Portugal from 1807 to 1809, which began in a clandestine correspondence carried on by the Prince of Asturias with Napoleon, then emperor of the French, on the subject of a projected marriage between the former and a princess of the Bonaparte family; as well as in a treaty between France and Spain, the object of which was to overthrow the principle of the treaty of Utrecht. Spanish patriotism aided British valour, and a treaty of alliance was formed between the governments of the two countries.

Look at the history of the Spanish war of independence, in which Wellington gained such deathless renown, and Soult and Bonaparte sustained such signal defeat. For what did Great Britain expend her treasures and her blood, but to uphold the principle of the Utrecht treaty and the succession to the Spanish crown, which was its natural sequitur?

And, finally, look at the invasion of Spain by France in 1823; at the just jealousy and protests of the British government; and at the assurances of France, that the perfect independence of Spain should be maintained when once the reigning monarch should be free in all his acts.

What, we ask with confidence, has been demonstrated by every line-every word, of this rapid résumé of Spanish connexion with France, from 1713 to 1823, but this immense fact,-that Great Britain has invariably insisted on Spanish independence on the principles of the treaty of Utrecht, and on that policy which should always prevent French councils from triumphing in Spain?

We have conducted this résumé with impartiality, and we have assembled the facts of the last 120 years. And now, we ask, Why was this policy changed? why was it not persevered in? why has the Spanish government been intrusted, with the approbation of the English government, to a weak and ambitious usurpress, who is under the influence and direction of the French revolutionary government; and who is set up by the English government in opposition to the legal and constitutional heir to the throne of Spain, whose succession would have been in direct accordance with the treaty of Utrecht, the law of succession then established, and with all the policy

and French influence, from 1700 downwards? We can give no other reply to this question than the statement with which we set out, viz. that the conduct of the Whigs has been, 1st, ignorant; 2d, anti-British; and, 3d, opposed to to the policy of this country in all times and under all administrations.

The treaty of Quadruple Alliance, which was organised by Prince Talleyrand and Martinez de la Rosa, was not a treaty advantageous to Great Britain in any one point of view; nor was it in harmony with the treaty of Utrecht, or with the policy of Great Britain from 1700 to 1830. What advantage did it confer on Great Britain? Has the expulsion of Don Miguel from Portugal been favourable to British commerce or British alliances? Quite the reverse. Has the British flag been more respected? have British merchants been more protected? and has British influence been more extensive in Portugal since Donna Maria was raised to the throne of her uncle? Precisely the contrary. Did the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain lead to the termination of the Spanish war? No. On the 9th July, 1834, that prince returned to the Basque provinces, and found some thousands of Navarrese, Alavese, Biscayans, and Guipuzcoans, grouped around the immortal Zumalacarregui. But now, even now, at the moment we are writing, though Whig bribes and Whig gold have succeeded in hatching the darkest treason in the camp of Don Carlos, he has still some 20,000 men who remain faithful to his cause and to the principle of the treaty of Utrecht. Has Great Britain gained any advantage by the reiterated defeat of the British legion in Guipuzcoa and Biscay? Has it been of any advantage to England that General Evans was obliged to retreat; and that British volunteers afterwards applied at the Mansion House of London for means of subsistence, as the government of the profligate and voluptuous Christina would not, if it could, pay one farthing of what it owed to them for their valiant though unsuccessful services? Has England gained any thing, either of reputation, respect, increase of possession, extended commerce, fair fame, or desirable alliance, by her expenditure for five years, off the coast of Biscay, in her blockading squadron? Has England gained any advantage by the

gratuitously, of arms and ammunition to the cause of the Infanta Isabella? Was Spain, on the death of Ferdinand VII., so powerful, so formidable, so important, as to render it of the greatest importance to Great Britain that the government of Madrid should spread over her her benign and protecting shield? Was it of such vast importance to Great Britain to stand well with Spain, that the former was bound to make all sorts of sacrifices, even of the principle of the Utrecht treaty, and of the policy of 120 years, in order to secure her favour and alliance? Was Great Britain reduced to such a state of weakness and exhaustion, that she could not defend her right and policy in Portugal without the aid of ruined and wretched Spain? Though the Spanish nation was for Don Carlos, and only the elite were for Christina, was it of such immense importance to Great Britain that the cause of the queen should succeed, that, rather than it should not do so, it became even necessary to quarrel with that very nation whose independence we had so often defended, and cause a permanent misunderstanding between Great Britain and the people of Spain? Or, finally, was there such a league against British security, the integrity of the British dominions, and the natural allies of England, on the part of the northern, or southern, or central powers of Europe, that a Quadruple Alliance was the only means by which the invasion of England and the peace of Europe could be assured? And was the alliance of France with Great Britain of that immense worth, that, to secure such a result, all British interests in the Peninsula, and all the British policy of 120 years, ought to be sacrificed without hesitation or delay ? Was France, when the Quadruple Alliance was formed, so united at home, and so powerful abroad, that, to be allied with her was security to the weakest, and an honour and glory to the most powerful states in the world? We need not reply to these inquiries : it is only necessary to make them: they answer themselves.-No. Great Britain has lost in her alliances, reputation, commerce, fame, and naval and military influence and renown, by the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance; and

Europe, by attacking the principle of the Utrecht treaty, and of the policy pursued by this country for 120 years.

