Accounts for Expenditures by the Post-Office Department. The language of the statute limits his duties "to all accounts arising in the Post-Office Department, or relative thereto." Their enumeration in found in sections 277, 292, 293, 294, 295, and 296, Revised Statutes, and section 4, pages 154 and 224, of the Supplement to the Revised Statutes. The fact that these duties are thus enumerated implies an exclusive enumeration, and the implication is fortified by the reference to "other financial concerns of the Department" that may be his duties also. The duties enumerated are his official duties absolutely; the "other" duties are not his official duties absolutely. The meaning of the phrase," accounts arising in the PostOffice Department, or relative thereto," is significant, considered apart from the context of the section. These accounts are of a fiduciary character, dependent upon the discretion of the Postmaster-General under authority of law, and generally refer to the postal service, and go direct to the Sixth Auditor. The accounts of the disbursing clerk under the legislative, judicial, and executive bill are not included among the "accounts arising in the Post-Office Department," as enume. rated, but are accounts arising directly under the appropri ation bill mentioned, are of a determinate character, where the discretion of the Postmaster-General is not the controlling authority, except in certain contingent expenses common to all disbursing clerks of the executive departments. These accounts go to such accounting officers in the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct. Very respectfully, The POSTMASTER GENERAL. A. H. GARLAND. Brig General Armstrong. BRIG GENERAL ARMSTRONG. Consideration of a claim presented by Mr. S. C. Reid, jr., on account of alleged advances made by him as agent and attorney for claimants, in the prosecution of the claim of the owners, officers, and crew of the brig General Armstrong. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, June 9, 1887. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant, in which you request an opinion from me " on a question of law which has been raised before the Department (of State) in relation to the distribution of the fund in the case of the brig General Armstrong, under the act of Congress approved April 20, 1882." I understand that the question relates to the validity of a claim presented by Mr. S. C. Reid, jr., against the United States on account of certain advances made by him as agent and attorney for claimants in the prosecution of a claim of the "owners, captain, officers, and crew of the General Armstrong," but its precise scope I am not sure that I correctly apprehend. If, therefore, in the opinion that follows, I fail to pass upon the exact question you intended to bring to my attention, I hope you will make further and specific inquiry. The liability of the United States under the act of April 20, 1882, is measured by the losses which the "captain, owners, officers, and crew" of the General Armstrong sustained through the destruction of that brig. The liability is to such "owners, captain, officers, and crew," their legal representatives or assigns, and if any part of the fund now under your control is paid to Mr. Reed it must be paid to him for and on account of those to whom it has been adjudged. In order to warrant such payment to him his authority to receive their money must be established. The authority claimed by virtue of the documents forwarded as exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, with your communication, has been negatived in a well-considered opinion of my predecessor, Mr. Brewster, which has been acted on by the the Department of State, and in which I concur. His claim upon the fund by reason of services rendered in the capacity Brig General Armstrong. of agent or attorney for the "owners, captain, officers, and crew" in creating it were considered, adjudicated, and liquidated by your precedessor, Mr. Frelinghuysen. The amount of money expended by the agent in the service of his principals was as much an element to be considered in fixing his compensation as the time and skill given to their cause. It is therefore probable that the compensation allowed Mr. Reid was intended to cover money expended, as well as personal service rendered. If this is untrue in fact, and if a proper showing for reopening the question could have been made at the proper time, the decision of your predecessor might have been reviewed. Upon such review, if the authority of the Secretary of State to adjudicate the rights of the agent of the "owners, captain, officers, and crew" against them and their funds in his hands, as held by Mr. Frelinghuysen, was maintained, the question of the amount to which Mr. Reid was entitled by virtue of his service rendered and money expended in their behalf might have been considered and determined de novo. In reaching such determination the stipulations in the so-called assignment to Captain Reid, as to the amount of his compensation, would be persuasive only as to the rights of Mr. Reid, jr., if proper for consideration at all, since it has been determined that Captain Reid could not assign his rights and powers under that instrument, and therefore that Mr. Reid, jr., is not Captain Reid's successor thereunder, but a stranger to its provisions. Now, however, it appears that four-fifths of the fund has been distributed to those entitled thereto, and you have no further control over it. Control of the fund was the only possible ground for any adjudication by the Secretary of State of Mr. Reid's right in it, and jurisdiction over the right was lost by the distribution of the fund. Mr. Reid's suggestion that his present claim, which existed, if at all, as a charge against the whole fund, be charged upon the small balance still in your hands awaiting the call of its owner or owners, could not for obvious reasons be seriously entertained, much less adopted. If any good ground exists for reopening Mr. Frelinghuy274-VOL XIX——3 Improvement of Great Kanawha River. sen's adjudication of this question, and I express no opinion upon the subject, a claim by Mr. Reid, jr., for a pro rata pay. ment out of the balance in your hands or any increase in the allowance to him might be considered. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF STATE. A. H. GARLAND. IMPROVEMENT OF GREAT KANAWHA RIVER. Advised that the provision in the act of August 5, 1886, chapter 929, namely: "Improving Great Kanawha River, West Virginia. Continuing improvement, one hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred dollars," does not, by implication, authorize the purchase of land for said improvement. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, June 10, 1887. SIR: Your letter to me of the 20th of April last states that the land originally needed for the site of lock and dam No. 2, Great Kanawha River, West Virginia, was acquired by deed and by condemnation under the provisions of the river and harbor act of March 3, 1881, chapter 136; that it is proposed to purchase additional land now found to be necessary for the same site, and pay for it out of the appropriation made by the river and harbor act of August 5, 1886, chapter 929; and requests that if such proposed purchase can be legally made under the provisions of the last mentioned act, the United States attorney for the district of West Virginia be instructed to prepare an abstract of the title to the premises, etc. I have the honor to advise you that upon examination of the act of August 5, 1886, I entertain grave doubt whether the proposed purchase is authorized thereby. The only provision made by it for the Great Kanawha appears to be this: "Improving Great Kanawha River, West Virginia; continuing improvement, one hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred dollars." And unless authority to purchase land needed for the improvement is here necessarily implied such authority does not exist. I find that similar provisions have been regarded by Congress as containing no implication of authority to make pur Klamath Indians. chases of that character. Thus in the river and harbor act of 1881 above cited, in which many provisions of that kind appear, it was thought necessary to provide in express terms that "such parts of the money appropriated by this act for any particular improvement requiring locks and dams as may be necessary in the prosecution of such improvement may be expended in the purchase, voluntary or by condemnation, as the case may be, of necessary sites," etc. So in the river and harbor act of July 5, 1884, chapter 229, it is expressly provided" that out of the money herein appropriated for the Kentucky River the sum of two thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, may be expended for the purchase of land for the construction of lock and dam at Beattyville, and so much thereof as may be necessary may also be expended for the same purpose at lock number six.” These provisions of the acts of 1881 and 1884 indicate that legislation such as that of the act of 1886 quoted above is not meant by Congress to include the purchase of land, and that for this something more explicit is required. The foregoing considerations seeming to me to render unnecessary at this time any investigation of title to the property which it is proposed to purchase, I have not sent any instructions to the United States attorney in reference thereto. I am, sir, very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. A. H. GARLAND. KLAMATH INDIANS. The Klamath River, where it flows through the Klamath Indian Reservation, is a navigable stream, in which the Indians occupying that reservation do not have an exclusive right to fish, but only a right in common with the public at large. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, June 11, 1887. SIR: The question presented by your communication of the 3d June instant arises upon the following state of facts: On the 16th November, 1885, the President of the United |