which he offers to this divinity. Like the Pagan priests generally, he is ever ready to obey the idol, having first supplied the sentiments of the oracle. "I know of no tribunal," he says, "to which a public man in this country, in a case of doubt and difficulty, can appeal with greater advantage or more, propriety, than the judgment of the people; and although I must necessarily in discharge of my official duties, be governed by the dictates of my own judgment, I have no desire to conceal my anxious wish, to conform, as far as I can, to the views of those for whom I act." Now this is very clear, though, perhaps, not very consistent. Here is profound respect for the public judgment, but more profound, for his own will. The people are to be king, but the President, is to be viceroy over them. But upon the relations between himself and the people, the President is still more explicit. He submits to the popular will when not opposed to the dictates of his own judgment, and successfully obviates every inconvenience which might result from a conflict of judgments, by assuming to interpret that of the people. For, he continues, “All irregular expressions of public opinion are, of necessity, attended with some doubt as to their accuracy; but making full allowances on that account, I cannot, I think, deceive myself, in believing that the acts referred to, (internal improvements) as well as the suggestions which I allowed myself to make in relation to their bearing upon the future operations of the Government, have been approved by the great body of the people."

149. This new source of presidential power merits to be dwelt upon, as well from the originality of the discovery, as the dangerous use to which it is applicable, and is applied. It is to an unprincipled politician, the most convenient engine which has ever been invented, for battering down the troublesome barriers of the Constitution. Observe the process. The President suggests, in studiously indefinite terms, his views on some measure of public policy. Those who do not understand those peculiar views, and who, understanding, would oppose them, cannot object to them, on account of the terms in which they are conveyed. The Government presses, of which there are several in every State, shed such light upon these suggestions as they are instructed, taking due care to praise them without stint. These echoes alone are heard by the President, and are taken as the voice of the people. The condemnation of the suggestions by those who may have dis covered their true tendency, are utterly disregarded. But in

the commendation of the venal presses, the President finds authority, that justifies him in prostrating, so far as in him lies, the measures which have received the most unequivocal sanction of the nation, expressed in the resolutions and acts of its representatives, in Congress assembled. The whole system is one of demagogical tyranny, and has no other object, than, that which is almost avowed, to render the will of the Executive paramount in the State.

150. But we demand, what were the abuses requiring reform and which brought the patronage of the Government into conflict with the freedom of elections? They were certainly not found in removals from office by Mr. Adams for political opinions or conduct. He made none. He filled the public offices, not with those who claimed to have purchased them, by the expenditure of time and money; but with those, who had capacity and integrity fitting them for the service. What causes, we demand, could or did disturb the rightful course of appointment? That course had been such only as the Constitution prescribed. With the motives of change avowedrotation in office, reward of friends, and punishment of enemies, the pretension to public virtue is, at least, not modest.

151. The new duty of reform was instantly commenced, and zealously prosecuted. Between the 4th of March, 1829, when the President assumed office, and the 4th of March, 1830, he displaced, chiefs and subordinates, more than two thousand persons; nor was the destroying sword staid until the more considerate partisans, knowing that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church, cried, Hold, Enough! Ministers to foreign countries who had scarce reached their des tinations were recalled, and a large expenditure thereby unne cessarily incurred, on the ground that, with every change of the Executive, there should be a change of all officers, holding responsible relations with the Executive-a ground which had not been taken when party spirit was wildest, and which, if assumed hereafter, must, every four years, throw our foreign relations into confusion and impose a greivous burthen on the treasury. Collectors and other agents of the customs were removed, even to the tide-waiters, who depended upon their daily wages for their daily bread; and not only were their places filled by famished expectants but new places were created to satisfy partisan rapacity. The Post Office was prostituted. The virtuous and efficient head, under whose ininistration it had ceased to be a charge upon the treasury, refusing to become the pander of this reform, was translated,

reluctantly, to another station; and his place given to one, who made the department bankrupt, in corrupting the people, and who has, unreproved, nay, approved, by the President, openly and undeniably violated the Constitution, by borrowing money on the credit of the United States without authority. But of this more hereafter. We must not in this enumeration of the pure effects of reform, omit to state, that they reached even the Presidential electors. In Ohio five were appointed to office.

