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of defence was changed; and though prior to the first of Oc tober, no intimation was given of an intention to endeavour the introduction of a metallic currency, we were then told, that the Government was making an experiment whether it could not substitute for one of the best currencies in the world, a currency of coin, as in France. And in this experiment, the ease, the happiness, the bread of millions were jeoparded. This object, however, is no sooner declared, than with the inconsistency inseparable from error and wrong, its impracti cability, is demonstrated by the Secretary, himself. “No commercial or manufacturing community," he observes, “could conduct its business to any advantage without a liberal system of credit, and a facility of obtaining money on loan, when the exigencies of their business require it. This cannot be obtained without the aid of a paper circulation founded on credit. It is, therefore, not the interest of the country to put down the paper currency altogether!!"

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We have seen, that for all the purposes of commercial exchanges, that, Bank notes and Bank credits furnish a more convenient and more desirable medium than specie. Whilst this medium is kept within a proper limit it must always exclude, as the cheaper, a metallic currency, which cannot be maintained but at great cost. And if there be an over issue of paper, the specie medium will inevitably be expelled the country, or buried in coffers or hidden vaults. So that, in either case, the establishment of a specie currency is hopeless.

CHAPTER XVIII.

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- WAR ON THE BANK CONTINUED ALLEGED OFFENCES

OF THE BANK.

427. The facts urged by the Secretary, which he, emphatically, styled his reasons, were: 1. That, the charter of the Bank would expire, by the existing law, in 1836: 2. That, the Bank had unwarrantably reduced its discounts and had thereby caused a great depression of commerce: 3. That, the Bank had been mismanaged: 4. That, though a fiscal agent of the Government it had sacrificed the interest of its principal to its own: 5. That it had sought to attain political power and, thereby, to assure the renewal of its charter.

428. I. The Secretary could not, with propriety, assume, that, the Bank would not be rechartered. A large majority of Congress, but one year preceding this declaration, had passed a bill renewing the charter; and a much larger majority had, but a few months before, expressed their fullest confidence in the Bank. And there had been, since, no opportunity to obtain the sense of the representatives of the people upon the subject. It could not be rechartered, he said, because it had enjoyed an exclusive privilege, at the expense of the community, for twenty years; because the charter was unconstitutional; and because public opinion had decided against it.

The privileges of the charter were not more exclusive than are those of every corporation, every social circle, church or eleemosynary institution. All who are qualified may participate in the advantages of these institutions. Upon granting the charter, the stock was accessible to all, and long solicited purchasers in vain. The first operations of the Bank were productive of heavy losses, and when it shall have closed its business, it will not have divided, six per cent. annually, upon its capital. Its stock has been, continually, changing hands, at advanced prices, and the present stockholders, if rechartered, would not gain so much as would the stockholders of a new Bank, who shall subscribe at par; their only claim for preference is, that they can, with experience and established relations, efficiently, promote their own and the

public weal. The question, however, was one with which the Secretary had nothing to do; it was purely of legislative jurisdiction.

On the constitutionality of the charter, we have already said all that is necessary. But this, too, was not a question for an executive officer; it was, also, purely, legislative.

429. But public opinion, said the Secretary, had pronounced against the Bank. We have here put before us, in the strongest light, the danger of the power claimed by the President, as derived directly and unconstitutionally from the people; which, impalpable and irresponsible as it is, is made the efficient cause for seizing upon the public treasure, abstracting it from the lawful depositary, and placing its custody wholly at the discretion of the Executive. A power over the Bank, with every mode of use, is distinctly derived by the President from this source. In his cabinet message, of the 18th September, he says, speaking of his unalterable opposition to the Bank:

"On that ground, the case was argued to the people. And now that the people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the influence and power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late, he confidently thinks, to say, that the question has not been decided. Whatever may be the opinion of others, the President considers his re-election as a decision of the people against the Bank."

Admitting for an instant, that a public officer has a right to recur to such a source for power, we deny the facts from which it is drawn. The sense of the people in relation to the Bank, was not involved in the presidential election.

