cavalry. The resistance opposed by the enemy was more determined than any opposition which the army under general Lake had experienced since the commencement of the campaign. His majesty's 76 regiment, on this memorable day, maintained the high reputation which it had acquired on many former occasions, but especially in every occurrence of this glorious campaign.

In

The victory, however, must be principally attributed to the admirable skill, judgment, heroic valor, and activity of the commander-in-chief, general Lake, whose magnanimous example, together with the recollection of his achievements at Coel, Ally-Ghur, Delhi, and Agra, inspired general confidence and emulation. the morning, general Lake led the charge of the cavalry, and in the afternoon conducted in person, at the head of the 76th -regiment, all the different attacks on the enemy's line, and on their reserve posted in and near the village of Mohaul poor. On this day, two horses were killed under the commander-in-chief. The shot showered around him in every direction in the midst of the danger and slaughter which surrounded him, he displayed not only the most resolute fortitude and ardent valor, but the utmost degree of professional ability and knowledge, availing himself with admirable promptitude of every advantage presented by the enemy, and frustrating every effort of their obstinacy and boldness. His masterly plans of attack during the action were carried into instantaneous execution by his unrivalled personal activity; and he appear ed with matchless courage and alacrity in front of every principal charge, which he had planned with eminent judgment and ekill.

The staff of the army distinguished themselves greatly, and merited the highest commendation. Among these, one of the most distinguished was major G. A. F. Lake, of his majesty's 94th regiment, son to the commander-in-chief, who had attended his father in the capacity of aidde-camp and military secretary, throughout the whole campaign, and whose gallantry

and activity in executing his father's orders, had been conspicuous in every service of difficulty and danger.

This promising young officer constantly attended his father's person, and possessed the highest place in his confidence and esteem. In the heat of the action, the commander-in-chief's horse, pierced by several shots, fell dead under him. Major Lake, who was on horseback close to his father, dismounted, and offered his horse to the commander-in-chief. This compliment was at first refused, but major Lake's earnest solicitations prevailed. The commander-in-chief mounted his his son's horse, and major Lake mounted a horse from one of the troops of cavalry in a moment a shot struck major Lake, and wounded him severely, in the presence of his affectionate father. At this instant the commander-in-chief found it necessary to lead the troops against the enemy, and to leave his wounded son upon the field. A more affecting scene never was presented to the imagination, nor has Providence ever exposed human fortitude to a more severe trial. General Lake, in this dreadful and distracting moment, prosecuted his victory with unabated ardor. the close of the battle, the commanderin-chief had the satisfaction to learn that his son's wound, although extremely se vere, was not likely to prove dangerous.

At

From the 8th of August, the day on which hostilities commenced, till the 1st of November, the British army conquered all the possessions of Scindiah in Guzerat, the city of Boorhanpoor in Candeish, the province of Cuttack in Orissa, the Mahratta dominions between the Jumna and the Ganges, the city of Delhi, and the right bank of the Jumna, the city of Agra and the adjoining territory; reduced by storm the fortified town of Ahmednuggur, the forts of Ally-Ghur, Baroach, and Cuttack; and by capitulation, after having opened batteries, the forts of Ahmednugger, of Powanghur and Champoneer, the fort of Assurghur, denominated the key of the Dekan, and the fort of Agra, denominated the key of Hindostan; and do feated the enemy in three general engage

ments at Delhi on the 11th of September, at Assye on the 23rd of September, and at Laswaree on the 1st of November; having taken according to the official returns, on the field of battle in those engagements and under the walls of Agra, 268 pieces of ordnance, 5000 stand of arms, 215 tumbrils, and 51 stand of colours, with a large quantity of stores, baggage, campequipage, and ammunition. The amount of the returns actually received of ordnance found in the several forts, exclusive of that taken on the field of battle, is 445 pieces of ordnance, exclusive of tumbrils, stores, &c. making the total number of ordnance, of which returns have been received, captured from the 8th of August to the 1st of November, 713.

The progress and result of these suc cessful operations restored his highness the peishwah to his sovereign authority at Poonah, and cemented our alliance with that prince, secured the succession of the legitimate heir of the sovereign prince of the Dekan to the government of his deceased father, the late nizam; protected the British interest at Hyderabad from injury:

confirmed the stability of the treaties by which the French were expelled from the Dekan in 1798; and delivered the aged, venerable, and unfortunate emperor of Hindostan from misery and ignominy, from indigence and bondage, and from the hands of the French.

The achievements of general Lake and major-general Wellesley, combined with the admirable and exemplary conduct of the officers and troops during this campaign, more particularly in the signal and splendid victories of Delhi, of Assye, and of Laswaree, inspired a general sentiment of just confidence in the vigor of our military resources, and in the stability of our domi nion and power. Our uniform success in frustrating every advantage of superior numbers, of powerful artillery, and even of obstinate resistance opposed by the enemy, constituted a satisfactory proof of the established superiority of British discipline, skill and valor; and demonstrated that the glorious progress of our arms, was not the accidental result of a temporary or transient advantage, but the natural and certain effect of a permanent cause.