152. The reform was not confined to the mere removal of official incumbents. The tenure of office was changed. Prior to the election of the Reformer, office was holden during the will of the President, which, in practice, was during the faithful performance of its duties. But a new construction was given, and the pleasure of the President was made to mean, whilst the officer obeyed his will in all respects. If any sinecure had existed it was now made to cease, for every incumbent was required to be instant, in season and out of season, in highways and by-ways, to cry aloud and spare not, in service of the Reform. Some officers, they have been few, have in removal, suffered the penalty of neglect of this duty. Mr. Jefferson denounced and punished, as criminal, all interference by officers of the General Government in popular elections. General Jackson rewards as virtuous, the most flagrant exercise of official influence upon the elective franchise.

153. This abuse of the power of appointment and removal is direct bribery; the most glaring, as it is the most successful, in modern times. It is in effect, an alteration of the Constitution, prostrating the only barrier between the Executive power and the people. In no other mode, save by military power, can the Executive control the public will. But, with the hope of appointment and the dread of removal, he operates on the polls, in the choice of agents, not only of the General Government, but even of the municipal institutions of the States-carrying into effect the plan proposed in 1829, at Washington, to form a great national party, which should rule in the State Legislatures, as in Congress, with its headquarters at Washington, and with all the apparatus of presses and committees. This mode of corruption was not new. It had been, unhappily, long in use, in several of the States especially in New York and Pennsylvania, where the first Secretaries of State and the Treasury, appointed by General Jackson, had grown expert in employing it. But, the virtue

and wisdom of the Presidents of the United States had, hitherto, resisted its introduction at Washington.

154. It was now, however, resorted to, with the most careful consideration of the means to make it effective. The removal of existing incumbents might be deemed, only, a measure of vengeance, towards enemies and gratitude" towards friends, whilst thousands of serviceable spirits who had been animated to action by the hope of reward, would suffer their energies to subside in chagrin and despondency. It was, therefore, necessary, that the hope of office should be nourished, that the door of entrance should be kept open, notwithstanding most of the offices had been, momentarily, reformed. The President's Inaugural address spoke only of reform; but the Congressional Message of 1829, promised frequent change in office. By it the policy of the Executive on this head was developed, and the intention of applying this instrument of corruption, to the Legislature and the people, rendered palpable. The Message having recommended a change in the mode of electing the President and Vice President, adds:

155. "If, however, it should be adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying for office the representatives in Congress, on whom such an election may have devolved, would not be proper.

"While members of Congress can be constitutionally appointed to offices of trust and profit, it will be the practice, even under the most conscientious adherence to duty, to select them for such stations as they are believed to be better qualified to fill than other citizens; but the purity of our government would, doubtless, be promoted by their exclusion from all appointments in the gift of the President, in whose election they may have been officially concerned. The nature of the judicial office, and the necessity of securing in the cabinet and in diplomatic stations of the highest rank, the best talents and political experience, should, perhaps, except these from the exclusion.

"There are, perhaps, few men who can, for any length of time, enjoy office and power, without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavourable to a faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to themselves; but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public interests, and of tolerating conduct, from which unpractised men would revolt. Office

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is considered as a species of property; and government rather as a means of promoting individual interests, than as an instrument created solely for the service of the people,ruption in some, and in others, a perversion of correct feelings and principles, divert government from its legitimate ends, and make it an engine for the support of the few, at the expense of the many. The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple, that the intelligent may readily qualify them for their performance; and I cannot but believe, that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office, than is generally to be gained by their experience. I submit therefore, to your consideration, whether the efficiency of the government would not be promoted, and official industry and integrity better secured, by a general extension of the law, which limits appointments to four years.

"In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people, no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is therefore done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is matter of right. The incumbent became an officer with a view to public benefits; and when these require his removal, they are not to be sacrificed to private interests. It is the people, and they alone, who have a right to complain when a bad officer is substituted for a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office. The proposed limitation would destroy the idea of property now so generally connected with official station; and although individual distress may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give healthful action to the system."

156. Now this is broad enough to be readily understood by members of Congress elect, and to be elected, and by every office-seeker throughout the land. The first are told, that it will be the practice, even under the most conscientious adherence to duty, to select them for such stations, as they are believed better qualified to fill than other citizens. The nature of this better qualification is now understood to be implicit obedience to Presidential behests, which some of the officers selected from Congress, as Messrs. Branch, Berrien, Ingham and McLane, have not been able, perpetually, to maintain.