We have, elsewhere, shown, that the President, prior to his cabinet communication, had, at no time, met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency-that the veto was not equivocal, inasmuch as it declared, that the Bank of the United States was convenient for the Government, and usefulfor the people; that the President was impressed with the belief, not that a Bank of the United States was unconstitutional and inexpedient, but that some of the powers and privileges of the EXISTING Bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, "and that, had the Executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed."

"But what part of the charter, or any law of Congress, authorizes the Secretary to communicate such a reason to the

House? Where is his warrant for instructing Congress as to the decision of the people.upon a matter of future legislation? By what channel does the Secretary or President maintain an intercourse with the people, that is not open to their representatives? How do they know any thing of the wishes of the people, which the representatives of the people do not better know themselves? The communication of such a reason to the representatives of freemen, who are themselves freemen, is without a precedent in the history of this or any other representative Government. The alleged fact is, moreover, an assumption, and a mere assumption, without proof, and without the means of proof. It is a political inference, which the people of this country will never sustain, until they are prepared to say that the election of a President is not the result of a preference founded upon his general qualifications, opinions and actions, but is an adoption and ratification of his single will, to any extent that he has at any time declared it, and even when he may have declared it in contrary directions, at different times.”

Against this inference of President and Secretary, the representatives in both Houses of Congress, and of all parties, energetically, protested. Messrs. Clay, Southard, Wilkins and others of the Senate, Messrs. Moore, Wise, Allen, Chilton, Adams and others of the House, declared, that, thousands of voters threw their weight on the side of the successful candidate, who would vote for a National Bank to-morrow.

430. II. The Secretary charges upon the Bank, unwarrantable reduction of its discounts, and consequent oppression of commerce. The specification is, that between 1st December, 1832, and 2d August, 1833, the Bank increased its discounts more than two and a half millions of dollars; and, so far from preparing to wind up its affairs, although the election of the President had sealed its death-warrant, strove to compel the country to submit to the renewal of the charter, under the penalty of a currency suddenly deranged: that, on the appointment of an agent to seek depositaries, and when the demands upon the traders, by Government, were unusually large, by reason of the conjunction of the payments of the bond and cash duties, the Bank, changed its course; and between the 2d of August and the 2d of October, curtailed its discounts four millions, whilst the public deposits were increased two and half millions; that this reduction compelled the State Banks also to curtail, and produced complaints of pressure from every quarter; so that, if the public monies had

continued to be deposited in the Bank of the United States for two months longer, and the same system had been followed, a wide spread scene of bankruptcy and ruin must have ensued; that these causes left no alternative to the Secretary of the Treasury, but to remove the deposits, when, under other circumstances, he would have been disposed to direct the removal to take effect at a distant day, so as to give Congress an opportunity of prescribing, in the mean time, the places of deposit, and regulating the securities proper to be taken.,

Now, these allegations are, one and all, untrué, either in motive or in fact.

The Bank did not, between the 2d of August and the 20 of October, voluntarily contract its discounts a single dollar. To protect itself against executive hostility, demonstrated during the summer of 1833, it resolved, on the 13th August, that the amount of bills discounted, should not be increased; that bills of exchange purchased, except at the western offices, should not have more than ninety days to run; that at the western offices no bills except those payable in the Atlantic cities, having no more than ninety days to run, or re-ceivable in payment for existing debts, and having no more than four months to run, should be purchased. Subsequently other protective measures were adopted; and the Bank sums up its operations, at this period, in the following manner 1st. That the Bank never directed any curtail

ment of its loans until the actual removal of the deposits.

2d. That the only actual reduction of loans took place from the 1st of October to the 1st of De

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5,887,864 63

cember, when the loans were diminished, $5,641,098 26 While, at the same time, the public and private deposits were reduced, 3d. That from the 1st of December, 1833, to the 1st of April, 1834, the loans were not reduced, but, on the contrary, actually increased, and were greater on the 1st of April, 1834, than on the 1st of October, 1833, by While, during that same period, the public deposits had decreased no less than

4th. That the total reduction of loans from the 1st of October to the 1st of April, was While the public deposits had

been reduced

353,712 95

2,239,393 89

5,057,527 22

$6,935,568 84

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