N. the month of January, 1804, consider able agitation was excited by the re currence of those symptoms which always preceded and accompanied his majesty's peculiar and lamentable malady. A day of prayer for his recovery was appointed, and the people at large testified the most lively interest in the affliction of their sovereign. But the national anxiety was soon relieved by a declaration of Mr. Addington, that no suspension of the exercise of the royal authority was necessary, and the discontinuance of the bulletins restored the public mind to its usual tranquillity. It is strongly sustected however, that during the temporary in disposition of the king, his name was affixed to many important documents, and his authority adduced in matters of which it was impossible that he should take the slightest cognizance.

Having proceeded to extremities, the British government lost no time in sending reinforcements to the West Indies, the troops in Malta being already sufficiently; numerous for the protection of the island. The defensive force of the country wascalled forth in the regular and supple imentary militia, and in the organization of: a system of volunteering which testified.

.

1803.

oy its success, the enthusiam and loyalty of the people. Expeditions were des patched to reduce the islands of St. Lucia and Tobago, and preparations were made for attacking the other possessions of France in different quarters. France on the other hand was not inactive. A few days after the date of the king's message, admiral Linois sailed from Brest for the East Indies, and the army of Italy, strongly reinforced, pushed on to Tarentum, and threatened to occupy all the strong posts in the kingdom of Naples bordering on the Adriatic. On the 18th of May, before the English declaration of war, general Mortier summoned the Hanoverian electorate, to surrender to his army. The professions and the menaces of the French general were opposed by the exertions and proclamations of the duke of Cambridge, but with no decisive effect, and the troops of the electorate were obliged to capitulate, and enter into an engagement not fo serve against France or her allies till regularly exchanged. The intelligence from Egypt was peculiarly gratifying to the French, as it imported that Alexaudria had been evacuated by the English on the 17th of March, though Elfi Bey had embarked as

ambassador extraordinary from the beys in Egypt to. the court of London. The consul in the mean time appeared to have lost the usual reserve and circumspection of his character. His ebullitions of caprice, and his bursts of passion were equally inconsistent with the dignity of his station, and with the dietates of rational policy. His demeanor towards the English ambassador at once betrayed the nature of his views and the bitterness of his enmity to England, and the letter of lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, exhibits a singular picture of his manners and con

versation.

Paris, Feb. 21st, 1803.

My lord, My last despatch, in which I gave your lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, was scarcely gone, when I received a note from him, 'nforming ine that the first consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at the Thuilleries, at nine o'clock. He received me in his cabinet, with tolerable cordiality; and, after taiking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did, on the other side of the table, and began. He told me that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should, in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to me, in order to their being communicated to his majesty; and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself, than through any medium whatever. He said, that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him, that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was now avowed in such a manner, as must bring the point to an issue.

"He now enumerated the several proVocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line, our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria, as we were bound to do

by the treaty. In this, he said, that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and, of the two, he had rather see us in possession of the Fauxbourg, St. Antoine, than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public prints; but this, he said, he did not so much regard, as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered, as much more mischievous, since it was meant to excite this country against him, and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges, and others of his description, who, instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this, he told me that two men had, within these few days, bcen apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the bishop of Arras, by the baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil, as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world.

"He acknowledged that the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind (I make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions,) which blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him.

"He now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending 25,000 men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country, in defiance of the 4000 British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence for invading it. This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it a colony, because he did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might, perhaps, be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain,

since, sooner or later, Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement

with the Porte.

"As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that, after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea. He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him, but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprise.

"He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France, with an army of 480,000; for to this amount it is, he said, to be immediately completed, all ready for the most desperate enter prizes and England, with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. Two such countries, by a proper understanding, might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said, that, if he had not felt the enmity of the British government, on every occasion, since the treaty of Amiens, there. would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities, as well as in influence, on the continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that could have given satisfation, and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British government, and, therefore, it was now come to the point whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the

abuse in the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies, (alluding to Georges, and persons of that description,) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary only to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. He now made the tour of Europe, to prove to me that in its present state, there was no power with which we could coalesce, for the purpose of making war against France; consequently it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain, renew the war when circumstances were more favourable. He said it was not doing him justice, to suppose that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him, by any violent act of aggression, neither was he so powerful in France, as to persuade the nation to go to war, unless on good grounds. He said that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers, but he hoped that England, Russia, and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land, than by plunder.

In the little I said to him, (for he gave ne in the course of two hours, but very few opportunities of saying a word.) I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your lordships instructions. I urged them in the same manner as I had done to M. de Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as 1 could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the views of France. towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilence and jealousy. He maintained that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace was, on the one hand, the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other, the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt, with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St Domingo, and that with the approbation of Europe, and more particularly of the