If we examined the history of the war from 1833 downwards, between the two contending powers in Spain, we would discover but one fact to rejoice our hearts, or to console us for our defeat and disgrace. The humane treaty of Lord Eliot for the prevention of Spanish prisoners from being shot, whilst prisoners, by their opponents, is the solitary exception, and this treaty is due to British Conservatives. The history of the war is most afflicting. On the one side, we have seen ranged national courage, conscientious conviction, love of country, and aversion to revolution and change. On the other side, we have seen an ambitious foreigner, an unprincipled usurpress, foreign influence, French arms, intrigue, democracy, revolt, and crime. And Great Britain, for the first time in her history, has been compelled, by the ignorant and unprincipled Whigs, to side with the latter.

Before we terminate this article, by glancing at the negotiations conducted by order of the Whig government for putting an end to the Spanish war, we must say a few words as to the Spanish combatants. Every one acquainted with the Spaniards is aware that he is, above and before all things, a Navarrese, a Catalonian, an Arragonian, a Castilian, an Andalusian, &c.; that he resolutely refuses every usage which is not hereditary; that he will not accept from any strange hand any change which is attempted to be introduced; that he will join at once all who shall raise a standard to oppose an attempt to submit his decision to force; and that Spain is almost the only country in which the words "God and the King" have lost none of their magical influence. The combatants in the northern provinces fought, and still fight, "for their king and their fueros.” Their king, without their fueros, or provincial privileges, would be valueless; their fueros, without their king, would be insecure.

The foregoing observations conduct us to the last topic of our article, the negotiations of the Whigs with Maroto, and his subsequent treason.

There were three plans which might
Whigs

the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance. The second was to convoke a congress, either at London or Paris, in order to settle, by diplomacy, the whole Spanish question. The third was to effect an arrangement.

The two first of these plans were decidedly to be preferred, but the third might have been adopted with justice and advantage.

Faithful, however, to all their antecedents, the Whigs resolved to attempt to terminate the Spanish war, not by an honourable and just arrangement, but by treason; and the chances for the moment are in their favour.

They had tried their threats in vain: Don Carlos had refused to reply to them. They had tried their Foreign Legion in vain the Basques had defeated them. They had tried their blockading of the coast of Biscay in vain: supplies did reach the Carlist army in spite of Lord John Hay and his coast-cruisers. Instead of sending authorised agents to Don Carlos and to Madrid to treat, they ordered that attempts should be made to bribe Maroto; that pensions, fortune, honours, should all be offered him, and that promises should be made to the Basques of their fueros, if they would lay down their arms and desert the cause of the king. The revolt of Munagorie was first encouraged. Negotiations with the chiefs of the Basque juntas were carried on. Maroto was appealed to as the "deliverer," the "saviour," of his country; and he was asked to say, "if he fought for Don Carlos or for his fueros?" At first, he replied, for both. But when asked "if he could not obtain both for his country, which would he prefer?” he replied, "The fueros." This was the first point. The rest were soon gained. The bribe was offered-the sop was eaten, and Maroto sold his king for a fortune and ignominy.

to

There was a transaction to be accomplished, an arrangement to be made, which would have secured peace Spain, the fueros to the provinces, the conservation of the principle of the Utrecht treaty to Europe, and which would have given satisfaction to all but to revolutionary France, and her not less revolutionary allies the Whigs. What was this? It was the convocation of the Cortes par estamentos, and the proposal of the marriage of the eldest son of Don Carlos with the Infanta Isabella. Are we told that Don Carlos would have objected? We reply, his

objections might have been overcome. Are we told that the Cortes would have viewed with a jealous eye this arrangement? We reply, the Cortes par estamentos, duly convened, would have assented.

Since the preceding observations were written, the treason has been fully consummated. Deserted by Maroto, the popular leader of the Biscayans and Guipuzcoans, Don Carlos was left to the Alavese and Navarrese battalions. For a moment they appeared disposed to rally, and at last to defend their positions in the fastnesses of Navarre. But treason is contagious. Besides this, the Christinos troops, flushed with victory, advanced to the combat. Union existed no longer among the Carlist forces. Don Carlos was without a regular and an organised army. Ile was still unwilling to surrender; and has, to the last, insisted that his title of Infante of Spain be restored to him, and that in the event of his nieces dying without issue, the crown shall revert to his descendants. He is now a French prisoner at Bourges, where Louis XI., the Nero of France, was born four centuries ago; and where Bourdaloue, the celebrated preacher, just two centuries since, was astounding France by his eloquence and piety. It was here, also, that Louis XII., in early life, was three years a prisoner in the castle, for rebellion against Charles VIII., and was confined during the night in an iron cage, from which he was released by the solicitations of his wife, the Princess Jane, sister of Charles VIII.

"Train'd in adversity's instructive school, With justice and with mercy learn'd to rule."

France is now dictating to Spain, and prescribing the form of government, as well as the dynasty which, in her opinion, are best suited to the Peninsula. The rightful heir to the throne "of Spain and the Indies" is a French prisoner in the department of Cher. The French Revolution of 1830 is satisfied; but the treaty of Utrecht is set at naught; the old British policy of the wisest and noblest statesmen of centuries is overthrown; monarchical principles are subverted in Spain by democratical successes; and that country, like Belgium, is subject to the Orleans dynasty.

"Spain requires and will have a national government." We admit it;