subject on which they never consult, and never wish to know, the views of any administration; That, for the Bank, which has specific duties to perform, and which belongs to the country and not to party, there was but one

course of honour and safety: That, whenever its duties came in conflict with the spirit of party, it should not compromise with it, nor capitulate with it, but, openly and fearlessly, resist it: That, in this, its interests concurred with its duty, as it would be found, at last, that, the best mode of satisfying all parties was to disregard all."

Notwithstanding this decisive rebuke, there lingered in the bosom of Mr. Van Buren a hope, that the Bank might yet be constrained to submission, or he dreaded to make upon it a resolute and unequivocal attack, before the party had been thoroughly prepared to sustain it. Whilst, therefore, the presidential message of 1829, struck a dreadful note of preparation for danger, it reserved a locus pœnitentiæ, a place for turning; and such continued the policy of the party for three years.

393. In the President's message to Congress, of December, 1829, he is made to observe: "The Charter of the Bank of the United States expires in 1836; and its stockholders will, most probably, apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy, in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the people. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this Bank, are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens; and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency."

In this there is no committal on the constitutional power of Congress to create a Bank. The Executive does not even express his conviction, that the law creating the present Bank is unconstitutional or inexpedient; but he intimates the doubts of others, and his own reserve upon the subject. The paragraph assumes the character of precaution, for the interests of the parties, while it threatens the Bank with possible danger.

The message of 1830 is more explicit of the views of the administration. "Nothing has occurred," says the President, "to lessen, in any degree, the danger which many of our citizens apprehended from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit of improvement and compromise which distinguishes our country and our institutions, it becomes us to inquire, whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present Bank, through the agency

of a Bank of the United States; so modified in its principles and structure, as to obviate constitutional and other objections." Still, not a doubt is expressed of the constitutional power of Congress. But the existing Bank is distinctly apprized of the design of the administration to prostrate it, and to establish another, modified on principles which would obviate the objections of the President to it. Though the non-committal hand of Mr. Van Buren be visible here, there is a clear admission of the right of the Government of the United States to incorporate a Bank, with an expression of a disposition to make one, suitable to the views of those now directing the affairs of the nation.

The subject is very briefly treated in the message of December, 1831, thus: "Entertaining the opinions, heretofore, expressed, in relation to the Bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty, in my former messages, frankly, to disclose them." To disclose what? That, the constitutionality and expediency of the law creating the Bank, was doubted, (not by the administration, but) by a large portion of our fellow citizens that many of our citizens apprehended danger from that institution, as at present organized. There is evidently a door kept open for retreat, and, had the Bank proven itself sufficiently docile and obedient, a very inconsiderable change in the provisions of its charter might have made it, the present Bank, constitutional and expedient; and the many citizens, who were conjured up to doubt or apprehend, would have been annihilated with the same magic wand that had called them into being.

394. The administration foresaw, and events soon made it evident to all, that, the nation was not prepared for the extinction of the Bank, when the design against it was first conceived. The first attack was repelled at every point. The Committees of both Houses of Congress reported in favour of the existing Bank. The Committee of Ways and Means, distinctly put, and ably maintained, the following propositions: 1. That, Congress had the constitutional power to incorporate a Bank, such as that of the United States: 2. That it is expedient to establish and maintain such an institution; and 3. That it is inexpedient to establish a national Bank, founded on the credit and revenues of the Government.

Thus rebuked and instructed, a decent respect for the Legislature required, that the President should have left the subject to them and the people, until he was called to act upon it, officially. But this course did not quadrate with the

views of the party-of Mr. Van Buren. The nation, if suffered to discuss it, solely, as a question of public policy, would, it was feared, recognize and pursue its true interests; and, in due season, recharter the Bank, and mar forever the design of the administration to engross and wield the money power of the country. An appeal was, therefore, made from the councils of the nation to the Jackson party, who were termed the people. It was with this view, and certainly with no hope of legislative action, that the President, in December, 1830, brought the Bank question again before the same Congress; and with the same view it was again agitated before a new Congress, in 1831.

395. At this session, the Bank, which for three years had been invited to a discussion of its claims, applied to Congress for the renewal of its charter. And, strange to relate, this application is charged by the President, in his cabinet communication of 18th September, 1833, as having been designed to make it a leading question in the election of a President of the United States. Was it the design of the President, in calling, so repeatedly, the attention of the Congress to the subject of the charter, to make it a political question? Surely, then, the Bank might seek the arena, in which the question must be debated. Was it to obtain a decision of Congress against the charter, six years before it would expire! If so, there was no impropriety in the Bank submitting the question, in a form that could not be evaded, only four years before the expiration of the charter. The reasons which could render it proper and expedient for the President, on the part of the nation, to obtain an early decision, upon this momentous subject, were equally operative upon the Bank when acting for itself and the country.

396. Charges had been made against the propriety of the conduct of the Bank, into which, the moment, when it asked for a renewal of the charter, was the proper one for inquiry. A committee of investigation was appointed by the House of Representatives; and the effect of their reports, after the fullest examination, was the passage of a bill, from the Senate, rechartering the Bank, by a vote of 107 to 85. Thus, the test which the President affected to seek, the public opinion towards the Bank, was applied, and the institution was fully approved, by the only tribunal of the country competent to judge it. Had the vote upon the Bank bill been taken, solely, upon its merits, unprejudiced by party, it is notorious, that there would have been a majority of two-thirds, in each House, in favour of the bill.

397. But the hostility of the President to an institution which had refused to become the tool of his party, grew inappeasable, as its submission became hopeless. The veto power was again invoked, and used, not upon constitutional grounds, but upon those of expediency; upon which the sense of the President was again opposed, triumphantly, to the congregated wisdom of the nation. In his extraordinary message of 1832, he declared:

"A Bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient for the Government and useful for the people. · Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief, that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing Bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the attention of Congress to the prac ticability of organizing an institution, combining all its advantages and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret, that, in the act before me, I can perceive, none of those modifications of the Bank charter, which are necessary, in my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound poli cy, or with the Constitution of the country." ** "That a Bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be required by the Government, might be so organized, as not to infringe on our own delegated powers or the reserved rights of the States, I do not entertain a doubt. Had the Executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed."

398. In another portion of this extraordinary production, which, though compiled by many hands, bears the impress of the imperiousness of the President's disposition, we behold, a new assumption on the part of the Executive. "The Bank," it says, "is professedly established, as an agent of the Executive branches of the Government, and its constitutionality is maintained on that ground. Neither upon the propriety of present action, nor upon the provisions of this act, was the Executive consulted. It has had no opportunity to say, that it neither needs, nor wants, an agent clothed with such pow. ers and favoured by such exemptions. There is nothing in its legitimate functions which makes it necessary or proper. Whatever interest or influence, whether public or private, has given birth to this act, it cannot be found either in the wishes or necessities of the Executive Department, by which